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Abstract
Deflationism about Truth and Meaning
By
Onyoung Oh

Adviser: Professor Paul Horwich
Abstract
The aim of my thesis is to defend a deflationary view of truth and meaning. I characterize
the view as a doctrine holding that truth is a purely logical notion, and truth-theoretic notions
don’t play a serious explanatory role in an account of meaning and content. We use truth-terms
(e.g. ‘true’) everywhere, from the discourse of ordinary conversation to those of the hard science
and morality. The ubiquity of truth-terms gives rise to the impression that truth is a profound
notion playing substantive explanatory roles. This impression, say deflationists, is unduly
inflated—the ubiquity of truth-terms is not a sign of the richness but thinness of the concept of
truth. In my thesis, I aim to defend this view by responding to some of its well-known objections.
To defend a view often involves a modification, which is especially relevant to the case of
deflationism due to the plethora of its variants. I have chosen two variants—Horwich’s and
Field’s—in order to find out what features are to be had by a well-rounded variant of
deflationism. My special interest is on the merits of a deflationary theory of truth as it is applied
to an account of meaning and content. The specifics of each chapter are summarized in the
following.
In chapter 1, I discuss the background of a deflationary theory of truth by examining the
problems with a correspondence theory of truth. I divide a correspondence theory into two kinds:
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a fact-based theory and an object-based theory. As examples of a fact-based correspondence
theory, Russell’s and early Wittgenstein’s theories are given a critical examination. I then turn to
Tarski’s semantic definition of truth. I argue that Tarski’s definition has offered a way to develop
a correspondence theory without invoking a fact or fact-like entity. I argue, however, that even a
correspondence theory of a Tarski-style is vulnerable to a certain problem—the problem raised
by Field. I then turn to reductive/physicalistic theories of reference—Kripke-Putnam’s causal
theory of reference, the information theory, and the teleological theory of representation. By
arguing against each of these theories, I conclude that the prospect of a correspondence theory of
truth is dim. I end this chapter by discussing how the dismal prospect of a correspondence theory
of truth has motivated a deflationary theory of truth.
In chapter 2, I embark upon the core project of my thesis—developing and defending a
deflationary theory of truth and meaning. I devote chapter 2 mainly to the discussion of Field’s
pure disquotational theory of truth. According to this view of truth, the concept of truth is at
bottom purely disquotational. In this chapter, I try to elaborate and clarify the central ideas
underlying this radical version of a deflationary theory of truth. To do so, I focus on some
objections leveled against this view: that it cannot accommodate the modal properties of truth
and logical derivations involving an attribution of truth to sentences that one does not understand.
After criticizing Field’s solutions to these problems, I propose my own solutions.
The topic of chapter 3 is the success argument against a deflationary theory of truth,
according to which a deflationist cannot make sense of the explanatory role of truth in an account
of the success of behavior or theories. In the first half of this chapter, I examine Nic
Damnjanovic’s supervenience/compatibilist objection to deflationism. I argue that a
supervenience approach to truth is incompatible with a deflationary theory of truth. In the second
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half, I discuss Kitcher’s realist objection to deflationism. Drawing upon the role of truth in an
account of the success of scientific theories, Kitcher contends that realism requires a nondeflationary—correspondence—concept of truth. I criticize Kitcher’s argument on the grounds
that it conflates the objectivity requirement with the systematicity requirement. I argue that only
the first is needed to accommodate the role of truth in an account of the success of a scientific
theory.
In chapter 4, I aim to defend a deflationary theory of meaning and content. To this end, I
carry out three projects—first, defending Horwich’s use theory of meaning against Kripke’s
skeptical challenge; second, bringing out the commonalities between Horwich’s and Field’s
views of meaning and content; and third, arguing for Field’s deflationary analysis of the role of
truth-conditions in psychological explanations. More precisely, I try to bring out the core ideas
running through some deflationists’ views of meaning and content such as late Wittgenstein,
Horwich, and Field. By doing so, I aim to explain what it involves to state that truth-theoretic
notions don’t play a central role in an account of meaning and content, which is the main thesis
of Horwich’s and Field’s deflationary views. I end this chapter by defending Field’s view of
truth-conditions—not only truth but also truth-conditions are expressive, not explanatory,
devices aiding generalization.
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I dedicate this dissertation to my late grandparents.
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Introduction

The objective of this dissertation is to examine what a deflationary theory of truth and
meaning is about. The term ‘deflationary’ is now used so abundantly that it may have little
explanatory function—to call a theory ‘deflationary’ may say little about the theory. That said, in
a debate about truth, it has a well-rounded meaning—that truth is a purely logical concept whose
sole purpose is to express generalizations over statements, beliefs, sentences, propositions,
claims or assertions. To take a mundane example, we sometimes wish to express our attitude
toward a belief, claim or proposition, but we find ourselves not being able to articulate the belief,
claim or proposition because we don’t clearly remember it. In such a case, the notion of truth is
handy—by uttering a truth-statement such as

What John said is true,

we can avoid making an infinite conjunction such as

If John believes that snow is white, then snow is white; if John believes that grass is green,
then grass is green; and so on.

To say that truth is a purely logical notion or property is to say that the role of truth is exhausted
by a generalization of this kind.
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An advocate of a deflationary theory of truth defends the deflationary conception of truth
just characterized—that truth is nothing but a logical concept the sole purpose of which is to
express generalizations over beliefs, sentences, or propositions. There are both positive and
negative sides of this theory. The positive side is that if this deflationary concept of truth is
accepted, it should be quite easy to develop an adequate theory of truth—an adequate theory of
truth just needs to explain how the notion of truth has the generalizing function. Thus, a
deflationary theory typically offers a very simple explanation of the concept of truth; for example,
the disquotational schema such as ‘p’ is true iff p or the equivalence schema such as the
proposition that P is true iff P. The negative side of the deflationary conception of truth is that it
doesn’t square well with the time-honored view of truth in western philosophy. The timehonored view is that truth plays important roles in explaining certain aspects of thoughts and
language; for example, the notion of truth plays an important role in explaining the effectiveness
of beliefs in achieving our goals; it plays a central role in explaining the meaning of an
expression and the content of a cognitive state (e.g., a belief or desire state); it plays an important
role in explaining the reasonableness of logical principles; and so on. The notion of truth also
appears in almost all philosophical discussions of importance; for example, the debates such as
whether moral claims can be said to be true, whether we have an access to truths about
unobservable entities, whether there is an objective truth in an absolute sense, etc. Even outside
philosophy, truth is deemed as a serious and preponderant notion; truth is considered as having
an important value (e.g. ‘true friend’, ‘truthful mind’, etc.).
From a deflationist point of view, however, it is merely a misconception to consider the
frequent employment of a truth-term as the sign for truth being a deep philosophical concept
waiting for a substantive analysis. The reason why the notion of truth is invoked so frequently is
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not that truth is a property with a deep nature but that it has the generalization function. Truth
pervades philosophical discussions and ordinary conversations for the same reason that
expressions such as ‘it’ and ‘that’ appear frequently in English language; it is a generalizing
device.
A deflationary theory comes in a wide variety.1 The discussions in this thesis will mainly
be concerned with the ones developed by two contemporary deflationists—Paul Horwich and
Hartry Field. I will defend their views—in particular, I will defend their views by arguing against
some objections raised about them. Given that the notion of truth is invoked in the discussions of
all major philosophical topics, the implication of endorsing a deflationary theory can be
discussed with respect to a wide range of philosophical problems. In discussing Horwich’s and
Field’s deflationary theories, however, I will only be concerned with its application to semantic
problems—the problems of meaning and content. It is undeniable that the notions of truth and
meaning are closely connected. For this reason, it is inevitable that a theory of meaning be
affected by a theory of truth; for example, a theory of meaning presupposing a correspondence
theory of truth is expected to meet certain conditions that are not required when a deflationary
theory is assumed. An aim of this thesis is to examine what a theory of meaning should be like
1

Some of the varieties of deflationary theories of truth are the redundancy (or the disappearance) theories of truth
advocated by Ramsey and Frege; the performative theory of truth formulated by Strawson; the prosentential theory
of truth developed by Belnap, Camp, and Grover; the simple theories of Prior and Williams; the disquotational
theory of truth that can be found in Quine, Tarski, Ayer, and Field; and Horwich’s minimalist or deflationary theory
of truth. See F. Ramsey, “Facts and Propositions,” 1927, in D. H. Mellor, ed., Philosophical Papers. Cambridge
University Press, 1990; G. Frege, “The Fundamental Laws of Arithmetic,” The Monist 25(4), 1915, pp. 481-194,
“The Thought,” 1956, in P. F. Strawson, ed., Philosophical Logic, Oxford University Press, 1973; D. Grover, J.
Camp, N. Nelnap, “The Prosentential Theory of Truth,” Philosophical Studies 27, 1975, pp. 73-125; A. Prior,
Object of Thought, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971; M. Williams, W. V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970; A. Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundation of Semantics,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, 1944, pp. 341-376; A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 2nd ed.,
London: Gollancz, 1946; P. Horwich, Truth, 2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 1999 (1990); H. Field, “The Deflationary
Conception of Truth,” in G. McDonald and C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science, and Value, Oxford; Blackwell, 1986, pp.
55-117 and “Deflationary Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2001.
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when the notion of truth is construed in the deflationary sense. Both Horwich and Field have
advanced their own views of meaning to match their deflationary theories of truth. There are
differences between their views; there seem to be more disagreements in their views of meaning
than there are in their views of truth. My aim, however, isn’t to take sides with one of them; it is
to find some important commonalities between their theories that can help us have an
overarching outlook on a deflationary theory of meaning and truth. More specifically, what I will
argue in each chapter is briefly as follows:
In chapter 1, the background of the deflationary conception of truth will be discussed.
Although a non-deflationary or inflationary theory of truth means any theory that doesn’t
endorse the deflationary conception of truth, a correspondence theory of truth is considered the
major opponent of a deflationary theory of truth. The intuitive appeal of the correspondence
conception of truth is that it is grounded on our basic conception of truth exemplified as follows:

‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white,
or
The proposition that snow is white is true iff snow is white.

Unlike a deflationist, a correspondence theorist attempts to justify this basic conception of truth
by defining truth in terms of a correspondence relation. I will explain why this attempt hasn’t
succeeded by discussing the problems with correspondence theories developed by Russell, the
early Wittgenstein, and Field in his inflationary phase. Field’s criticism of Tarski’s theory of
truth and the problems with reductive theories of reference will be discussed as a way of
criticizing a correspondence theory. I will argue that the problems with a correspondence theory
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and the deflationist view of the role of truth constitute two motivations for a deflationary theory
of truth.
In chapter 2, I will discuss Field’s disquotational theory. During his deflationary phase,
Field has defended a theory called ‘pure disquotationalism’. It is difficult to say what this theory
is in one sentence, because Field has kept changing his view of it. Initially, Field characterized it
as a theory stating that the notion of truth is at bottom purely disquotational, where purely
disquotational truth is characterized as a use-independent notion. It was also characterized as one
that can meaningfully be ascribed only to sentences that one understands. This view, however,
has confronted serious objections one of which is the modal objection, and the other is that it
cannot explain logical derivations involving an ascription of truth to sentences one doesn’t
understand. I shall explain what these objections are, and how Field has responded to them. In
particular, I will argue that his latest response is still short of resolving the problems. I will
propose my own solution to the problems.
In chapter 3, the so-called success argument against a deflationary theory of truth will be
examined. What I mean by ‘the success argument’ is one that argues for a non-deflationary
theory of truth on the basis of the role played by truth in an account of the success of behavior. In
the first of the chapter, I discuss Nic Damnjanovic’s argument according to which a Horwichstyle deflationist theory of truth shows that truth plays a causal-explanatory role in an account of
the success of behavior. To argue for this unusual view, Damnjanovic invokes Jackson and
Pettit’s program explanation of a mental property (a sort of supervenience theory of a mental
property). I argue against Damnjanovic’s view on the grounds that Jackson and Pettit’s program
explanation cannot be applied to the deflationary conception of truth. In the second half of this
chapter, I discuss Kitcher’s argument according to which scientific realism requires a
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correspondence theory of truth. In defending this view, Kitcher appeals to the success
argument—that a deflationary theory of truth cannot make sense of the role played by truth in an
account of the success of a scientific theory. On Kitcher’s view, a deflationary theory isn’t
neutral between scientific realism and scientific anti-realism, because a deflationist cannot make
sense of the role played by truth in an account of the success of a scientific theory. I argue
against Kitcher—I argue that Kitcher’s demand for an account of systematic success is
orthogonal to explaining the role of truth in an account of the success of a scientific theory.
Kitcher assumes that the success of all scientific theories can and should be explained by a small
number of basic principles. Kitcher then argues that a deflationist cannot explain the systematic
success. I argue, however, that a deflationist doesn’t have to explain systematic success in order
to make sense of the role played by truth in an account of the success of a scientific theory.
In chapter 4, I discuss deflationary theories of meaning advanced by Horwich and
Field—Horwich’s use theory of meaning and Field’s linguistic view of meaning attributions.
Both Horwich and Field defend theories of meaning in which truth-theoretic notions don’t play
important roles. Applying what he calls ‘the deflationary spirit’ to an account of meaning,
Horwich aims to show that skepticism about a theory of meaning is largely due to “pseudoconstraints” imposed on an adequate theory of meaning. I shall concentrate on two of the six
pseudo-constraints discussed by Horwich—the relationality and representation constraints.
Horwich’s treatment of these constraints shows a way in which a theory of meaning becomes
free of misconstrued presupposition by having the deflationary concept of truth. To make the
point vivid, I discuss Horwich’s solution to Kripke’s skeptical argument against Wittgenstein’s
use theory of meaning. In the second part of this chapter, I compare Horwich’s deflationary
theory of meaning with Field’s. I compare their theories with respect to two issues—the issues
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about meaning-entities and a fact of the matter by virtue of which a meaning-attribution is true.
Viewed superficially, their theories of meaning are opposed to each other with respect to these
issues. I will argue, however, that important similarities are hidden under superficial differences.
By arguing for the hidden similarities between Horwich’s and Field’s theories of meaning, I
intend to find some core ideas that can characterize a deflationary theory of meaning and content.
In the last part of this chapter, I examine Field’s response to the success argument. Field’s
response to the success argument is different from Horwich’s in that it is more concentrated on
the role of truth conditions than that of truth in an account of the success of behavior. I will argue
that the moral to be drawn from Field’s response to the success argument is that not only truth
but also truth conditions are to be construed as purely expressive devices in a deflationary theory
of truth and meaning.
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Chapter1. The Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Motivations for Deflationism

1.1 The Correspondence Theory of Truth
The topic of this section and the section following it is the correspondence theory of truth. The
purpose of discussing the correspondence theory isn’t, however, to examine the features and
prospect of the theory per se; it is to explain the transition from the correspondence theory to the
deflationary theory of truth. To do so, I will concentrate on some of the objections raised of the
correspondence theory. I have a very modest ambition in carrying out this task. As with any
theory of truth, the correspondence theory of truth is based on the correspondence concept of
truth: the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality. Presumably, this concept of truth is the
very one that ordinary people associate with ‘is true’. As a result, numerous accounts have been
proposed to clarify and systematize the correspondence concept of truth. Due to the lack of
knowledge and space, it is impossible for me to go over all the different theories of
correspondence truth. In the following, I will discuss only some of the most often-discussed
versions of the correspondence theory of truth and their problems.
In order to avoid an unnecessary confusion, I will first clarify the meaning of the
‘correspondence concept’ of truth. To say that truth is a correspondence notion doesn’t just mean
that the notion of truth is closely related to the notion of reality. As Horwich points out, no one—
including the deflationist—denies that the proposition that snow is white is true because snow is
white.2 Kunne makes a similar point; he says, “[Y]ou do not become a partisan of a

2

Horwich distinguishes the correspondence intuition from the correspondence theory of truth. By ‘correspondence
intuition’ he means the sentiment that statements owe their truth to the nature of reality. The correspondence theory
of truth is based on this correspondence intuition, but it must go far beyond merely accommodating this intuition.
Most of all, the correspondence theory of truth—if it is to be called a ‘theory’—must define truth by invoking the
correspondence intuition. The difference is huge. When we say that the ordinary notion of truth accommodates the
correspondence intuition, it doesn’t necessarily imply that the correspondence intuition is built into the definition of
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correspondence conception of truth simply by assenting to the slogan that what somebody
thought or said is true if and only if it agrees with reality.”3 According to Kunne, one becomes a
partisan of a correspondence conception by taking the truth predicate ‘is true’ as expressing a
relational property; i.e., a seriously dyadic relation.4 Put more precisely, to say that truth is to be
understood as a correspondence notion is to say that a sentence of the form ‘x is true’ is to be
understood in the way a sentence such as ‘Mary loves a musician’ is understood. From ‘Mary
loves a musician’, we can infer ‘There is someone in the world whom Mary loves’. Similarly, to
accept the correspondence theory of truth—to construe truth as a correspondence notion—
implies that we should be able to infer, from a truth sentence of the form ‘x is true’, a sentence
of the form ‘There is something in the world which x corresponds to’.
There is a wide variety of truth-bearers; the truth predicate can be applied to sentences,
utterances, statements, propositions, beliefs, assertions, and so forth. Therefore, in discussing a
theory of truth, it is important to specify what the truth predicate is primarily ascribed to. In this
thesis, I will assume that the truth predicate is primarily ascribed to a sentence or sentence-like
entity. The reason is heuristic. First, the version of the correspondence theory that will be
discussed below is mainly characterized as a theory of truth for sentences. Second, two
deflationists whose theories I will concentrate on—Horwich and Field—disagree on this very
issue.5 While Horwich takes propositions as primary truth-bearers, Field objects to characterizing
the deflationary theory of truth as a theory of truth for propositions. Given that there is such a
truth. It only means that there is room for making sense of the correspondence intuition. To say that truth is defined
in terms of correspondence notion is to say that truth is a correspondence property. There will be more discussion on
this point later in this chapter. See P. Horwich, Truth, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1998, Ch. 1 and Ch. 7.
3
W. Kunene, Conceptions of Truth, Oxford University Press, 2003, Ch. 3.
4
By ‘seriously dyadic relation’, Kunene means a property that obtains two objects or entities in the world. Kunne
says that from ‘Bell fell into oblivion’, nobody would seriously conclude ‘There is something into which Bell fell’.
But from ‘Mary loves a psychopath’, we conclude ‘There is someone whom Mary loves’. So, ‘love’ expresses a
seriously dyadic relation. See W. Kunne, ibid.
5

See H. Field, “Critical Notice: Paul Horwich’s Truth,” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 59, No. 2, 1992.
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disagreement, it is better to characterize a theory of truth for an entity that both deflationists can
accept. Moreover, ‘proposition’ is a term of art—it is a term that is introduced to do a specific
job.6 As such, there is a disagreement among philosophers about how ‘proposition’ is to be
understood.7 To avoid being tangled into such a complicated issue from the beginning, I decided
to take sentences or sentence-like entities as the primary truth-bearers. So, in the following, I will
apply the correspondence theory to sentences, not to propositions.
Since there are many varieties of the correspondence theory, let’s begin with the idea that
all the correspondence theories are committed to. 8As was mentioned above, the correspondence
theorist construes ‘is true’ as expressing a seriously dyadic relation. In this sense, in the
correspondence theory, the logical form of a truth-statement of the form 1)

1) x is a true sentence

is 2) below:

2) True (x, y).

‘True’ here expresses a two-place, correspondence relation. So, 2) should be in turn understood
in terms of 3) in the following:

3) Corresponds (x, y).

6

See S. Schiffer, The Things We Mean, Oxford University Press, 2003, Ch.1.
See S. Schiffer, ibid.
8
See W. Kunne, Conceptions of Truth, Oxford University Press, 2003, Ch. 3 (“Varieties of Correspondence”).
7
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Two questions arise immediately. First, what substitutes for ‘y’ in 3)? Put differently, what is the
relatum of the correspondence relation? According to the correspondence theory, to say that a
sentence is true is to say that there is something that the sentence corresponds to. What is the
thing that a true sentence corresponds to? Second, what does it mean to say that a true sentence
corresponds to something? What is the nature of the correspondence relation? An acceptable
correspondence theory must address both of these questions. In the following I will examine how
and whether these questions can be answered by the correspondence theory.
Let’s first deal with the question of the relatum of the correspondence relation; what does a true
sentence correspond to? Broadly, correspondence theorists have been trying to answer this
question in one of the following two ways: one is that the relatum of the correspondence relation
is a fact (or fact-like entity), and the other is it is an object.9 Following Kunne, I will call the first
‘the fact-based correspondence theory’ and the latter ‘the object-based correspondence theory’.10
According to Kunne, the object-based correspondence theory has a much longer history;
basically, most correspondence theories developed before the 20 century should be considered
object-based correspondence theories.11 In the following, I will ignore the traditional, objectbased correspondence theory, and focus on the fact-based correspondence theory developed by
the 20century philosophers. That said, it is not necessary that a correspondence theory invoke
fact-like entities. As will be explained later, Tarski’s definition of truth provides a way of
developing a correspondence theory of truth without invoking fact-like entities.

9

This categorization is not mine; I referred to Kunne’s Conceptions of Truth. I found this categorization very helpful
to have a better understanding of a correspondence theory of truth. Marian David also makes this distinction in “The
Correspondence Theory of Truth,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2002/2009. But David didn’t make this
distinction in his Correspondence and Disquotation, Oxford University Press, 1994.
10
W. Kunne, ibid.
11
See W. Kunne, ibid. Also see Marian David, “The Correspondence Theory of Truth,” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, 2002/2009. Some exceptions are (according to Kunne and David) correspondence conceptions of truth
entertained by Aristotle, Hume, and Mill. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1749),
and J. S. Mill, System of Logic (1843).
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1.1 Fact-Based Correspondence Theories: Russell and Wittgenstein
According to the fact-based correspondence theory, to say that a sentence is true is to say that it
corresponds to a fact. This theory was proposed by some of the most prominent philosophers in
the early 20th century; e.g. Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein.12 In particular, Russell and
Wittgenstein developed the fact-based correspondence theory in carrying out their bigger
philosophical project: logical atomism. 13 Put roughly, logical atomism is the idea that the world
at its most fundamental level is constituted by simple entities (logical atoms), and these simple
entities form complex entities.14 The notion of a fact figures prominently in the formulation of
this idea. Although Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s theories have a lot in common, there are some
important differences between them. One of the differences is that while Russell’s theory mainly
appeals to the notion of a fact, Wittgenstein’s appeals to the notion of a state of affairs as well as
the notion of a fact. So, in the following I will consider Russell’s theory is best captured by the
formulation (CF) while Wittgenstein’s by the formulation (CS):
12

B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” The Monist, 1918, Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University
Press,1912, “On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean,” Proceedings from Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 2, 1919. pp. 1-43, “On the Nature of Truth”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
7: 28-49, 1906; G. E. Moore, “Truth and Falsity,” in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 1901-2,
reprinted in: Selected Writings, edited by T. Baldwin. London and New York: Routledge 1993, 20-22; L.
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logic-Philosophicus, trans., by Pears and McGuinness, side-by-side-by-side edition, version
0.24 (August 1, 2011).
13
G. E. Moore subscribed to the identity theory (in “Truth and Falsity”, although it is said that he later repudiated
it). The identity theory of truth is considered an opponent of the correspondence theory of truth (Moore writes it that
way in “Truth and Falsity”). Contemporary advocates of the identity theory of truth include J. Hornsby and J. Dodd.
See J. Hornsby, ‘Truth: The Identity Theory’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XCVII: 1–24, 1997; reprinted
in M. Lynch, ed., The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT
Press, 2001, pp. 663–81.
14
Russell says that the goal of philosophical analysis is to arrive at logical, not physical, atoms. This makes it
difficult to understand the metaphysics of logical atomism; what does it mean to say that the world is constituted of
logical, not physical, atoms? What underlies this peculiar metaphysics of logical atomism is Russell’s (and
Wittgenstein’s) naïve representationalism (as I call it). Russell believed that the logical structure of an ideal
language represents the logical structure of the world. This is a suspicious idea for many reasons. First, there is no
reason to believe that a linguistic analysis can reveal the true, metaphysical, nature of the world. Second, it is not
clear what is meant by ‘the logical structure of the world’. See B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,”
The Monist, 1918.
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(CF) x is a true sentence =Df there is some fact y such that x corresponds to y;
x is a false sentence =Df there is no fact y such that x corresponds to y.

(CS) x is a true sentence =Df there is some state of affairs y such that x corresponds to y and
y obtains.
x is a false sentence =Df there is some state of affairs y such that x corresponds to y and
y doesn’t obtain.

I will discuss Russell’s theory first, and then turn to Wittgenstein’s.
1.1.1 Russell’s Correspondence Theory of Truth
According to Russell, the relatum of the correspondence relation is a fact; that is to say, a true
sentence corresponds to a fact, but a false sentence doesn’t. Russell also says that a fact is what
makes a sentence (proposition) true or false; in other words, a fact is a truth-maker.15 But what is
a fact? What is the ontological or metaphysical nature of a fact? How many different kinds of
fact are there? On what grounds can we distinguish one fact from another? Russell never
provided satisfactory answers to these questions. So, one of the major problems with Russell’s
fact-based correspondence theory is that the nature of a fact is entirely obscure. To see why let’s
first examine what Russell himself says of the nature of a fact. According to Russell, a fact is a
complex entity constituted of simpler entities; Russell says, “I mean by a “fact” anything that is
15

See B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1912, Ch. 12 “Truth and Falsehood”.
As is well known, Russell kept changing his philosophical views throughout his career. His views of a proposition
often shift as well. Indeed, it seems that Russell is simply careless in his use of this term. He sometimes identifies a
proposition with a fact (B. Russell, “On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean,” Proceedings from
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 2, 1919, pp. 1-43). At other times (“The Philosophy of Logical
Atomism,” The Monist, 1918) he simply means an indicative sentence by a ‘proposition’. I here follow the second
meaning of Russell’s notion of a proposition.
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complex.”16 But of course this explanation is far too thin to individuate facts; i.e., to distinguish
one fact from another. Without having identity criteria for facts, it is entirely vacuous to say that
a sentence is true or false by virtue of corresponding to a fact. In order for the notion of a fact is
to be of explanatory value, we should be able to identify the fact that a given sentence is
supposed to correspond to. As was mentioned earlier, if truth is a correspondence relation, a
truth-statement of the form ‘x is true’ should be understood on the par with a statement such as
‘Mary loves Tom’. Suppose we have no idea how to distinguish Tom from other people. We
would not be able to determine whether Mary loves Tom or not; in other words, we cannot say
whether the loving-relation holds between Mary and Tom. Similarly, if the notion of a fact is to
be of an explanatory value, we need know how to distinguish one fact from another; we need
identity criteria for facts.
Unfortunately, Russell never provides a proper account of the identity criteria for facts. Indeed,
Russell’s explanation of facts is so confusing that it makes us doubt whether it is beneficial to
invoke the notion of facts in defining the truth and falsity of a sentence. A place to see the
confusion is Russell’s explanation of a negative fact. According to Russell, facts of the
rudimentary kind are atomic facts, where atomic facts are defined as the ones constituted of an nplace relation and n particulars. Russell says that atomic facts are those “contain only one verb
and neither generality nor its denial.”17 Atomic facts, however, are of two varieties: positive and
negative. It is relatively easy to understand what positive atomic facts are, but it is by no means
easy to understand what negative atomic facts are.18 He sometimes says that a negative fact is
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B. Russell, “On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean,” p. 1.
B. Russell, ibid., p.3.
18
There are, however, unsettled questions about positive atomic facts as well. First, according to Russell, ordinary
proper names are not logically proper names; they are disguised definite descriptions. But if ordinary proper names
are not names, what should count logically proper names? Only expressions that cannot further be analyzed into
other expressions—for example, ‘this’ or ‘that’—may count logically proper names. But in such a case how are to
17
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what a true negative sentence corresponds; for example, ‘Socrates isn’t alive’ corresponds to the
negative fact that Socrates isn’t alive. But what is this negative fact? What is it constituted of?
Since Russell denies that there is something in the world that corresponds to ‘not’, this negative
fact is constituted of Socrates and the property being alive. But then, how does this negative fact
differ from the positive fact that Socrates is alive? Is the negative fact that Socrates isn’t alive the
same as the fact that Socrates is dead?19 At other times, Russell invokes a negative fact in order
to explain the falsity of an atomic sentence; for example, ‘Socrates is alive’ is false because it
corresponds to the negative fact that there isn’t such a fact that Socrates is alive.20
When things are this complicated, we may need to suspect the plausibility of the basic
assumption; in this case, the assumption is that a fact is what makes a sentence true or false.
Does the notion of a fact do any explanatory work in an explanation of the truth and falsity of a
sentence? Aren’t we (as Quine once complained) just projecting a fact from a true sentence
merely for the sake of correspondence?21 The murkiness surrounding Russell’s notion of a
negative fact supports this suspicion. Another factor contributing to this suspicion is that Russell
invokes a general fact to explain the truth of a general sentence.22 Russell’s argument for
invoking a general fact is that the truth of ‘All men are mortal’ cannot be inferred from the truth
of each and every sentence such as ‘Socrates is mortal’, ‘Plato is mortal’, and so on. This claim
determine the fact that an atomic sentence corresponds to? If we have to appeal to “direct acquaintance”, most facts
would be beyond our reach. Another problem is that it is not clear how far in space and time we should extend the
range of positive atomic facts. Do facts include facts in the past and future? Do facts include those in a possible or
counterfactual world?
19
Russell says that the sentence ‘Socrates is dead’ is the conjunction of ‘Socrates was alive’ and ‘Socrates isn’t alive
now.’ But this answer isn’t satisfactory, since we have another negative sentence ‘Socrates isn’t alive’. See B.
Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.”
20
Russell says, “[T]he absence of a fact is itself a negative fact.” See B. Russell, “On Propositions: What They Are
and How They Mean,” p.5.
21
W. V. Quine, Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1987, p. 213.
22
See B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”. It seems, however, that Russell changed his view of
negative and general facts later. There are also disagreements among Russell’s commentators. Some say that Russell
accepted the existence of molecular facts as well (see “B. Russell”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
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is true in itself. But what reasons do we have to infer from this the conclusion that there is a
general fact such as the fact that all men are mortal? We have no reason other than the questionbegging one that a true sentence corresponds to a fact. If we accept Russell’s fact-based
correspondence theory, we have to invoke facts of many different kinds to explain the truth of
sentences. For example, we need to invoke mathematical facts in order to explain the truth of
mathematical sentences; we need to invoke moral facts in order to explain the truth of moral
sentences; we have to invoke aesthetic facts in order to explain the truth of aesthetic sentences;
and so on.23 Indeed, we have to keep invoking a fact of a new kind whenever we confront a nontruth-functional compound sentence; i.e., a sentence of which the truth isn’t the function of the
truth of its constituent sentences. Russell denies that there is a molecular fact (such as a
disjunctive or conjunctive fact) because the truth of a disjunctive or conjunctive sentence can be
explained in terms of the truth of its constituents. But there are many molecular (compound)
sentences that are not truth-functional; for example, modal sentences, counterfactual sentences,
belief-sentences, and so forth. Does that mean we have to invoke modal facts, counterfactual
facts, belief-facts, and so forth? We may do so, but what explanatory gain is accrued if we do so?
Does invoking facts explain the truth of sentences at all?
The answer seems no, because we have no clear idea of how these facts make relevant sentences
true. While we don’t have any clear idea of what facts are, it is impossible to comprehend how
facts make sentences true. If facts come in such a wide variety of ways—negative, general,
mathematical, moral, counterfactual, etc.—then facts cannot be spatio-temporal entities. As

23

Russell says that there are mathematical facts (See B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” Lecture 1,
The Monist, 1918). I don’t know whether Russell acknowledged the existence of ethical and aesthetic facts.
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Kunne says, facts, if they exist, should be abstract entities.24 But if facts are abstract entities, in
what sense do facts make sentences true? In what sense do mathematical facts make
mathematical sentences true? Similar questions should be raised about facts of other kinds. In
this way, the problem concerned with the nature of facts gives rise to another major problem
with the correspondence theory; how sentences and facts are related to each other. Before
discussing this problem, however, I would like to examine another type of the fact-based
correspondence theory: the one that defines truth along the lines of (CS).25,26
1.1.2 Wittgenstein’s Correspondence Theory of Truth
According to Wittgenstein—who may be the first defining truth along the lines of (CS)—an
atomic sentence represents a state of affairs, and the atomic sentence is true if and only if the
state of affairs actually obtains in the world.27 A state of affairs that actually obtains (or exists) in
the world is defined as a fact. So, like (CF), (CS) defines truth in terms of correspondence to a
fact. Unlike (CF) however, (CS) invokes the notion of a state of affairs. By invoking this
additional notion, (CS) earns some advantages over (CF). One of the advantages is that (CS) has
a better grip on falsehood than (CF); (CS) provides a simpler way of defining falsehood.28
According to (CF), falsehood is a lack of correspondence to a fact, and this, according to Kunne,
24
25

W. Kunne, ibid., p. 144.
For readers’ convenience, I here reiterate (CS):

(CS) x is true =Df there is some state of affairs y such that x corresponds to y and y obtains.
false =Df there is some state of affairs y such that x corresponds to y and y doesn’t obtain.
26

x is

It may be better to call (CS) ‘the state-affairs-based correspondence theory’ in order to distinguish it from (CF). I
may use the label in discussing Wittgenstein’s version of the correspondence theory of truth.
27
Wittgenstein doesn’t explain what he means by ‘a state of affairs that obtains.’ The only account he gives is that a
fact, by definition, is a state of affairs that exists. See L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, first
published by Kegan Paul (London)1922. I referred to Pears/McGuinness English translation; Side-by-side-by-side
edition, version 0.24 (August 1, 2011).
28
I referred to Marian David (Correspondence and Disquotation) on this point. But the argument presented below
isn’t from David. His reason is that (CS), unlike (CF), can define truth as well as falsehood as relations to reality,
where truth is a relation to those parts of reality that we refer to as facts. See Marian David, Correspondence and
Disquotation, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.34.
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means that a false sentence is in a discordance-relation with the same fact that a true sentence
corresponds to:
Russell maintains that not only true sentences, but also false ones correspond to facts.
In the case of ‘Socrates is dead’ the correspondence is accordance with the fact that Socrates is
dead, in the case of ‘Socrates is not dead’ it is discordance with the same fact. (For Russell in
1918 the difference between a true belief and a false belief isn’t like that between a wife and a
spinster but like that between friend and foe—of the same person.)29

But then, we would have to map even a false sentence onto a fact; even a false sentence is related
to a fact, where the nature of the relation is explained in terms of “discordance”. An obvious
problem with this definition of falsehood is that it cries for an explanation of the nature of a
discordance relation. What does it mean to say that a sentence is in discordance relation with a
fact? While we don’t have a clear understanding of what is meant by “correspondence relation”,
it is even harder to understand what is meant by “discordance relation”. By defining falsehood in
this way, Russell added another obscurity to an already obscure situation. To see how hopeless
the situation is, let’s consider a sentence such as ‘Madonna is 7 feet tall’. We know that this
sentence is false. But what fact does this sentence is in discordance with? We cannot say that this
sentence is in discordance with the fact that Madonna is 7 feet tall, because there is no such fact
that Madonna is 7 feet tall. Presumably, the most plausible answer is that the sentence ‘Madonna
is 7 feet tall’ is false because it is in discordance with the fact that Madonna is ___ feet tall,
where the blank is to be filled by her exact height. But we may not know here exact height
whereas we know that the sentence is false.
Wittgenstein’s correspondence theory averts this problem by defining truth and falsehoold in the
manner of (CS):
29

W. Kunne, Conceptions of Truth, pp.118-119.
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(CS) x is a true sentence =Df there is some state of affairs y such that x corresponds to y and
y obtains.
x is a false sentence =Df there is some state of affairs y such that x corresponds to y and
y doesn’t obtain.

According to Wittgenstein’s correspondence theory, even a false sentence represents a state of
affairs, but the state of affairs represented by a false sentence doesn’t obtain (or exist) in this
world. Hence, if we define falsehood along the lines of (CS), we don’t have to map a false
sentence onto a fact; we don’t have to invoke a fact in order to define a false sentence. Instead,
we can define a false sentence as a sentence that represents a possible condition that isn’t
actualized in the world.30 Besides, (CS) explains how a false sentence can still be meaningful
although it doesn’t correspond to a fact. Consider the following remark made by Russell:
[T]he components of the fact which makes a proposition true or false, as the case may be, are the
meanings of the symbols which we must understand in order to understand the proposition.31

What Russell is saying here is that the meaning of an atomic sentence is the fact that the sentence
corresponds to.32 So, if an atomic sentence doesn’t correspond to a fact, the atomic sentence is

30

It seems that Wittgenstein states of affairs are possible situations in which the basic constituents of this word are
combined in ways that are different from the way they are combined in this world. Facts are just small parts of all
possible situations. But then, Wittgenstein’s states of affairs may be construed as possible worlds of a certain kind;
possible worlds that are composed of the same basic ingredients constituting the actual world. The actual world
differs from possible worlds not in terms of its basic ingredients but in terms of the ways in which those basic
ingredients are combined.
31
B. Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism: Lecture 2,” The Monist, 1918. Russell says that the only
exception is a logical constant.
32
Russell’s theory of meaning and reference is based on the principle of compositionality; the meaning and
reference of a complex expression is determined by the meanings and references of the symbols that constitute the
complex expression. The compositionality principle holds not only at the level of a language but also at the level of
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meaningless. But atomic sentences can be false as well as true. Therefore, in order to make sense
of the meaningfulness of a false atomic sentence, Russell had to relate such a sentence with a fact
of some sort; e.g. a negative fact.
A major advancement of Wittgenstein’s correspondence theory over Russell’s theory is
that Wittgenstein doesn’t invoke a fact to explain the meaningfulness of an atomic sentence.
What makes an atomic (simple) sentence meaningful isn’t a fact but a state of affairs that is
represented by it Indeed, Wittgenstein defines the notion of a state of affairs as the meaning of
an atomic sentence. Wittgenstein says:
2.201 A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it represents.
2.202 A picture represents a possible situation in logical space.
.
2.221 What a picture represents is its sense.33

A picture here is an atomic sentence, and the possibility of the situation is the existence or nonexistence of the state of affairs represented by an atomic sentence. According to Wittgenstein, an
atomic sentence, like a picture, comes to have a meaning by representing a state of affairs. So,
the state of affairs represented by an atomic sentence is the meaning of the atomic sentence.
What constitutes a state of affairs, however, isn’t something like a Fregean sense; i.e., an
intensional entity such as a mode of presentation or way of thinking of an object. Rather, it is an
extensional entity such as the referent of a name and the property (or class) determined by a
predicate. For example, an atomic sentence such as ‘Madonna is a dog’ represents a state of
affairs that is constituted of Madonna and the property doghood (or the class of dogs). So, if a

reality. In other words, a fact is a complex entity, and it is constituted of entities to which simple symbols
correspond. From these, we can infer that a fact is the meaning of an atomic sentence to which it corresponds.
33
What Wittgenstein means by ‘picture’, of course, is an atomic sentence. See L. Wittgenstein, ibid.
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state of affairs is the meaning of an atomic sentence, it should be a meaning of a particular kind;
the meaning that constitutes the truth condition of an atomic sentence. According to Wittgenstein,
an atomic sentence represents a possible situation—state of affairs—and the atomic sentence is
true if and only if the possible situation obtains. So, the state of affairs represented by an atomic
sentence is the condition to be met in order for the sentence to be true; i.e., a truth-condition. If
we put this together with what was stated in the previous paragraph—that a state of affairs is the
meaning of an atomic sentence—we arrive at the conclusion that a state of affairs in Wittgenstein
in Tractatus is both the meaning and the truth condition of an atomic sentence.
One may consider it an advantage that Wittgenstein’s notion of a state of affairs has this
double function. The fact of the matter, however, is just the opposite; it makes identity criteria
for states of affairs impossible. To see why let’s consider a pair of sentences involving coreferential singular terms such as ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’.34 Do ‘Superman flies’ and
‘Clark Kent flies’ represent the same state of affairs or not? On the one hand, it seems they
should represent the same state of affairs, since states of affairs, according to Wittgenstein, are
the truth conditions of atomic sentences. ‘Superman flies’ and ‘Clark Kent flies’ must have the
same truth condition, since ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ are co-referential singular terms.
A state of affairs, however, is also the meaning of an atomic sentence. Do ‘Superman flies’ and
‘Clark Kent flies’ have the same meaning? By almost any standard, the correct answer should be
‘No.’ I said “almost” because some philosophers insist that the meaning of a singular term is
simply its reference and the meaning of a predicate the extension it is true of.35 But as is argued

34

Let’s here assume, for the sake of argument, that ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ are not fictional but real names.
The advocates of the so-called ‘direct-reference view of proper names’ (e.g. Soames and Nathan Salmon) are of
this view. According to the direct-reference view of proper names, the semantic content of a proper name is simply
its referent, and the semantic content of a sentence containing a proper name is simply a Russellian proposition—a
proposition composed of n-objects and an n-place property. Russell advocated this view, hence the name ‘Russellian
35
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by Devitt, the meaning of an expression should be a property that is concerned with causing
behavior.36 ‘Superman flies’ and ‘Clark Kent flies’ can cause vastly different behavior; for
example, Lois Lane assents to the former, but dissents to the latter. So, if a state of affairs is the
meaning of an atomic sentence, these sentences must represent distinct states of affairs.
Thus, we are split between two mutually incompatible identity criteria for states of affairs;
one is that a state of affairs is the truth condition of an atomic sentence, and the other is that it is
the meaning of an atomic sentence. It seems that we cannot keep both. To be sure, the truthcondition of a sentence is part of the meaning of the sentence. The problem with Wittgenstein’s
notion of a state of affairs, however, is that a state of affairs is identified with the meaning of a
sentence; it is as a whole the meaning of a sentence. This makes it impossible to sustain the
notion of a state of affairs as it is characterized by Wittgenstein. The notion of a state of affairs in
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is supposed to be both an extensional and an intensional entity at the
same time, but this doesn’t seem a viable idea. Something has to be given up, and what needs to
be given up is the idea that the state of affairs represented by an indicative sentence is as a whole
the meaning of the sentence. Instead, a state of affairs needs to be characterized as an entity that
encapsulates only the truth condition of an indicative sentence, and a representational relation

proposition’. Wittgenstein also advocated this view. It should be noted, however, that Russell and Wittgenstein
didn’t consider most proper names in ordinary language proper names in a strict, logical, sense. See M. Devitt, “Still
Against Direct Reference,” in Prospects for Meaning, ed., R. Schantz, Berlin” Walter de Gruyter, 2010.
36
According to Devitt, a semantic property—meaning—should be a property of an expression that plays the
following two roles: explaining behavior and guiding us to reality. Devitt defends himself a truth-referential or
representational view of semantic content—the view that the semantic content of an expression is entirely
constituted by representational properties. But Devitt’s view is different from the direct-reference view of a proper
name. According to Devitt, the semantic content of a name is a property of referring to an object under a specific
mode. See M. Devitt, ibid.
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needs to be characterized in a purely truth-conditional way as well. Contemporary advocates of a
state of affairs seem to accept this modified Wittgensteinian notion of a state of affairs.37
So, let’s recast Wittgenstein’s correspondence theory of truth using this modified notion
of a state of affairs. On this modified theory, a true sentence is still defined as a sentence that
represents a state of affairs that exists in the world. But the state of affairs that is represented by a
sentence doesn’t exhaust the meaning of the sentence; it is simply an entity that encapsulates the
truth condition of the sentence. But even in this modified sense, Wittgenstein’s theory has
problems. First, a state of affairs is still an ontologically dubious entity. Let’s reconsider the
sentence ‘Madonna is 7 feet tall’. According to Wittgenstein’s theory, this sentence is false
because it represents the state of affairs that Madonna is 7 feet tall, and this state of affairs
doesn’t exist in the world. But what is the state of affairs that Madonna is 7 feet tall? It is one
thing to say that the sentence ‘Madonna is 7 feet tall’ has as its truth condition that Madonna is 7
feet tall, and another to say that the sentence represents the state of affairs that Madonna is 7 feet
tall. According to Wittgenstein’s correspondence theory, we have to understand the first (the
truth condition of the sentence) in terms of the second (the state of affairs represented by the
sentence). But what do we gain by doing so? Instead of gaining anything, we only seem to create
unnecessary problems. This raises the suspicion that a state of affairs—just like a fact—is a
theoretically vacuous notion; i.e., a notion that doesn’t do any explanatory work.
The second problem with the Wittgensteinian correspondence theory is derivative of the
first problem. Given that the ontological status of a state of affairs is obscure, it is hard to explain
37

For example, according to the view that defines a state of affairs as a state of a possible world, the state of affairs
that Madonna is 7 feet tall is true if and only if there is a possible world in which Madonna is 7 feet tall. When a
state of affairs is defined this way, it has only a minimal connection with the meaning of a sentence; that is, if two
sentences have the same meaning, then they should represent the same state of affairs. On the possible world
account of states of affairs, a state of affairs is a conceptual apparatus that is employed to specify the truth condition
of a sentence involving modality.
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the nature of the representational relation between a sentence and a state of affairs. Wittgenstein
avoided addressing this question entirely by saying that language can only show, but cannot say,
how it represents the world. This is a quite an implausible idea which is based on an incorrect
analogy between a picture and a language. In order to explain the representational relation
between a sentence and a state of affairs, it is essential to define it recursively in terms of the
representational relations between the constituents of a sentence and the constituents of a state of
affairs. But even this is not enough, since a state of affairs isn’t simply a conglomeration of
entities; it is supposed to have a structure. For example, the state of affairs that Tom loves Mary
is supposed to be distinct from the state of affairs that Mary loves Tom. Moreover, a state of
affairs isn’t necessarily part of the actual world; if it were, it couldn’t be distinguished from a
fact. This makes it even harder to explain the nature of the representational relation between a
sentence and a state of affairs. Without an account of the nature of the representational relation,
the nature of the correspondence relation couldn’t be explained. That means the Wittgensteinian
correspondence theory would have a hard time in explaining the nature of the correspondence
relation. So, for the life of the correspondence theory, it would be better to advance the theory
without invoking an entity such as a fact or state of affairs. In the next section, I will explain how
Tarski’s definition of truth shed light on that idea.

1.2 Field’s Criticism of Tarski’s Theory of Truth
The purpose of this section is to motivate the motivation for the deflationary theory of truth. As
will be discussed in the next section, one of the chief motivations for the deflationary theory is
that there is a serious problem with the correspondence theory of truth. In explaining what this
problem is, it is essential to discuss Field’s criticism of Tarski’s theory of truth. The reason isn’t
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so much that Tarski’s theory of truth is in itself a correspondence theory of truth. As is well
known, there have been many controversies whether Tarski really intended to give a
correspondence theory of truth with his definition of truth.38 The merit of Tarski’s theory of truth,
however, seems that it is neutral between the correspondence theory and the deflationary theory.
Being neutral, it has an affinity both with the deflationary theory and the correspondence theory.
In this section, I will mostly focus on its affinity with the correspondence theory of truth. More
precisely, I will focus on how the technique employed in Tarski’s definition of truth can be of
use to develop the correspondence theory of truth that is free from the problems with the factbased correspondence theory. Field’s criticism of Tarski’s theory needs to be appreciated from
that perspective as well; namely, from the perspective of the correspondence theory of truth
developed out of Tarski’s definition of truth.39
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Popper, Gila Sher, and the earlier Davidson understand Tarski’s definition of truth as a version of the
correspondence theory of truth. Soames, the later Davidson, Etchemendy, and many others, however, don’t think
that there is any interesting connection between Tarski’s definition of truth and the correspondence theory of truth.
In my view, Devitt’s understanding of Tarski’s definition of truth seems most adequate: although Tarski intended his
theory to be a version of the correspondence theory, the theory that he actually presented is more like a version of
the deflationary theory of truth. See K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge, London, 1963, G. Sher
“On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth”, Synthese 117, 1998, H. Putnam, “A Comparison of
Something with Something Else”, New Literary History17: 61-79, 1985, S. Soames, “What is a Theory of Truth?”,
Journal of Philosophy 81, 411-429, 1984, S. Soames, Understanding Truth, Oxford University Press, New York,
1999, J. Etchemendy, “Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 53,51-79, 1989, M.
Devitt, “The Metaphysics of Truth,” in The Nature of Truth, ed. Michael Lynch, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001,
579-61.
39
As for the references for Tarski’s own work, I referred to A. Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the
Foundation of Semantics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, 1944; “The Concept of Truth in
Formalized Languages,” Logic, Semantics, and Metamathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956; and “The
Establishment of Scientific Semantics,” Logic, Semantics, and Metamathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. I
also referred to secondary sources; S. Soames, ‘What is a Theory of Truth?’ The Journal Of Philosophy, Vol. 80.
No. 8. 1984: 411-429, Understanding Truth. Oxford University Press, 1998; J. McDowell, ‘Physicalism and
Primitive Denotation: Field on Tarski’. Erkenntnis Vol. 13. 1978: 131-152; H. Putnam, ‘A Comparison of
Something with Something Else’. New Literary History17, 1985: 61-79; G. Sher, ‘What is Tarski’s Theory of
Truth’. Topoi 18,1999: 149-166; P. Raatikainen, “Truth, Meaning, and Translation,” New Essays on Tarski and
Philosophy. (Douglas Patterson, Ed.) Oxford University Press, 2008; W. Kunne, Conceptions of Truth, Oxford
University Press, 2003; J. Etchemendy, “Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 53,
1988:51-79.
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Tarski’s definition of truth is intended as a definition of truth for sentences. A sentence in
Tarski’s semantic concept of truth is not an uninterpreted syntactic entity; it is a fully interpreted
entity with its meaning built into it. It makes sense to talk about the meaning of a sentence only
when it is relativized to a language. So, Tarski’s definition of truth is relativized to a specific
language. There is of course an even more important reason why Tarski’s definition of truth is
relativized to a specific language: to avoid a semantic paradox. One of the main objectives of
Tarski’s definition of truth is to define truth in such a way that when we employ the concept of
truth in accordance with his definition, we can avoid a semantic paradox. According to Tarski,
our ordinary notion of truth gives rise to a semantic paradox because we ascribe the truthpredicate without making a hierarchical order of languages. In order to avoid a semantic paradox,
Tarski suggests that we make distinctions between an object-language and a meta-language. In
Tarski’s theory, an object-language is characterized as the language for which truth is defined,
whereas a meta-language as the language in terms of which the truth for the object-language is
defined. But then, in order for the truth of an object-language to be defined in terms of the
expressions of a meta-language, the vocabulary of a meta-language should always be richer than
the vocabulary of an object-language. More precisely, a meta-language should involve semantic
expressions that are ascribed to expressions of an object-language; it should involve either
object-language expressions themselves or their translations; it should involve names or
structural descriptions of object-language sentences; etc. As a result, a truth predicate that is
defined in a Tarski-style cannot be legitimately ascribed a language it belongs to. Tarski’s truthdefinition doesn’t permit an ascription of a truth predicate to a sentence that already involves a
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truth predicate unless there is a difference between the levels of the truth predicates. For example
a Tarski-style truth definition doesn’t allow us to ascribe ‘T1’ (the truth predicate of the level 1)
to a sentence of the form ‘‘s’ is T1’ or ‘‘s’ is not T1’. Since self-ascription of this kind is the
ultimate source of a semantic paradox, and a failure of making a hierarchical order of languages
yields a semantic paradox, Tarski’s definition of truth showed a way to avoid a semantic paradox.
In addition to the requirement of making a hierarchical order of languages, Tarski
imposed two further conditions that an adequate definition of truth must satisfy; namely,
material adequacy and formal correctness. According to Tarski, a definition of truth for a
specific language L is materially adequate if it satisfies Contention T; that is, if it implies an
instance of the following schema for each and every indicative sentence of L:

(T) s is true in L iff p,

where ‘s’ is to be replaced by the quotation-name (structural description) of an object-language
sentence s, and ‘p’ is to be replaced by a meta-language sentence that means the same as ‘s’ in an
object-language L. The rationale for the condition of material adequacy is that an adequate
definition of truth must correctly determine the extension of true sentences in an object-language
L. The correct extension of true sentences in an object-language is in turn determined by ordinary
speakers’ intuition of truth; the class of true sentences in an object-language L is the class of
sentences that the speakers in L consider to be true. So, the definition of truth for an objectlanguage L should satisfy Convention T so that it can determine the correct extension of true
sentences in L. In addition, Convention T is imposed on the definition of truth for L so that the
definition squares with the ordinary intuition of truth that had by the speakers of L.
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Tarski’s condition of formal correctness states that an adequate definition of truth for an
object-language L should not employ in its definiens a semantic concept that isn’t previously
defined in terms of a non-semantic term. The motivation for this condition may be understood in
two different ways. First, it may be designed to make sure that the definition of truth isn’t
circular. Tarski characterizes his definition of truth as the ‘semantic definition of truth’. Since
semantic concepts are inter-connected, if an undefined semantic concept is employed in the
definition of truth, the definition will be circular. Second, as Field emphasizes, it may be that
Tarski was really serious about the harmony between semantic concepts and the postulates of the
unity of science and physicalism.40 In other words, the condition of formal correctness may have
been motivated by the desire to incorporate semantic concepts into a physicalistic view of the
world.
Now, how is Tarski’s definition of truth relevant to the discussion of the correspondence
theory? Its relevance is that the recursive method (or technique) Tarski employs in his definition
of truth introduces a new way in which the correspondence theory can be developed. Of course,
it isn’t Tarski who introduced a recursive method to the definition of truth. As was explained in
the previous section, Russell and Wittgenstein also employs a recursive technique in
characterizing their correspondence theories of truth. Tarski’s definition of truth incorporates this
idea but pushes this method further—into the definition of the truth of a simple sentence. In
Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s theories, only the truth of a compound sentence is recursively
defined. In their theories, a simple sentence is the smallest unit of a language, and so, the truth of
a simple sentence isn’t defined recursively. Instead, the truth of a simple sentence is defined in
40

Field asks what the purpose Tarski’s explicit definition of truth can serve that cannot be served by a definition of
truth that employs an unexplicated semantic notion. Field finds the answer in Tarski’s attempt to bring semantics
into harmony with the postulates of the unity of science and physicalism. See H. Field, “Tarski’s Theory of Truth.”
Kunene, however, says that Field overreacted to Tarski’s somewhat incidental remark on physicalism. See W.
Kunne, Conceptions of Truth, Ch.4, Oxford University Press, 2003.
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terms of the correspondence relation to a fact or state of affairs. What makes Tarski’s definition
of truth ingenious, however, is that he applies the recursive technique to the definition of a
simple sentence. To be more precise, in Tarski’s semantics, the smallest unit of language isn’t a
simple sentence but a sentential function; i.e., an open sentence. And then, in order to define the
truth of a sentence in terms of a sentential function, Tarski brings in the notion of satisfaction.
Satisfaction is a relation between a sentential function and an object in the world, and it is itself
recursively defined as follows:

(S)

An open sentence ‘Pxk’ in an object-language L is satisfied by a sequence of objects <a1, . . ,

an> iff Pak (where ak is the k-th member of the sequence of objects).41

In Tarski’s semantics, satisfaction is the most fundamental semantic notion in terms of which
other semantic concepts such as the concepts of truth and denotation are defined. By invoking
the notion of satisfaction, Tarski’s recursive definition of truth comes to have two virtues that are
lacked by Russell-and-Wittgenstein’s recursive definition. One is that it better handles the
definition of truth for a universally quantified sentence, and the other is that Tarski’s definition
provides the correspondence theorist with a way of dispensing with facts or states of affairs.
These two features are related, since Russell had to invoke a general fact in order to define the
truth of a universally quantified sentence. Wittgenstein denied the existence of a general fact;
41

If the meta-language is not an expansion of the object-language L, we have to use an expression that translates ‘P’.
So, Kunne says that a definition of satisfaction is materially adequate if it meets Convention S (instead of
Convention T):
Convention S: A definition of satisfaction for an object-language L is materially adequate iff it implies all sentences
that can be obtained from the schema (S):
(S) For any object y, y satisfies ɸ in L iff p ,
if one replaces ‘ɸ’ with a revealing designator of an open sentence in L and ‘p’ with a meta-language expression that
translates the open sentence. See W. Kunne, Conceptions of Truth, 198.
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instead, he regarded a universally quantified sentence as equivalent to infinite conjunctions of
simple sentences. Tarski’s strategy is more in line with Wittgenstein’s, but it has more generality
and so is simpler. Tarski defines the truth of a universally quantified sentence in the way below:

(Su) ∀xkA is true in L iff, for every sequence s' that is different from s at most in the k-th place,
A is true.
The difference between a variable and a name is that a variable can be replaced by any name; i.e.,
both by a name that is included in an object language and by a name that will be included in the
language. So, by taking a sentential function (open sentence) as the fundamental unit of a
language, Tarski could give an explicit definition of truth for a sentence involving universal
quantification. Last, the truth of a sentence is defined, and in Tarski’s formalized language, the
truth of a sentence is taken care of as a limiting case. Tarski says,
It turns out that for a sentence only two cases are possible: a sentence is either satisfied by all
objects, or by no objects. Hence we arrive at a definition of truth and falsehood simply by saying
that a sentence is true if it is satisfied by all objects, and false otherwise.42
In order to see, however, the full implication of Tarski’s definition of truth on the
correspondence theory, we have to consider how Tarski’s definition can be extended to a natural
language. Tarski’s theory was originally put forward as a definition of truth for a sentence in a
formalized language. The basic principles of Tarski’s theory, however, can be used to define the
truth of a sentence in natural language. Unlike a formalized language, a natural language has
names, which means that a theory of reference or denotation is required. Tarski in effect defines
the notion of denotation in terms of the notion of satisfaction as follows:

42

A. Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundation of Semantics,” p. 353.
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To say that the name x denotes a given object a is the same as to stipulate that the object a . . .
satisfies a sentential function of a particular type. In colloquial language it would be a function
which consists of three parts in the following order: a variable, the word 'is' and the given name
x.43
If we add to this Tarski’s characterization of satisfaction, and we get 1):

1)

To say that the name ‘N’ in English denotes a given object a is the same as to
stipulate that ‘N’s ‘France’ and a is France; ‘N’ is ‘Germany’ and a is Germany; or . . .
or ‘N’ is ‘Korea’ and a is Korea.

A statement such as 1) is Tarski’s theory of denotation for names in one’s own language. For
foreign names, Tarski’s theory of denotation goes in the manner of 2):

2)

To say that the name ‘N’ in German denotes a given object a is the same as to
stipulate that ‘N’ is ‘Frankreich’ and a is France; ‘N’ is ‘Deutschland’ and a is
Germany; or . . . or ‘N’ is ‘Korea’ and a is Korea.

Once the notion of denotation is defined in the manners of 1) and 2), the truth of a simple
sentence in a natural language L is recursively defined. In other words, a T-sentence of the form
such as

3)

‘P(e)’ in L is true iff P(e)

or

43

This is Field’s quote of Tarski. See H. Field “Tarski’s Theory of Truth,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact,
p.15. It is originally from A. Tarski, “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages,” in Logic, Semantics, and
Metamathematics, p. 194.
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4)

‘P*(e)’ in L* is true iff P(e)

is derived from the definitions of denotation (such as 1) or 2) and of satisfaction.44
Presented this way, it is clear that Tarski’s theory of truth isn’t per se a version of the
correspondence theory of truth. Although Tarski called his theory of truth ‘the semantic
definition of truth,’ there is nothing so much semantic about his definition of truth.45 The reason
has mainly due to the way he characterizes the notion of satisfaction. As was mentioned earlier,
in Tarski’s theory, satisfaction is the most fundamental semantic notion in terms of which all the
other semantic notions are defined. The way Tarski characterizes the notion of satisfaction,
however, makes his theory almost (if not entirely) circular. To see why let’s consider (S) that
was illustrated above: (S) An open sentence ‘Pxk’ in an object-language L is satisfied by a
sequence of objects <a1, . . , an> iff Pak (where ak is the k-th member of the sequence of objects.
This characterization of satisfaction assumes that the predicate ‘P’ in the object-language L
stands for the property being P. Tarski makes this assumption but not in these semantic terms; he
44

3) is a case in which the object-language L is the same as the meta-language; that is, L is the truth-ascriber’s own
language. 4) is a case in which the object-language L* is a foreign language.
45
This is a well-known criticism of Tarski’s theory of truth. For example, Putnam states that Tarski’s truth
predicates have nothing to do with semantics or the ordinary conception of truth. (H. Putnam, “A Comparison of
Something with Something Else”, New Literary History 17: 61-79, 1985). Davidson agrees with this criticism in his
later years (in “The Structure and the Content of Truth,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87, No. 6, 1990, pp. 279328). The point of the criticism is that Tarski’s theory of truth doesn’t make any systematic connection between
meaning- or use-properties with the concept of truth. Putnam’s criticism is that Tarski’s theory cannot explain why
‘Snow is white’ would have had been true iff snow is black if ‘white’ had meant the same as ‘black’ (or if ‘white’
had been used in the way we use ‘black’). As I stated at the outset, however, Tarski’s sentences are fully interpreted
ones (Soames makes this point in his “What is a Theory of Truth?,” The Journal of Philosophy 81, 411-429, 1984).
Tarski’s theory of truth assumes that the semantic properties of sentences are fully determined and explained by
something other than the definition of truth. Indeed, Tarski’s theory cannot even explain why a certain sentence in
an object-language L has the truth condition that it has. In that sense, Putnam’s criticism is correct; Tarski’s theory
doesn’t provide any answer to usual semantic questions. But then, why did he call his theory ‘the semantic
conception of truth’? I am not sure; it seems that he didn’t think hard enough when he used the term ‘semantic’.
That said, nobody can deny Tarski’s contribution to semantics. Tarski’s theory seems to provide a logical tool for
the development of semantic theories. If the logical tool (his logical-recursive analysis of language) is not of use to a
theory of truth, it is still of use to a theory of meaning.
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rather appeals to the notion of translation.46 The fact that he appeals to the notion of translation
doesn’t make his definition of truth circular as long as the notion of translation isn’t defined in
terms of semantic notions (such as reference, denotation, or truth). But if Tarski really meant his
theory of truth to be a semantic definition of truth, he eventually had to deal with a semantic
question; for example, what makes the predicate ‘P’ in L stand for the property being P? Tarski,
however, never addressed semantic questions of this kind, and this makes his theory vulnerable
to Field’s criticism that I will introduce shortly.
Of course, Tarski’s theory many be defended in the way Soames or Etchemendy does; in
other words, by construing the goal of Tarski’s theory in a deflationary way. Or as Devitt says,
Tarski intended to give a correspondence theory of truth but ended up presenting a deflationary
theory. But if so, what’s the point of talking about Tarski’s theory in discussing the
correspondence theory of truth? The point is that the reductive technique found in Tarski’s
theory enables the correspondence theorist to develop the correspondence theory without
invoking cumbersome entities such as facts or states of affairs. Russell and Wittgenstein had to
invoke these entities as the relata of simple sentences mainly because they didn’t have Tarski’s
ingenious recursive technique. Since Tarski defines the truth of a simple sentence in terms of the
satisfaction of a predicate by an object, it isn’t necessary to hypostasize entities such as facts or
states of affairs. Instead, the correspondence theory of truth of a Tarski-style needs to invoke
only the objects that are referred to by names and the properties that are stood for by predicates.
This is a huge advantage because these entities—compared to entities such as facts or states of
affairs—are both ontologically and conceptually less troublesome. So, the correspondence theory
46

Tarski assumes that an object-language sentence that replaces ‘s’ and a meta-language sentence that replaces ‘p’
in an instance of T-sentence of the form ‘‘s’ is true in L iff p’ have the same meaning. Tarski, however, didn’t build
the notion of meaning or translation into the definition of truth. Nor did he attempt to give an account of the
meaning of an object-language sentence. He rather assumed that the meaning of an object-language sentence is
already well defined, and used it in his definition of truth.
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of a Tarski-style doesn’t need to define the truth of a sentence in terms of correspondence to a
fact or state of affairs that exists. Instead, it can define the truth of a sentence along the lines of 5)
as follows:

5)

‘Pa’ is true in L =Df the object referred to by ‘a’ in L has the property that the
predicate ‘P’ in L stands for.

A definition of truth along the lines of 5), however, cannot by itself be considered a
correspondence theory of truth, because it doesn’t say anything about the nature of the semantic
relations between objects and names and predicates and the properties that the predicates stand
for. In effect, 5) is it itself compatible with both the correspondence and the deflationary
conceptions of truth.47 In order to develop 5) into a correspondence theory of truth, we need a
theory that explains the nature of the semantic relation between objects and names and predicates
and properties in a correspondence way. Field’s criticism of Tarski’s theory can be appreciated
from this perspective. According to Field, Tarski failed to meet his own stated policy: that he
will not make use of any semantic concept if he is not able previously to reduce to other
concepts.”48 This shouldn’t be taken as implying that Tarski’s definition of truth explicitly
violated this policy. A definition of truth along the lines 5) explicitly violates Tarski’s stated
policy, since 5) employs semantic terms in the definition of truth.49 Unlike 5), Tarski’s definition
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It depends on how the notions of reference and standing for are further defined. If these notions are defined in a
minimalistic way—in terms of implicit definitions involving infinite lists—then 5) is compatible with the
deflationary notions of truth and reference. If the notions of reference and standing for are explicitly defined, 5) isn’t
compatible with the deflationary theory.
48
H. Field, “Tarski’s Theory of Truth,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, p.7.
49
A definition of truth along the lines of 5) is not Tarski’s definition of truth. Indeed, a definition of truth along the
lines of 5) is what Field calls ‘Tarski*s theory of truth’—the truth definition that Field calls ‘T1’. In “Tarski’s
Theory of Truth,” Field compares two truth definitions: T1 and T2. T2 is Tarski’s theory of truth, and T1 is similar
to Tarski’s theory, but it explicitly employs semantic concepts such as ‘denotes’ and ‘applies to’ in the definition of
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eliminates all the semantic terms in the definition of truth by replacing them with extensionally
equivalent concepts. More precisely, Tarski succeeds in eliminating the notion of truth by
defining it in terms of satisfaction and denotation, and then he eliminates the notion of denotation
by giving extensionally correct definitions such as 1) and 2). Definitions such as 1) and 2) satisfy
Tarski’s conditions of material adequacy and formal correctness; they determine the correct
extension of ‘N refers to a’ in an object-language L; they are also formally correct since no
semantic term is explicitly employed in their definiens. So, it appears that Tarski lived up to his
stated policy; he eliminated all the semantic concepts by replacing them with extensionally
equivalent concepts that don’t explicitly involve semantic terms. So, why does Field say that
Tarski failed to meet his own standard?
The reason, in short, is that to replace a concept with an extensionally equivalent concept isn’t
the same as reducing the concept into another concept. To argue for this point, Field appeals to
an analogy to the concept of valence. Consider the following definition of the concept of valence:

6)

(∀E) (∀n) (E has a valence n = C is potassium and n is +1, or …or E is sulphur and
n is -2).50

This definition is extensionally correct, and thus it enables us to replace the concept of valence
with its extensional equivalents. This definition, however, doesn’t reduce a chemical fact into a
non-chemical fact; i.e., a physicalistic fact of a more fundamental kind. But why is it necessary
to reduce a chemical fact into a non-chemical/physicalistic fact? The rationale is derived from
the idea of physicalism: the idea that chemical facts, biological facts, psychological facts, and
truth. Interestingly, Field says that Tarski should have offered the truth definition T1 instead of T2. Field’s point is
that T1 plus a physicalistic reduction of primitive denotation would constitute an ideal correspondence theory of
truth.
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semantical facts are all explicable in terms of physical facts.51 Field says that if 6) had been the
only definition available for the concept of valence, scientists would have eventually had to give
up the concept of valence.52 Fortunately, chemists could establish the reduction of the concept of
valence to physical properties, and so the concept of valence was saved from being thrown away.
So, there are two reasons why Field demands a physicalistic reduction of semantic
concepts, especially, the concept of denotation (or reference). First, Tarski said himself that he
would not employ any previously unreduced semantic concept in his definition of truth. More
importantly, if the notion of truth plays an explanatory role that is similar to that of the notion of
valence, the notion of truth should be explicated in terms of physicalistic concepts. The notion of
valence, being a chemical concept, enters into causal explanations of chemical elements. So, to
say that the notion of truth plays the kind of explanatory role played by the notion of valence is
to say that truth plays a causal-explanatory role. But if truth plays a causal-explanatory role, then
there has to be an explanation of how it plays the role. Such an explanation requires a
physicalistic reduction of the property of truth.
So, Field’s criticism of Tarski’s theory of truth may be best appreciated not as a criticism
of Tarski’s theory per se but as a criticism of a correspondence theory of truth of a Tarskian style
without a theory of primitive denotation. Whether or not Tarski aimed to give a correspondence
theory of truth, Tarski’s theory isn’t of itself a correspondence theory. The recursive technique
that Tarski uses in his theory, however, offers an invaluable tool for the development of a
correspondence theory. Field recognized this value, but he also recognized that a correspondence
theory of a Tarskian style without a theory of primitive denotation cannot satisfy the demands of
a correspondence theory of truth.

51
52

See H. Field, “Tarski’s Theory of Truth.”
H. Field, ibid.
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1.3. The Motivations for the Deflationary Theory of Truth
Motivations for a theory are not the same as the arguments for it; the former usually alludes to
the problems that the theory aims to solve, while the latter alludes to the reasons that support the
theory. They sometimes, however, overlap with each other, and this is the case with one of the
motivations for the deflationary theory.
There are at least two major motivations for the deflationary theory. One is that the prospect of
constructing its major rivalry theory—the correspondence theory—is very dim. The other is that
the role of truth, as Horwich says, isn’t as it appears to be; the role of truth isn’t what Field
thought it was when he demanded a reductive/correspondence theory of truth in his ‘Tarski’s
Theory of Truth.” According to deflationists, the role of truth is purely logical, and therefore, the
theory of truth has only a minimal theoretical duty to satisfy—to explain what makes the concept
of truth serve relevant logical functions. This means that if deflationists’ view of the role of truth
is correct, all the inflationary theories of truth—including the correspondence theory—are
inherently wrongheaded.
The two motivations for deflationism are complementary. Anomalies accumulated in searching
for an adequate correspondence theory may have inspired a new paradigm of the concept of truth.
That said, they are concerned with significantly different problems with the correspondence
theory of truth. The first motivation addresses a problem that arises within the correspondence
theory of truth. In other words, it addresses a problem that arises when we accept the idea that
truth is a correspondence notion. The second motivation, by contrast, challenges the very idea
that truth is a correspondence notion. So, the second motivation stands even without the first
motivation, although not vice versa. Despite so, I will discuss both motivations in the following.
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Deflationism, as I understand, isn’t just about the concept of truth but about a host of related
concepts. The deflationary theory of truth can properly appreciated only against the rich history
of theories of meaning and content that goes back to Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. A
discussion of the problems with the correspondence theory will hopefully shed some light on
understanding the historical background of the deflationary theory of truth.

1.3.1. Motivation 1—Problems with Reductive Theories of Reference

Let’s say that we accept the correspondence conception of truth. Let’s also say that an adequate
correspondence theory of truth should be developed in a Tarskian style for the reason that was
explained above; that is, to eschew mysterious entities such as facts or states of affairs. In
addition, let’s suppose that Field is right in saying that a correspondence theory of truth needs a
reductive theory of primitive denotation. Then, the next question to be answered is what it takes
to give a reductive theory of reference. In this subsection, I will discuss the problems that arise in
answering this question.
According to Devitt, there are at least three reductive/physicalistic theories of reference
advanced in the 20th century; the first is Kripke-Putnam’s causal-historical theory, the second is
the informational theory of representation, and the third is the teleological theory of
representation.53 All these theories appeal to the notion of a causal relation between an
expression (either a linguistic or mental expression) and an object in the world. Besides, they are
chronologically and theoretically related to each other; in particular, the teleological theory is a
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M. Devitt, “Theories of Reference,” Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Vol. 3. L. Nagel, ed. London: Nature
Publishing Group (2003): 904-07.
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development of the informational theory of representation. Each of these theories has many
variants and has been subject to wild discussions. Since it is beyond capacity to examine the
details of these theories, I will concentrate on one question that all these theories ultimately have
to deal with; namely, the question whether any of these theories succeeds in justifying the truth
of a disquotational reference-statement such as 1) below:

1) ‘cat’ (in English) refers to a cat.

Like Tarski’s theory of truth, a reductive theory of reference aims to give an explicit definition of
reference; it aims to define the notion of reference in terms of non-semantic terms in the style of
(RC):
(RC) x refers to y =Df x bears a non-semantic/physical relation R to y.

Given that a reductive theory of reference aims to offer an explicit definition of reference, we
may speak of some conditions that these theories must satisfy. These conditions are parallel to
the two conditions that Tarski imposes on a definition of truth; formal correctness and material
adequacy. The formal correctness of a theory of reference is already characterized by Field;
namely, a reductive theory of reference should not employ undefined semantic terms in its
definiens. Hence, we have (RC) above.
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A reductive theory of reference, however, should also be materially adequate if it is to correctly
determine the extension of the reference.54 Tarski characterizes material adequacy for a theory of
truth in terms of Contention T: that is, an adequate theory of truth for an object-language L
should entail all the instances of (T) below:

(T) s is true in L iff p,

where ‘s’ is to be replaced by the quotation-name (structural description) of an object-language
sentence s, and ‘p’ is to be replaced by a meta-language sentence that means the same as ‘s’ in an
object-language L. What this implies, among others, is that a theory of truth for one’s own
language is materially adequate if all the instances of the schema (DS) below are derived from
the theory:

(DS) ‘p’ is true iff p,

where ‘p’ is replaced by an indicative sentence in my own language.55 More precisely, a theory
of truth for English satisfies Tarski’s Contention T if it entails truth-statements such as ‘‘Snow is
white’ is true in English iff snow is white’, ‘‘Grass is green’ is true in English iff grass is green’,
and so forth.
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According to Tarski, a definition of truth for a language L is materially adequate if and only if it correctly
determines the extension of true sentences. Put differently, a definition of truth of the form below
For all x, True(x) if and only if ɸ(x)
is materially adequate if and only if objects satisfying ɸ are the objects that we would intuitively count as being true
sentences in L.
55
Let’s here assume that the sentence that replaces ‘p’ doesn’t involve an ambiguity, vagueness, indexical, or
demonstrative.
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Parallel to Tarski’s Contention T, we may say that a reductive theory of reference for an
object-language L is materially adequate if all the instances of the schema (DR) below are
derived from the theory:

(DR) (If r exists) ‘r’ refers to r and nothing else.56

So, Contention R, parallel to Convention T, may be characterized as follows:

Convention R: All the legitimate instances of the schema (DR) are to be derived from the
definition of reference of the form below:

For all x, Refers(x) iff ϕ(x).

If a reductive theory of reference is to be adequate, it has to satisfy Contention R. The question is
whether there is any reductive theory that satisfies Contention R.
I used to think, among those three variants of the causal theory of reference, that KripkePutnam’s theory has the least chance of satisfying Convention R. But now I think the opposite;
Kripke-Putnam’s causal theory seems to have the best chance of satisfying Convention R if the
theory is true. In order for a reductive theory of reference to satisfy Contention R, it has to cope
with Fodor’s disjunction problem. As I will argue below, it is very unlikely that either the causalinformation theory or the teleological theory of reference will ever be able to cope with Fodor’s
disjunction problem. Kripke-Putnam’s theory, if it turns out to be true, can solve Fodor’s
disjunction problem. The theory, however, isn’t true. So, none of the three variants of the causal
56
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theory of truth can satisfy Contention R. Therefore, none of the causal theories of reference can
be considered an adequate theory of reference. This is what I will argue in the following.

Fodor’s Disjunction Problem, and the Causal-Informational and Teleological Theories57
Fodor initially raised the disjunction problem for the causal-informational theory of
representation. So, to explain what the problem is, I will briefly explain what the causalinformational theory of representation is.
The causal-information theory is a physicalistic theory of mental representation that reduces the
semantic/intentional content of a mental representation to an external condition that is reliably
correlated with the mental representation. This theory is based on the perfectly plausible idea that
A carries information about B if A is reliably caused by B; for example, smoke carries the
information that there is a fire because smoke is reliably caused by a fire. The causalinformational theory is the result of applying this idea to an account of the semantic/intentional
content of mental representations. Thus, the core idea of the causal-informational theory is that
the semantic or intentional content of a mental representation R reduces to the type of external
conditions that reliably cause the tokens of the mental representation R.
According to Fodor, however, this theory faces a serious problem—the “disjunction problem”.58
This problem arises because a mental representation of the same type can be reliably caused by
external conditions of distinct types. For example, tokens of ‘cat’ are caused not only by cats but
also by cat-like dog. But if the semantic or intentional content of a mental representation reduces
to external conditions that reliably cause the tokens of the mental representation, on what ground
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should we say that a token of ‘cat’ is about a cat and not about a cat-like dog? Given that the
tokens of ‘cat’ are reliably caused both by cats and cat-like dogs, a token of ‘cat’ carries both the
information that there is a cat around and the information that there is a catlike dog around. In
order to say that a token of ‘cat’ is about or represents a cat, and not a cat-like dog, we should be
able to select the causal relation between a token of ‘cat’ and a cat as the semantically and
intentionally relevant relation. The causal-informational theory, however, is helpless in this
respect. The theory cannot explain what makes the causal relation between the tokens of ‘cat’
and cats the semantically and intentionally relevant relation.
One may ask here why we have to select only one of the causal relations as the
semantically and intentionally relevant relation. Why can’t we say that a token of ‘cat’ is about a
cat or a cat-like dog? Why can’t we allow a mental or linguistic representation have disjunctive
content? As was mentioned earlier, the core idea of the causal informational theory is derived
from the relationship between the information carried by a natural sign and external conditions
that reliably cause the occurrence of the natural signs. With respect to natural signs, however, we
have no problem with the multiplicity of informational content. For example, smoke indicates
not only that there is a fire but that there is oxygen. But here, unlike in the case of ‘cat’, we don’t
have to choose one of them as the information carried by the natural sign smoke. So, why is the
multiplicity of information a problem only when it occurs with regard to a mental or linguistic
representation? The most convincing answer that I can think of is a pragmatic one; that is, it is
simply too inconvenient to allow disjunctive content. Suppose my friend visited a remote island
and called me saying ‘There is no cat in this island’. Suppose I think what he is saying is true. If
we allow an expression to have disjunctive content, then the information that I can obtain from
what he uttered would be as follows: Either there is no cat or cat-like dog in the island. To make
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matters worse, let’s say that my friend also said ‘But there is a dog in this island’. But then, the
information that I infer from what my friend said would be: Either there is no cat or catlike dog,
but there is a dog in the island. There is no logical contradiction here, and we might even give a
more accurate characterization of the semantic content of my friend’s utterance by allowing
disjunctive content. But to allow disjunctive content isn’t a good idea for the pragmatic purposes
of ordinary conversation.
At this point, the deflationist will immediately step in claiming that this is the reason why
it is a wrong idea to reduce the notions of truth and reference into physical notions. Those who
try to reduce the notions of truth and reference, says the deflationist, got the role of these notions
entirely wrong. But not everyone agrees with the deflationist’s analysis of the role of truth and
reference. So, those who try to explicate the notions of truth and reference in terms of
physicalistic notions developed the causal-informational theory into a more sophisticated
theory—the teleological theory of intentionality. Fodor was himself drawn to this approach, but
he later abandons it.59 In this thesis, I will not discuss the details of the teleological theory.60 I
will point out, though, one crucial problem with the theory.
According to the teleological theory, we can isolate the causal relation between ‘cat’ and cats
from the causal relation between ‘cat’ and catlike-dogs by appealing to the teleological function
served by the causal relation between ‘cat’ and cats. So, the core idea of the teleological theory is
that there is a special function—biological function—served only by a semantically relevant
59
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causal relation, and we can reduce the truth-referential (intentional or representational) relation
to the causal relation that has this special biological function. As Godfrey-Smith has points out,
however, this theory has a serious problem when it is applied to a particular state of a
mechanism.61 It makes sense to say that a mechanism has a function; for example, our belief- and
desire-mechanism must have a specific biological function. It doesn’t make sense, however, to
say that a belief- or desire-state of each type has a distinct biological function or purpose. Let’s
assume, for arguments’ sake, a sort of language of thought hypothesis: believing that p is
believing* a mental sentence δ means that p.62 According to the teleological theory, the semantic
or intentional relation between δ and the external condition that p reduces to a causal relation that
has a special biological function. More specifically, on this theory, what makes δ have the
representational/intentional/semantic/truth-conditional content that p is that an organism has a
better chance of surviving when the tokens of its mental sentence δ are caused by the external
condition that p than any other external conditions. In this sense, the external condition that p is
defined as the “normal cause” of the mental sentence δ, and the normal cause of a mental symbol
determines its semantic/intentional content.
So, according to this theory, a token of ‘cat’ refers to a cat, not a catlike-dog, because the causal
relation between the tokens of ‘cat’ and cats has a special biological function that is lacked by
other causal relations such as the one between the tokens of ‘cat’ and catlike-dogs. But what is
this special biological function that can be served only by a semantically or intentionally relevant
causal relation? If the nature of this special function is vaguely characterized such as
‘contributing to the survival of an organism’, then the teleological theorist cannot isolate the
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causal correlation between ‘cat’ and cats from other causal correlations. There is simply no
reason to believe that for each mental symbol there is a causal relation of a certain type such that
the occurrences only of that type contribute to the survival of an organism. For example, a frog’s
mental symbol δ can be tokened either by the presence of a fly or a flylike mosquito. According
to the teleological theory, however, the presence of a fly is the normal cause of the frog’s mental
symbol δ because the causal relation between the tokens of δ and flies has a special biological
function that cannot be served by the causal relation between the tokens of δ and fly-like
mosquitoes. There is, however, little evidence to think this way, because the frog’s biological
purpose can be equally well served by the frog’s actions that are performed when the tokens of δ
are caused by the presence of fly-like mosquitoes.
The problem here is that an advocate of the teleological theory should spell out the nature of the
special function without appealing to a semantic or intentional notion. To see why this is
important, consider Papineau’s solution to the disjunction problem. According to Papineau, the
disjunction problem can be solved only when the content of a belief-state is considered in liaison
with a desire-state. Papineau says,

[B]iological functions are always a matter of effects; functions are effects in virtue of which traits
are selected. Beliefs, however, do not have any effect to call their own. Rather, their biological
purpose is to produce whichever result will fulfill the purposes of the desires they are acting in
concert with. And then it will then explain the contents of beliefs derivatively, by saying that the
purpose of beliefs is to generate actions that will produce desired results in such-and-such
conditions, which conditions will therefore counts as the truth conditions of those beliefs.63
Papineau is right in saying that the content of a belief-state and the content of a desire-state are
interdependent. He is wrong, however, in saying that the content of a belief-state can be
derivatively determined by the content of a desire-state. The moment we determine the content of
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a desire-state so do we determine the content of a belief-state. That is to say, to determine the
content of a belief is of itself to determine the content of a desire-state..
So, Papineau’s solution to the disjunction problem assumes the very thing that the
solution is supposed to answer—on what ground should we say that the frog desires that it wants
to eat a fly instead of wanting to eat a fly-like mosquito? Why can’t we say, as Neander claims,
that the frog desires that it wants to eat a small, dark, and moving insect?64 Papineau claims that
Neander begs the question by characterizing the frog’s desire-state in this way. But the burden of
proof is on Papineau’s claim, not on Neander’s claim. It is Papineau who claims that the frog’s
desire state has a determinate content, and Neander’s job is just to offer a reason to doubt it. Her
reason is that we can characterize the frog’s desire-state in a way that doesn’t invoke a fly. A
small, dark, and moving insect can be a fly or flylike mosquito; therefore, the content of the
frog’s desire-state is indeterminate. Now, it is Papineau’s turn to explain why it is necessary that
we invoke a fly in characterizing the frog’s desire-state. Papineau, however, doesn’t seem to
have an explanation. Instead, he makes a dubious claim; that content becomes determinate if we
move away from frogs toward beings with more complicated psychologies.65 But this is a naïve
view; there is no fundamental difference between a frog’s psychology and a human’s psychology.
If there were, the teleological theory wouldn’t have got off the ground in the first place.

Fodor’s Asymmetric Dependence
Before I discuss Kripke-Putnam’s theory, I will discuss briefly Fodor’s own solution to the
disjunction problem: the theory of asymmetric dependence. Interestingly indeed, there are some
similarities between Fodor’s theory of asymmetric dependence and Kripke-Putnam’s causal
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theory of reference. Both theories heavily rely on the conceptual fundamentality of the instances
of the disquotational reference (DR):

(DR) (If r exists) ‘r’ refers to r and nothing else.

No physicalist including the advocates of the causal-informational theory and teleological theory
would deny that the instances of (DR) are true. But the causal-informational theory or the
teleological theory wasn’t designed to explain the instances of (DR). The motivations of these
theories come from somewhere else, and to accommodate the instances of (DR) is just one of the
desiderata of these theories. Fodor’s theory and Kripke-Putnam’s theory, however, are designed
to accommodate the instances of (DR). So, if these theories are true, the disjunction problem will
be solved. The problem, however, is that it is doubtful that any of these theories is actually
true.66
First, according to Fodor’s theory of asymmetric dependence, although tokens of ‘cat’
can be caused by non-cats, a token of ‘cat’ refers to a cat, not a catlike dog, because the causal
connection between the tokens of ‘cat’ and the property of being a cat is metaphysically
fundamental. That is to say, the causal connection between the tokens of ‘cat’ and the property of
being a catlike dog is asymmetrically dependent on the causal connection between the tokens of
‘cat and the property of being a cat.67 The crucial notion here is ‘asymmetric dependence’, and
Fodor explicates this notion in terms of a subjunctive conditional: if the nomic (lawlike) relation
between P1 and P2 is asymmetrically dependent on the nomic relation between P3 and P4, then
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ceteris paribus, breaking the relation between P3 and P4 would break the relation between P1
and P2.68 To elaborate it as Block does, ‘cat’ refers to a cat if and only if although there are
nomologically possible worlds in which cats cause ‘cat’ but catlike dogs don’t, there are no
nomologically possible worlds in which catlike dogs cause ‘cat but cats don’t.69 There are many
complicated questions to be discussed about this theory, but the most important question seems
the following: why do we have to believe that these counterfactuals are true? Fodor asks this
question himself, and his own answer, as Devitt says, is strange:

Don’t forget, this stuff is supposed to be philosophy. In particular, it’s an attempt to solve
Brentano’s problem by showing that there are naturalistically specifiable, and atomistic, and
sufficient conditions for a physical state to have an intentional content. In that context, I get to
stipulate the counterfactuals. . . . That is, solving Brentano’s problem requires giving sufficient
conditions for intentionality, not sufficient and necessary conditions.70
Philosophy, however, is concerned not only with the validity of an argument but also with the
soundness of an argument. In order for Fodor’s argument to be sound, the antecedent of his
argument should be true. The antecedent of the argument is Fodor’s theory of asymmetric
dependence. So, the question re-arises: why do we have to believe that the counterfactuals being
invoked are true? To say that the relevant counterfactuals are true entails that there is no
nomologically possible world in which ‘cat’-tokens are caused by catlike dogs while ‘cat’-tokens
are not caused by cats. There seems, however, that there is such a possible world. All we need is
a possible world in which the property that causes the tokens of ‘cat’ is nomologically connected
to the property of being a non-cat but isn’t nomologically connected to the property of being a
cat. A good example is Putnam’s Twin-Earth.
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In Putnam’s Twin-Earth example, my doppelganger lives in the twin-earth in which the
stuff that looks like water is of a different chemical structure—XYZ. By assumption, my
doppelganger is in the brain-states that are type-identical to my brain-states. So, she acts and
talks like me; she even uses the (phonetically and typographically) same word ‘water’ to pick out
the stuff that looks like water. Despite so, it is obvious that the reference of my doppelganger’s
word ‘water’ is different from the reference of my word ‘water’; any sane ordinary person would
agree with this. So, the reference isn’t determined by what is in the head. Meaning and reference,
says Putnam, aren’t just in the head no matter how we cut the pie.71
I will discuss Putnam’s theory of reference shortly. But let me first explain why this example
repudiates Fodor’s theory of asymmetric dependence. In this example, my doppelganger is in the
same brain-state that I am in; we are molecule-by-molecule duplicates. So, the property that
causes the tokens of my doppelganger’s ‘water’ in the twin-earth is the same as the property that
causes the tokens of my word ‘water’ in the earth.72 In the twin-earth, however, there is no H2O.
So, in this world, the same brain-state (or brain-property) is caused by XYZ although it isn’t
caused by H2O. But according to Fodor’s theory, for each brain-state B, there has to be one and
only one type of an external condition E to which B bears a special causal connection. What
makes this causal relation special is that the brain-state B wouldn’t be caused by other external
conditions unless it is caused by the external condition E. As was stated above, what this means
is that there is no possible world in which B is caused by an external condition E* but isn’t
caused by the external condition E (where E ≠ E*), although there is a possible world in which B
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is caused by E but not caused by E*. Putnam’s twin-earth argument, however, offers a counterexample to this theory. Putnam’s twin-earth example shows that there is simply no special
external condition E to which a brain-state B bears a special causal connection. In this world, the
brain state that causes the tokens of ‘water’ is caused by H2O but it isn’t caused by XYZ. In the
twin-earth, the same brain-state is caused by XYZ while it isn’t caused by H2O. If there is a third
possible world, it may be caused by another external property. This seems enough to show that
Fodor’s thesis is incorrect; there is no metaphysically special causal relation on which other
causal connections are dependent. The causal relation between the tokens of ‘water’ and XYZ
isn’t metaphysically dependent on the causal relation between the tokens of ‘water’ and H2O.
Fodor’s theory doesn’t give any reason to think that the causal relation between the tokens of ‘cat’
and cats is metaphysically fundamental in such a way that other causal relations are dependent
on it. But if we cannot single out the causal relation between the tokens of ‘cat’ and cats as
metaphysically fundamental, Fodor’s theory cannot solve the disjunction problem.

Kripke-Putnam’s Causal Theory of Reference
Now, let’s consider whether Kripke-Putnam’s causal historical theory of reference can help
solving the disjunction problem. As I stated above, if Kripke-Putnam’s causal historical theory is
correct, it can. What I mean by this conditional statement is that if proper names and natural-kind
terms are rigid designators as they are claimed by Kripke-Putnam’s theory, the disjunction
problem will be solved. But then, the question is whether proper names and natural-kind terms
are rigid designators.
First, let’s examine what it means to say that an expression is a rigid designator. According to
Kripke, to say that an expression is a rigid designator is to say that it has the same reference or
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extension in every (relevant) possible world. More specifically, according to this theory, a proper
name such as ‘Aristotle’ is a rigid designator because it refers to one and the same person in all
possible worlds in which Aristotle exists. A natural-kind term such as ‘water’ is also construed as
a rigid designator because ‘water’, according to this theory, determines the same extension in
every possible world in which water exists. Some definite descriptions are also construed as rigid
designators although most definite descriptions are not; for example, the number succeeding 2’
refers to 3 in every possible world, and so, it is a rigid designator.
This simple definition of a rigid designator, however, raises many complicated questions. First,
what is exactly referred to by an expression that is characterized as a ‘rigid designator’?
According to this theory, a proper name and a natural-kind term are rigid designators, and
therefore, they refer to the same entity in every possible world. But what is exactly referred to by
a proper name or natural-kind term? Second, what is the nature of the semantic relation between
a rigid designator and its reference? What makes a proper name or a natural-kind term refer to
whatever entity that it refers to? These two questions are related, since we cannot determine the
reference of a rigid designator unless we can characterize the nature of the semantic relation
between a rigid designator and it reference. Notice that the conception of reference advertised by
Kripke-Putnam’s theory is by no means deflationary; in Kripke-Putnam’s theory, an instance of
(DR)

(DR) (If r exists) ‘r’ refers to r

isn’t considered true a priori. The conception of reference advertised by Kripke-Putnam’s theory
is inflationary, and so, it doesn’t consider the trivialities of the instances of (DR)—‘Aristotle’
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refers to Aristotle, ‘water’ refers to water, etc.—as constituting the whole story of a theory of
reference.73 Moreover, the idea of reference in Kripke-Putnam’s theory is very specific; namely,
a proper name or a natural-kind term is considered as referring to that very specific thing in the
actual world. As will be discussed, however, Kripke-Putnam’s theory never offers a clear
explanation of what that specific thing is. Considering what is advertised by this theory, what
this theory really offers is very meager. I will explain why.
First, according to Kripke-Putnam’s theory, the entity that is referred to by a rigid designator is
what is related to the rigid designator in terms of an actual causal history. An actual causal
history is composed of two steps: the reference-fixing step and the reference-transferring step.
What is crucial in the reference-fixing step is a non-descriptive way of referring to an entity. A
typical example of a non-descriptive way of referring to an entity is direct or indirect (deferred)
ostension.74 According to Kripke-Putnam’s theory, the reference of a proper name is fixed by
direct ostension; the reference of a proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ is fixed when someone
directly points at a certain baby dubbing him ‘Aristotle’. Once the reference of a proper name is
fixed by direct ostension, the semantic relationship between the name and its reference has to be
properly transferred to the other members of a linguistic community. Indirect or deferred
ostension is involved in fixing the reference of a natural-kind term. For example, when someone
73
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first introduced the term ‘water’ by pointing at a particular instance, the reference of ‘water’ was
fixed by deferred ostension; ‘water’ refers to the natural kind that the particular instance belongs
to. In explaining the reference of a natural-kind term Kripke and Putnam also appeal to the view
called ‘scientific essentialism’; the view that that the essential properties of natural kinds are to
be discovered a posteriori by scientific investigations. For example, we couldn’t have known a
priori that water is H2O. So, if the current theory of water is true, then an identity-statement such
as ‘Water is H2O’ is metaphysically necessary but epistemologically a posteriori.
It should be noted, however, that although both Kripke and Putnam endorse scientific
essentialism, scientific essentialism is orthogonal to their theory of reference. There are two
reasons for this; first, as Kripke admits himself, any scientific theory may turn out to be false.
For example, water may not turn out to be H2O. But then, we cannot rely on scientific theories to
connect a natural-kind term to its reference. If we did, we could no longer consider a natural-kind
term a rigid designator; the reference of a natural-kind term would keep changing with the
vicissitudes of scientific theories. Another reason that scientific essentialism isn’t central to
Kripke-Putnam’s theory of reference is that this theory was motivated to refute Frege-Russell’s
description theory of reference. One of Kripke’s major complaints of the description theory is
that if the references of a proper name and a natural-kind term were determined via satisfying
definite descriptions, then the references of these expressions would vary from world to world.
But if we turn to an essential property of a natural kind in picking out the reference of a naturalkind term, we would have to treat the natural-kind term as an abbreviation of a definite
description. Suppose we pick out the reference of ‘water’ by investigating its chemical structure.
In such a case, we would have to consider anything that satisfies ‘the stuff that is H2O’ to be the
reference of ‘water’. There is no guarantee, however, that the stuff that satisfies this definite
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description in a possible world is the same stuff that satisfies the definite description in the actual
world. Therefore, scientific essentialism isn’t central to Kripke-Putnam’s theory of reference; to
the contrary, it may result in a consequence that is contradictory to the idea that proper names
and natural-kind terms are rigid designators.
What is central instead to Kripke-Putnam’s theory of reference is the idea that the reference of a
rigid designator is fixed by direct or indirect (deferred) ostension. Kripke makes this point very
clear with the following consideration. Suppose a cat doesn’t turn out to be an animal but turns
out to be an automaton. In such a case, says Kripke, the correct thing to say isn’t that a cat
doesn’t exist but that a cat isn’t an animal as we originally thought it was. Kripke says,

The original concept of cat is: that kind of thing, where the kind can be identified by
paradigmatic instances. It is not something picked out by any qualitative dictionary definitions.75
But how can direct or indirect (deferred) ostension fix the references of a proper name and a
natural-kind term in a way that can make them rigid designators? Kripke-Putnam’s idea is that a
proper name and a natural-kind term rigidly designate the entities that they refer to in the actual
world. But if the reference-relation in the actual world is to be explicated in terms of direct or
indirect ostension, the reference of a proper name or a natural-kind term would be highly
indeterminate. One can refer to many different things by direct or indirect ostension. The only
way to solve this problem, as Kripke admits himself, is to appeal to a speaker’s intention. But by
appealing to a speaker’s intention, we would give up much of Kripke-Putnam’s theory of
reference. There is simply no way of appealing to a speaker’s intention without associating a
proper name or natural-kind term with definite descriptions; we cannot articulate a speaker’s
intention merely by invoking direct or indirect ostension. In the passage quoted above, Kripke
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says that the original concept of cat is that kind of thing. But that kind of thing is almost an
empty concept. What is the reference of ‘water’? According to Kripke-Putnam’s theory, it is also
that kind of thing, since reference cannot be picked out by any “qualitative dictionary
definitions”. The semantic machinery provided by Kripke-Putnam’s theory is so barren that it
seems almost meaningless to say that a proper name or natural-kind term is a rigid designator.
With such a skimpy explanation, we have little idea of what an expression refers to even in the
actual world. But then, to say that an expression refers to the same entity in every possible world
seems of little semantic importance.
The initial question that drove us here is whether a causal theory of reference can provide
a reductive account of the reference relation; the relation between ‘Aristotle’ and Aristotle,
‘water’ and water, ‘cat’ and the class of cats, etc. None of the causal theories of reference that
have been examined—the causal-informational theory, the teleological theory, Fodor’s
asymmetric dependence theory, and Kripke-Putnam’s causal-historical theory—fills the bill.
This raises the doubt for the sustainability of the correspondence theory of truth. According to
Marian David, one of the chief motivations for the deflationary theory is “that no physicalistic
explanation of semantic and intentional notions—a fortiori no physicalistic explanation of
representation and similar relations—is forthcoming.”76 But why is it such a big problem?
Because without a reductive theory of reference the correspondence theory would fail internally.
The correspondence theory of truth for sentences stems from the idea that truth is a dyadic
relation, and as such the theory is intended to provide an account of the nature of the semantic
relation between indicative sentences and external conditions. Since the number of indicative
sentences is infinite, such an account should be given in a systematic/recursive way—via an
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account of the nature of the semantic relation between the constituents of indicative sentences
and external conditions. This is the reason that a physicalistic explanation of the notion of
reference is required by the correspondence theory of truth. Unfortunately, no physicalistic
explanation of reference, and this motivates a search for an alternative theory of truth; i.e., the
deflationary theory of truth.
This internal problem of the correspondence theory, however, stirred even a greater
suspicion about the correspondence theory of truth; that this theory may be based on a wrong
conception of truth. This is the second motivation of the deflationary theory of truth.

1.3.2. The Motivation II—The Role of Truth
Devitt says that one of the major differences between the correspondence theory and the
deflationary theory of truth is that whereas the focus of the correspondence theory is on the
nature and the role of truth, the focus of the deflationary theory is on the nature and the role of
the truth term; for example, of ‘true’.77 What Devitt says here tells us something important about
the deflationary theory of truth. To see why let’s take a look at what Horwich says about the
problems with the inflationary theory of truth including the correspondence theory. Horwich
states that the inflationary theory of truth is based on two related misconceptions: first, truth has
some hidden structure that needs to be discovered; and secondly, we can explain central
principles employing the term ‘true’, and thereby solve a host of problems in logic, semantics,
and epistemology.78
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According to Horwich, however, such an idea is based on the misconception of the truth
term, and this misconception is caused by an incorrect application of a linguistic analogy.
Predicates such as ‘is magnetic’ and ‘is diabetic’ ascribe substantive properties to their bearers in
the sense that the properties ascribed by these predicate are real ingredients of the world. Since
‘is true’ is linguistically similar to these substantive predicates, it has traditionally thought
thought that the truth predicate also ascribes a substantive property to its bearers.
If we go beneath the surface, however, we find that the truth predicate serves a very
different function. Despite its surface structure, the function of the truth predicate is not to
ascribe a substantive property to its bearers. The function of the truth predicate is simply “to
permit the formulation of generalizations (including laws of logic) that would otherwise call for
substitutional quantification, or some alternative device of 'infinite conjunction.”79 This idea—or
some ideas similar to it—was already defended by those philosophers whose views of truth
sowed the seeds for contemporary deflationism. For example, Ramsey’s redundancy theory of
truth (or “no-theory” of truth), Strawson’s performative theory of truth, the prosentential theory
of truth developed by Belnap, Camp, and Grover, and last but not least Quine’s thesis of truth as
a device of semantic ascent offered dramatically deflated analyses of the function of truth.80 As
Devitt points out, they all focused on the truth term, not truth itself; more precisely, their
attitudes are that the nature of truth can only be revealed through the analysis of the nature and
the role of the truth term. This attitude is also adopted by contemporary deflationists such as
Horwich, Field, Williams, Leeds, Hill, and so forth. In this sense, it may be said that the
79
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deflationary theory of truth is the result of applying the time-honored philosophical method that
has been employed by analytically-minded philosophers to truth terms.81
So, the deflationist focuses on the question of how we use the truth term or what we use
the truth term for. The deflationist’s answer is that we use the truth term simply as “ersatz” for
substitutional quantifiers or infinite conjunctions (or disjunctions). In other words, the purpose
for which we employ the truth predicate is “purely logical”. For example, when we want to
endorse, agree, or affirm what someone stated, but we don’t remember exactly the sentence he
uttered, we employ the truth predicate: e.g. ‘What Oscar said is true’. We also employ the truth
predicate when we want to generalize an infinite (or a finite) of sentences or propositions. For
example, instead of stating that if John is tall, then John is tall, if Mark is a man, then Mark is a
man, and so forth, we state that any statement of the form “If P, then P” is true. Or we may
employ the truth predicate when we want to say that a theory is true when we cannot state each
and every statement that constitutes the theory. For example, when we state that Einstein’s
theory is true while we don’t know each and every statement constituting his theory, we employ
the truth predicate as an ersatz for substitutional quantification or any alternative device enabling
us to express the generalization.
In each of these cases, we don’t employ the truth predicate to ascribe a substantive property to a
statement, proposition, or a sentence. For example, when we state that what Oscar said is true,
we don’t ascribe to the sentence that Oscar uttered a property that is part of the world. This is the
difference between the truth predicate and other predicates such as ‘is magnetic’ and ‘is diabetic’,
since when we employ the latter predicates, we ascribe properties that are part of the world to the
bearers of these predicates. For example, when we state a sentence of the form
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1) X is magnetic,

we ascribe to X the property of being magnetic that is part of the physical world. On the other
hand, when we state a sentence of the form

2) X is true,

we don’t ascribe to X (a sentence, statement, or proposition) a property that is part of the physical
world. Superficially, both 2) and 3) have the linguistic form 3) as follows:

3) X is F.

The property of truth, however, is an entirely different kind from the property of being magnetic;
whereas being magnetic is a physical property, being true or truth isn’t. Truth is a purely logical
property in the sense that it is a purely inferential property. The only function served by ‘is true’
in a statement of the form 2) is that it enables us to infer X itself. So, if we know that

4) X = ‘Snow is white’ (or X = the proposition that snow is white)

we can infer 5) from 2):
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5) Snow is white.82

Of course, the term ‘is magnetic’ also has an inferential function; we can infer from 1) a
statement of the form 6):

6) X is not a plastic.

The question, however, is what makes these inferences possible. In order to infer 6) from 1), we
need to make an empirical investigation of the nature of the property of being magnetic; we need
empirical tests and observations to connect the property of being magnetic to the property of not
being a plastic. That’s not the case, however, with the inferential relation between 2) and 5). In
order to infer 5) from 2), we only need to understand English and the non-theoretical
identification 4). None of them requires an empirical investigation or a theoretical justification.
Anyone who understands English would agree that ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white;
‘Grass is green’ is true iff grass is green; and so forth. Put simply, whereas the inference of 6)
from 1) is made possible by a physical theory of magnetism, the inference of 5) from 2) is made
possible by infinite conjunctions such as 7) and 8) that we trivially accept:

7) ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white; ‘Grass is green’ is true iff grass is green; and so
forth.

8) The proposition that snow is white is true iff snow is white; the proposition that grass is
green is true iff grass is green; and so forth.
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So, one of the two core theses of the deflationary theory is that what we mean by a truthstatement of the form 1)—X is true—is exhausted by 1*) in the following:
1*) If X = ‘Snow is white’ (or the proposition that snow is white), then snow is white; if X =
‘Grass is green’ (or the proposition that grass is green), then grass is green; and so on.

We cannot generalize 1*) in the usual way by invoking objectual quantification, since objectual
quantification doesn’t permit quantifying into expressions that occur inside quotation marks. We
may appeal to substitutional quantification, but even if we did, we would still want to express the
generalization in ordinary language. The truth predicate serves this purpose with the help of
some ancillary devices; e.g. quotation marks or a nominalizing phrase (‘the proposition that’). As
Quine says, to express the generalization of 1*), we engage in semantic ascent by using ancillary
devices while we use the truth predicate to cancel off the effect of semantic ascent. Moreover,
what enables the truth predicate to serve this purpose is our willingness to accept the instances of
the disquotational schema (DS) and the equivalence schema (E):

(DS) ‘p’ is true iff p.
(E) <P> is true iff P.

The instances of these schemas are epistemologically (or conceptually) fundamental; we accept
them trivially or a priori. Besides, truth has no other role to play; the sole purpose of truth
consists in facilitating generalizations. So, no inflated theory—a theory of truth that says more
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than what is stated by an instance of (DS) or (E)—is needed. This is the second core thesis of the
deflationary theory of truth.
Presented this way, what is stated by the deflationary theory is so thin that one may
wonder how such an impoverished theory can produce a fruitful discussion. When it comes to
deflationism, however, a fruitful discussion isn’t so much generated by what is stated by the
theory as what is denied by the theory. Since the deflationary theory of truth isn’t of one kind,
what is denied by the deflationary varies from theory to theory. That said, there are some claims
commonly denied by deflationary theories of almost any kind. First, deflationism denies the idea
that truth has a serious explanatory role to play. To say that truth has a serious explanatory role
to play is to say that the role of truth goes beyond expressing generalizations. So, in order to
defend deflationism, it must be shown that the truth predicate, in all the contexts in which it is
used, is employed merely as a device of expressing generalizations. In particular, the deflationist
must make sense of all the major philosophical principles involving the notion of truth without
inflating the role of truth beyond what is acknowledged by the deflationary theory. This is a
difficult task, because the use of the truth predicate is paramount. Consider some examples of
philosophical principles involving the notion of truth: ‘The meaning of a sentence involves its
truth condition’; ‘True beliefs facilitate successful behavior’; ‘The success of a scientific theory
is best explained by its truth’; ‘Psychological laws essentially involve truth and reference’; and
so forth. The deflationary theory must accommodate all these principles without assigning any
additional role to the notion of truth.
What makes the deflationist project even more difficult is that many philosophically important
notions—such as the notions of representational or semantic content, intentionality, meaning,
realism, and anti-realism—have been deployed in a very close connection with the notion of
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truth. In particular, the notions of representational content and intentionality are so tightly
connected with the notion of truth that it would be inconsistent if one adopts a deflationary
attitude toward the notion of truth while one adopts an inflationary attitude towards the notions
of representational content and intentionality. The question is then what it is to give a
deflationary account of the notions of representational content and intentionality. The two
deflationists that I will discuss in this thesis—Horwich and Field—offer slightly different
answers to this question. I will discuss it in Chapter 4.
The deflationist adopts a similar attitude toward the notion of reference as she does
toward truth. For example, Horwich sees that the role of reference terms (such as ‘refers to’, ‘is
about’, etc.) consists in enabling us to obtain valuable information from other people’s beliefs.
Suppose someone said ‘John is the inventor of Viagra’. By knowing that ‘John’ refers to the guy
living next door, I can learn that the guy living next door invented Viagra.83 The whole point of
de re, as opposed to de dicto, attribution of content is simply to make such an inference possible.
But if this is the only function served by reference terms, then all we need is an instance of the
reference schema (R) below:

(R) (x)(Tokens of *n* refer to x iff n = x). 84
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Just as the function or utility of the truth predicate determines the kind of a theory of truth that is
needed, so does the function or utility of the reference predicate determine the kind of a theory of
reference that is needed.
To sum up, the gist of the second motivation for the deflationary theory of truth is that the
roles of truth terms and reference terms are not such that they require substantive/deductive
theories. Given the roles that truth terms and reference terms play, theories of truth and reference
need nothing more than what is stated by the instances of the disquotational or equivalence
schemas for truth and reference. This is also the reason why Field eventually got to renounce the
view he defended in “Tarski’s Theory of Truth.” In “Tarski’s Theory of Truth,” Field assumed
that the role of truth is similar to the role of valence; that is, just like the notion of valence, the
notion of truth has a causal-explanatory role. Construing the role of truth on a par with the role of
valence, Field argued for the need of a reductive theory of reference. Field no longer defends the
view; he now construes the role of truth as a purely logical device. In the next chapter, we will
see how radically Field changed his view of truth from the days of “Tarski’s Theory of Truth.”
He says that he’d like to think that by advocating radically opposed views he’d have gotten it
right once. Let’s see whether his wish can come true.

66

Chapter 2. Field’s Pure Disquotationalism

2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will discuss Field’s version of deflationism—the theory he calls ‘pure
disquotationalism’. I do not intend to give a full characterization of Field’s theory from the
beginning; I intend it to be unfolded as the discussion of the theory evolves. So, at the outset, I
will only give a brief account of Field’s pure disquotationalism. 85
Field defines pure disquotationalism as the view that the notion of truth is at bottom
purely disquotational. To understand what Field means by this claim, we first need to understand
what he means by the ‘purely disquotational’ notion of truth. According to Field, to say that the
notion of truth is purely disquotational is to say that the notion of truth has the following two
features:

i)

‘true’ as it is understood by a given person applies only to an utterance (or a sentence)
that that person understands, and
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ii)

for any utterance (or a sentence) ‘p’ that a person X understands, a truth-ascription of
the form ‘‘p’ is true’ is cognitively equivalent for X to the utterance ‘p’ itself; for X, to
say that ‘p’ is true is to say that p.86

As will be explained later, Field changes his view on the feature i) in response to the criticism
raised of it. I will also argue later in this chapter that pure disquotationalism doesn’t need the
feature i) and will be better off without it. For these reasons, a more detailed explanation of the
feature i) will be saved for a later discussion.
Unlike the feature i), the feature ii) will be with Field’s disquotational theory of truth as
far as this theory goes—it is the core feature of the purely disquotational notion of truth. As a
version of deflationism about truth, Field’s pure disquotationalism defends certain ideas of truth
that are shared by other types of deflationism—truth is a purely logical notion in the sense that
its role is expressive, and not explanatory; truth is not a notion of which the nature has to be
explained by a substantive.87 Here, a ‘substantive’ theory can be understood as any theory of
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truth that gives a more inflated account of truth than what is stated by instances of the pure
disquotational schema (DS) in the following:

(DS) ‘p’ is true iff p.88

By stating that a truth-claim—for example, ‘‘Snow is white’ is true’—is as a whole cognitively
equivalent to a truth-less claim— ‘Snow is white’—the pure disquotationalist makes it clear that
a substantive theory of truth is not called for when the notion of truth is construed in the purely
disquotational sense. If the truth-claim ‘‘Snow is white’ is true’ is as a whole cognitively
equivalent to ‘Snow is white’, then the following biconditional is true as a matter of simple
identity:

‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white.

accept the claim that ‘is true’ isn’t a predicate, the prosententialist analysis of the function of truth terms sheds light
on the understanding of the deflationary conception of truth; in particular, on the understanding of deflationist view
of the role of truth. The prosententialist view of truth seems to have been inspired by Strawson’s view of truth (see
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So, on the purely disquotational conception of truth, an instance of (DS) is a logical truth; it is
tautologous to say that ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. But then, no further
explanation is needed for why ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white. In this sense, the concept
of truth is exhausted by what is implied by the instances of (DS) when truth is construed in the
purely disquotational sense. Also in this sense, no substantive theory of truth is needed that
analyzes the nature of truth in terms of other concepts.
In Field’s pure disquotationalism, the feature ii) is also at the heart of the claim that truth
is nothing but a logical device. This can be explained as follows. In order to make sense of the
logical function served by the notion of truth, the cognitive equivalence thesis isn’t required. To
say that the notion of truth has a logical function is to say that we appeal to the notion of truth as
a device of expressing generalizations. For example, we appeal to the truth predicate when we
want to express our agreement with an utterance, but we cannot articulate it. Suppose I want to
express my agreement with what John said, but I don’t remember exactly the sentence he uttered.
In such a case, the truth predicate is indispensable—by saying ‘What John said is true’, I can
express my agreement, which I couldn’t do if I didn’t have the truth predicate.89 Taking another
example, suppose we want to generalize an infinite conjunction such as ‘If 1+2 =3, then 1+2=3;
if Fido is an animal, then Fido is an animal; and . . .’ We cannot generalize this infinite
conjunction by appealing to usual, objectual quantification (e.g. (p)(if p, then p)), because we
cannot quantify into sentential positions—sentences are not names. The truth predicate is handy
in these cases, because the truth predicate enables us to talk about sentences while it also cancels
89
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out the effect of talking about sentences. As Quine says, we can talk about sentences by using
quotations—quotations are devices for naming sentences.90 But the truth predicate has the force
of canceling the effect of talking about sentences—by saying that the sentence ‘Snow is white’ is
true, we can say that snow is white. In this sense, the truth predicate is a device for disquotation.
That the truth predicate has this feature is made explicit by the disquotational truth schema (DS):
‘p’ is true iff p. As long as we accept the instances of this schema, we can explain the logical
function served by the notion of truth. But an instance of (DS) doesn’t by itself imply that a
truth-claim of the form ‘‘p’ is true’ is cognitively equivalent to a truth-less claim ‘p’; it only
implies that they have the same truth-value.91
So, in order to make sense of the logical function served by the notion of truth, we don’t
need the cognitive equivalence thesis. The pure disquotationalist’s claim, however, isn’t simply
that the notion of truth has a logical function—his claim is that there is no other function served
by the notion of truth. Here, the cognitive equivalence thesis is required—more precisely, it is
required because truth isn’t construed as an explanatory notion in Field’s purely disquotational
theory of truth. According to Field, truth doesn’t play a causal-explanatory role in explanations
of meaning and the success of behavior.92 If the notion of truth had a causal-explanatory role, the
truth predicate would express a causal-explanatory property. But then, the notion of truth would
be construed on the par with the notions of being magnetic, being H2O, and so forth. The result
would be totally inconsistent with the core thesis of pure disquotationalism—no theory of truth
other than what is implied by the instances of the pure disquotational schema (DS) is needed. If
90
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the notion of truth is construed on the par with the notions of being magnetic, being H2O, etc.,
then the nature of truth couldn’t be exhausted by the instances of the disquotational schema. So,
from the purely disquotationalist point of view, the cognitive equivalence schema is needed to
make sure that truth is nothing but a logical notion; that it isn’t an explanatory notion.
The cognitive equivalence thesis, however, confronts several difficult problems. One of
them is that it conflicts with the modal properties of truth. If a truth-claim such as ‘‘Snow is
white’ is true’ is cognitively equivalent to ‘Snow is white’, then an instance of (DS) is a
necessary truth; it is a logical truth. This feature of the purely disquotational truth, however,
doesn’t go well with the modal properties of the ordinary notion of truth. This problem will be
discussed in the next section.
Another problem with the cognitive equivalence thesis is related to the feature i)
mentioned above—that ‘true’ as it is understood by a given person applies only to an utterance
(or a sentence) that that person understands. Field needed this feature to defend the cognitive
equivalence thesis; that is, the feature i) is subordinate to the feature ii).93 In order to say that the
left-hand side and the right-hand side of ‘iff’ in
‘p’ is true iff p
are cognitively equivalent, it is essential that the sentence replacing ‘p’ at the left side means the
same as the sentence replacing ‘p’ at the right side. There is more than one way to have this
condition met; for example, the pure disquotationalist may say that the sentence replacing ‘p’ at
the left side belongs to the same language that the sentence replacing ‘p’ at the right side does,
and there is interpersonal synonymy within a language. In other words, if the pure
93
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disquotationalist assumes that the same sentence-type is understood in the same way by different
speakers in a language, he can easily have the condition met.
This road is blocked to Field—he skeptical of interpersonal synonymy.94 As a skeptic of
interpersonal synonymy, Field looked to another way of having the condition met. Thus, Field
characterizes the purely disquotational truth predicate as one that is ascribed to a sentence as it is
understood by a speaker—he says, “As a rough heuristic, we could say that for a person to call
an utterance true in this pure disquotational sense is to say that it is true-as-he-understands-it.”95
So, Field needed the feature i) as a way of making sense of the feature ii).
The feature i), however, causes a serious problem—probably an even more serious
problem than the problem with not accommodating the modal properties of truth. If we accept
Field’s characterization of the purely disquotational notion of truth, then we wouldn’t be able to
ascribe the truth predicate to a sentence in a language that we don’t understand. Initially, Field
wasn’t so much worried about this problem; his initial attitude was that if the purely
disquotational notion of truth diverges from the ordinary notion of truth in this respect, then it is
not a problem with pure disquotationalism but a problem with how ordinary people use the truth
predicate. 96 This attitude had to be changed when he confronted the objection raised by Shapiro.
This will be discussed in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.
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See H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content” and “Attributions of Meaning and Content” in his
Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press, 2001. Field’s skepticism about interpersonal synonymy
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H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University
Press, 2001, p. 106.
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Field says that his initial attitude was simply to bite the bullet, and say that the disquotational truth predicate
cannot be applied to a sentence that one doesn’t understand. See H. Field, “Postscript: Deflationist View of Meaning
and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, p. 147.

73

In responding to the objection raised by Shapiro, Field makes a considerable change to
his initial thesis of disquotationalism.97 Field doesn’t state explicitly how his ideas have changed,
but I will try to make it clear in the section 2.2.3. Although the changes Field makes to his initial
thesis is helpful to solve the objection raised by Shapiro, they are not enough to entirely fix the
problem. So, in the last section of this chapter, I will propose a different solution to the problem
from Field’s. This new solution proposes a disquotational theory of truth that doesn’t have the
feature i). I will argue that the disquotational notion of truth isn’t immanent to a truth-ascriber’s
understanding of a language. In pure disquotationalism, it is the notion of truth-conditions—not
the notion of truth itself—that has to be construed as being immanent to a language that a truthattributor understands.98 By making the distinction between the notion of truth and the notion of
a truth condition, the disquotationalist may resolve some of the most vexing problems with the
theory.

2.2 The Modal Objection
2.2.1 The Problem and a Misunderstanding
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See H. Field, “Postscript: Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact. Also
see S. Shapiro, “The Guru, The Logician, and The Deflationist: Truth and Logical Consequence,” Nous, 37 (1),
2003: 113-132.
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I am inclined to think that a minimalist needs to take the more radical position that talk of truth makes sense
primarily in connection with our own language, and makes sense for other languages only insofar as they are
translatable into our own. ("Truth is an immanent notion", as Quine puts it.)

H. Field, “Critical Notice: Paul Horwich’s Truth,” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 59, 1992, pp. 321-330, p. 325.
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The modal objection to Field’s pure disquotationalism is that Field’s theory of truth gets
the modal properties of the truth predicate wrong. The objection was raised by various people;
for example, Marian David, Vann McGee, W. Kunne, Ray Buchanan, and, most of all, Field
himself.99 Interestingly, Putnam raised the same objection to Tarski’s definition of truth—that in
Tarski’s definition of truth, a biconditional such as

1) ‘Snow is white’ is true (in English) iff snow is white

becomes a logical, thereby, necessary truth.100 The modal objection raised to Field’s
disquotational theory is basically to the same effect. That is to say, in Field’s theory, an instance
of (DS) such as ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white is construed as having the following
modal status:

2)  (‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white).

The reason why the modal status of an instance of the disquotational schema is construed along
the lines of 2) is that an instance of (DS) is considered a logical truth—it is a tautology. Given
the cognitive equivalence thesis that was explained previously, the truth-claim that ‘Snow is
99

See M. David, Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth, Oxford University Press,
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deflationary interpretation of Tarski’s theory of truth on this very ground. See S. Soames, “What is a Theory of
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Something Else”, New Literary History17: 61-79, 1985.
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white’ is true is cognitively equivalent to the truth-less claim that snow is white. In Field’s
disquotationalism, an instance of (DS) is true as a matter of simple identity.101 But then, an
instance of (DS) is a logical truth, and therefore, the modal status of an instance of (DS) should
be understood along the lines of 2).
Field’s position on the modal properties of the notion of truth has gone through some
changes. At first, Field took a radical position—he said that the purely disquotational notion of
truth is the one that makes counterfactual claims C1 and C2 come out equivalent:

C1: If we had used the word ‘white’ differently, ‘Grass is white’ might have been true.
C2: If we had used the word ‘white’ differently, grass might have been white.102

To say that the counterfactual claims C1 and C2 are equivalent is to say that the way we use the
word ‘white’ doesn’t affect the truth condition of ‘Grass is white’. To say that C1 and C2 are
equivalent implies that it is necessary that ‘Grass is white’ has the truth condition that grass is
white. But that is possible only if the way we use words doesn’t affect the truth condition of a
sentence. So, by claiming that the purely disquotational notion of truth is the one that renders C1
and C2 equivalent, Field wanted to make it clear that purely disquotational truth is a useindependent notion. More precisely, Field’s point is that when the notion of truth is understood
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See H. Field, “The Deflationary Conception of Truth,” in G. McDonald and C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and
Value. Oxford: Blackwell, 55-117.
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See H. Field, “The Deflationary Concept of Truth,” in G. MacDonald and C. Wright (eds.) Fact, Science and
Morality, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, p. 58.
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in the purely disquotational sense, the truth condition of a sentence is characterized
independently of the semantic—meaning or use properties—of a sentence.103
To say that C1 and C2 are equivalent is obviously at odds with the ordinary notion of truth.
That is to say, ordinary folks would hardly take ordinary subjunctive conditionals C1 and C2 to
be equivalent or the subjunctive statement 2) above to be true. Consider Marian David’s
objection to Field’s disquotationalism:

So maybe (D) (‘p’ is true if and only if p) has to be understood as the statement of a law-like
regularity. Such an interpretation would perhaps permit the definition to occupy some middle
ground between a necessary equivalence and a material biconditional. But this interpretation
is not plausible either, for (D) supports the wrong subjunctives:
a) If ‘Snow is green’ were true, then snow would be green.104
b) If ‘Snow is white’ were not true, then snow would not be white.
Both subjunctives are false. If the sentence ‘Snow is green’ were indeed true, then that would
be so either because we would be using the word ‘green’ as we do now and snow would be
green or because snow would be white and we would be using the word ‘green’ to mean
what we now mean by ‘white’. If a) were correct, we could make snow green quite easily,
namely simply by choosing to use ‘green’ from now on as we used ‘white’ until now.
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In the same paper where Field characterizes the purely disquotational notion of truth as the one making C1 and C2
equivalent, he says that he understands a theory of truth as a theory of a truth condition. What he means by this is
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Similarly for b); if it were correct, we could make snow stop becoming white simply by
using ‘white’ to refer to, say, the color of fruit bars.105

According to David’s argument, ordinary folks consider subjunctive conditionals such as
a) and b) false because we understand the subjunctive clauses such as ‘If ‘Snow is green’ were
true’ and ‘If ‘Snow is white’ were not true’ as describing counterfactual situations in which we
use the words differently. In other words, according to David, ordinary folks understand
subjunctive truth-statements such as 3) and 4) as expressing 3o) and 4o) in the following
respectively:

3) ‘Snow is green’ might have been true.
4) ‘Snow is white’ might not have been true.
3o) In some possible world, we might have used the word ‘snow’ or ‘green’ in such a way
that the sentence ‘Snow is green’ is true in the world.
4o) In some possible world, we might have used the word ‘snow’ or ‘white’ in such a way
that the sentence ‘Snow is white’ is not true in the world

To say that we ordinary folks understand 3) and 4) in terms of 3o) and 4o) respectively is to say
that ordinary people’s understanding of the modal properties of ‘true’ is different from the pure
disquotationalist’s. According to the pure disquotationalist, the modal property of ‘true’ is such
that an instance of (DS) is necessarily true; for example, it is a necessary truth that ‘Snow is
white’ is true iff snow is white. According to David, however, this isn’t the way we, ordinary
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M. David, Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth, Oxford University Press, 1994.
pp. 130-131.
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folks, understand the modal properties of ‘true’. Ordinary folks understand the modal properties
of ‘true’ as having to do with the meta-linguistic, semantic, or use properties that words might
have. Therefore, we don’t consider subjunctive conditionals such as a) and b) to be true. To think
that a) and b) are true, says David, is to have the crazy idea that if we had used words differently,
snow might have been green or snow might not have been white.106 In other words, to think that
a) and b) are true is to think that we could change world easily by changing the way we use
words.107
Is David’s argument sound? Although this argument succeeds in posing a serious
challenge to Field’s theory, it has its own flaw. I will discuss its flaw before discussing its merit.
According to David, a subjunctive truth-statement such as a) or b)—‘If ‘Snow is green’
were true, snow would be green’ or ‘If ‘Snow is white’ were not true, snow would not be
white’—is “unambiguously” false.108 The fact of the matter, however, is much more complicated
than that—the meaning of a subjunctive truth-statement is ambiguous. David’s understanding of
a subjunctive truth-statement reveals only one aspect of the meaning of a subjunctive truthstatement; it doesn’t exhaust the entire meaning of a subjunctive truth-statement. Granted, we
sometimes understand subjunctive truth-statements such as 3) and 4) in terms of 30) and 4o). That
may also reflect ordinary folks’ immediate response to subjunctive truth-statements such as 3)
and 4). But our ordinary notion of truth is a mixed bag, and this many-sidedness of the notion of
truth is accentuated when it is conjoined with modality.

106

M. David, Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth, Oxford University Press, 1994,
Ch. 4.
107
M. David, Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth, Oxford University Press, 1994,
Ch. 4.
108
M. David, ibid.

79

Depending upon a speaker’s intention in a specific context, subjunctive truth-statements
such as 3) and 4) can also be understood in terms of 3pd) and 4pd), not only in terms of 3o) and 4o):

3pd)

Snow might have been green.

4pd)

Snow might not have been white.

We sometimes mean 3pd) and 4pd) when utter subjunctive truth-statements such as 3) and 4).
Let’s suppose the Pope said ‘The earth is flat’ to Galileo when Galileo was excommunicated
several hundred years ago. Suppose Galileo responded to the Pope by saying ‘What you say
might have been true in another world’. Here, Galileo doesn’t use the truth predicate in the way
that David understands it. In this context, Galileo isn’t interested in the usage of a word. What
Galileo intends to say in this context isn’t that if we had used the word ‘earth’ differently, the
Pope’s utterance e might have been true. What he intends to say is rather that the Pope’s
utterance (‘The earth is flat) might have been true if and only if the earth would have been flat
itself. So, in a context in which a speaker isn’t interested in the semantic/use properties of a
sentence, a subjunctive truth-state of the form ‘‘p’ might have been true’ should be understood in
terms of ‘It might have been that p’, rather than ‘In some possible world, we might have used the
sentence ‘p’ in such a way that ‘p’ is true in that world.’
It is a misconception about the modal properties of truth to think that subjunctive truthstatements such as 3) and 4) should always be understood in terms of meta-linguistic subjunctive
statements such as 3o) and 4o). We sometimes intend to make a meta-linguistic statement such as
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3o) or 4o) in uttering a subjunctive truth-statement such as 3) or 4). But this doesn’t exhaust the
entire purpose of a subjunctive truth-statement. In other contexts, in uttering a subjunctive truthstatement, we simply want to talk about the modal properties of the world. In such a context, we
don’t want the semantic properties of words to vary from one possible world to another possible
world; namely, when we want to talk about the modal properties of the world rather than words,
we need to keep the truth condition of a sentence constant from world to world. If the truth
condition of a sentence changes from world to world, we cannot talk about the modal properties
of the world. We cannot, because we would not talk about the same world when the semantic
properties of words change. When we talk about the modal properties of the world, however, we
talk about different ways the same world might have been. So, when we want to talk about the
modal properties of the world, we need to keep the semantic properties constant from world to
world. Therefore, in such a context, the modal statement 2)— (‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow
is white)—is what we need.
Viewed this way, it is unfair to say that Field’s pure disquotationalism is entirely wrong
about the modal properties of truth. To the contrary, a certain aspect of the modal properties of
‘true’ requires Field’s purely disquotational understanding of the modal properties of truth.
Unfortunately, David misses this point. In the passage quoted above, David says
If a)—If ‘Snow is green’ were true, then snow would be green—were correct, we could
make snow green quite easily, namely simply by choosing to use ‘green’ from now on as we
used ‘white’ until now.109

Of course, no disquotationalist would claim that we can make snow have the color green just by
choosing to use the word ‘green’ in the way we use ‘white’ now. That is a crazy idea. David
109
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credits this crazy idea to the disquotationalist, because he understands the subjunctive truthstatement ‘‘Snow is green’ were true’ in terms of a subjunctive meta-linguistic statement. David
understands

5) if ‘Snow is green’ were true

in terms of 5*) in the following:

5o) if we used the word ‘green’ in the way we use the word ‘white’ in the actual world.

If 5) is understood in terms of 5*), then to say that a) is true implies that we can easily make
snow green by choosing to use a word differently. So, David credits this crazy idea because he
thinks that 5) can be understood only in terms of 5*).
The subjunctive truth-statement 5), however, can be understood in terms of 5pd) in the
following:

5pd) if snow were green,
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if one’s intention in uttering 5) is to talk about the modal properties of the world. In such context,
a)— If ‘Snow is green’ were true, then snow would be green—is true. This is the reason why the
purely disquotational conception of truth has a point. When we make a subjunctive truthstatement such as ‘What the scientist said might be true’, we don’t make a modal statement about
the use of a sentence. After all, if it makes sense to say that our purpose of stating that ‘Snow is
white’ is true is simply to state that snow is white (at least in some contexts), then the
disquotationalist view of the modal properties of truth should make sense as well. In making a
truth-statement of the form ‘‘p’ is true’, are we always interested in the semantic properties of ‘p’?
If the answer is no, then a subjunctive truth-statement of the form ‘‘p’ might have been true’ can
be understood in terms of an object-level subjunctive statement ‘It might have been that p’.
David’s mistake is not to see this aspect of the truth predicate.
That said, Field’s pure disquotationalism still owes us an explanation of how a
subjunctive truth-statement can be about modal properties of the semantic, use-dependent
features of words. Although David and other critics of pure disquotationalism got one aspect of
the modal properties of ‘true’ wrong, they are right about the other aspect. In uttering a
subjunctive truth-statement of the form ‘‘p’ might have been true’, we sometimes intend to make
a modal statement about the semantic, use properties of the words. How can this nondisquotational—or, as Field puts, “inflationary”—reading of a subjunctive truth-statement be
accommodated by Field’s pure disquotationalism? Ever since Field proposed the theory, he has
attempted several solutions to respond to this question. In the following, I will examine the mostoften discussed solution among them—the quasi-disquotational solution.

83

2.2.2 The Quasi-Disquotational Solution
The term ‘quasi-disquotational’ is from the quasi-disquotational notion of truth that Field
introduces in order to accommodate the non-disquotational reading of a subjunctive truthstatement.110 Before explaining Field’s account of the quasi-disquotational notion of truth,
however, it may be helpful to have knowledge about Field’s general strategy in dealing with
problems of this sort—the problems caused by the discrepancy between the ordinary notion of
truth and the purely disquotational notion of truth. From the beginning, Field was fully aware of
that the ordinary notion of truth often diverges from the purely disquotational notion of truth. As
was stated previously, Field characterizes purely disquotational truth as a use-independent notion.
The ordinary notion of truth, however, is not a use-independent notion. Put more accurately, the
ordinary notion of truth has both aspects—the use-dependent aspect and the use-independent
aspect. At times, we employ the truth predicate without having any intention of giving semantic
information about the sentence to which it is ascribed. At other times, we employ the truth
predicate with an intention to give semantic information about the sentence to which it is
ascribed. Parallel with this duality, the ordinary truth predicate is sometimes ascribed to a purely
orthographic sentence-type, and at other times it is ascribed to a sentence-type that has its
semantic properties built into it.
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See H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact. Field also
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and Content” and “Postscript: Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact.
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To say that purely disquotational truth is a use-independent notion is to say that the
purely disquotational truth predicate isn’t ascribed to a purely orthographic type but to a
sentence-type that has semantic properties built into it. Most of all, if the truth predicate is
ascribed to a purely orthographic type, it doesn’t make sense to say that the truth-claim ‘‘Snow is
white’ is true’ is cognitively equivalent to the truth-less claim ‘Snow is white’. Only when ‘Snow
is white’ at the left-hand side of ‘iff’ in the biconditional
‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white
is understood as meaning the same as ‘Snow is white’ at the right-hand side, it makes sense to
say that the truth-statement at the left-side is as a whole cognitively equivalent to the truth-less
statement at the right side. Since the cognitive equivalence thesis is the core idea characterizing
the purely disquotational notion of truth, the purely disquotational truth predicate is meaningful
only when it is ascribed to a sentence-type that has semantic properties built into it. In this sense,
Field says that the sentence replacing ‘p’ at the left-hand side of the disquotational schema (DS)
should be construed as a computational type—a sentence-type individuated in terms of its
computational properties.111 In Field’s account, the meaning of an expression is explained in
terms of its computational properties; namely, the inferential/conceptual roles and the indication
relations of the expression.112 Moreover, since Field is skeptical of interpersonal synonymy, it
doesn’t make sense to talk about the interpersonal sameness of a computational property. So, in
Field’s theory, the sentence ‘Snow is white’ at the left side and the right side of ‘iff’ in the
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biconditional above is to be understood in terms of a computational sentence- type understood by
individual speaker X.
Viewed this way, it is inevitable that the purely disquotational notion of truth conflicts
with the modal properties of the ordinary notion of truth. An aspect of the ordinary notion of
truth is that a subjunctive truth-statement of the form i) in the following can be understood in
terms of a meta-linguistic subjunctive statement of the form ii):

i) ‘p’ might have been true.

ii) In some possible world, ‘p’ might have had semantic properties that make ‘p’ in that
world true.

If we understand the sentence replacing ‘p’ in i) as a computational type—or a sentence-type that
has its semantic properties built into it—we cannot derive ii) from i). It simply doesn’t make
sense to say that sentence ‘p’ as I understand it now might have had different semantic properties.
We can derive ii) from i) only when we construe the sentence replacing ‘p’ as a purely
orthographic type. Only then, does it make sense to say that the sentence replacing ‘p’ might
have had different semantic properties than it has now. In order to derive ii) from i), we should
detach the semantic (use) properties from the syntactic/orthographic properties of a sentence.
Whenever the purely disquotational notion of truth diverges from the ordinary notion of
truth in this way, Field tries to explain the latter in terms of the purely disquotational notion of
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truth, using fairly limited additional resources.113 This is Field’s general strategy in dealing with
problems of this sort.114 The motivation behind Field’s invoking the quasi-disquotational notion
of truth should be understood from this perspective as well—the quasi-disquotational notion of
truth is at bottom purely disquotational, but some additional resources are invoked in its
characterization. As with almost everything else, Field offers more than one characterization of
the quasi-disquotational notion of truth.115 I chose to present here the original version, and it
defines the quasi-disquotational notion of truth as follows:
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(*) S is trueqd (at possible world v) iff S is to be translated by a sentence of mind (in the actual world) that is
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(See “Postscript to “Deflationary Views of Meaning and Content.”)
This version is wrong because ‘S’ is here a purely orthographic type, therefore, it doesn’t make sense to “translate”
‘S’ into a sentence of mine. We cannot translate a purely orthographic type. The other one (**) has a problem as
well:
(**) SX,u is trueqd (at possible world v) iff SX,u is to be translated by a sentence of mine (in the actual world)
that is purely disquotationally true (at v).
About this version, Field says that it avoids using two distinct truth predicates—the purely disquotational one and
the quasi-disquotational one—because the truth predicate is ascribed to a computational type ‘SX,u’. So, he says that
we can use the single truth predicate by taking ‘S’ in (*) as a computational type, rather than a purely orthographic
type. But does (**) use the single truth predicate? It still uses two distinct predicates: the quasi-disquotational and
purely disquotational truth predicates. So, I am not sure why Field says that he now can use the single truth predicate
with version (**). That doesn’t mean that it is wrong to consider the truth predicate ascribed to ‘SX,u’ quasidisquotational. It should be considered quasi-disquotational in Field’s theory, because Field characterizes the purely
disquotational truth predicate as being ascribed to a sentence “as-I-understand-it”. Although ‘SX,u’ is a
computational type, it is a computational type understood by speaker X at the possible world v. The sentence
replacing ‘SX,u’ doesn’t occur as a sentence-as-I-understand-it. So, it is outside the extension of the purely
disquotational truth predicate as characterized by Field. But then, the truth predicate ascribed to ‘SX,u’ is quasidisquotational by “Field’s own standards.” Field offers another approach (***), and that approach will be discussed
in the next section.
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(QD)  (S is trueqd iff Ʃp[Ǝm(m is the meaning of S and m is the meaning of ‘p’ in the actual
world) & ‘p’ is truepd]),
and analogously,
 [S has the quasi-disquotational truth condition that p iff Ǝm(m is the meaning of S and
m is the meaning of ‘p’ in the actual world)].116

In order to see how the quasi-disquotational notion of truth helps addressing the modal objection,
let’s consider a subjunctive truth-statement 1) in the following:

1) ‘Snow is green’ might have been trueqd,

where 1) is understood along the lines of 1*) in the following:

1*) In some possible world, the sentence ‘Snow is green’ might have had semantic
properties that make ‘Snow is green’ true in that possible world.

The reason why there is such confusion is that Field restricted the extension of the purely disquotational truth
predicate to a sentence-as-I-understand-it. Once we get rid of this restriction, we can consider the truth predicate
ascribed to ‘SX,u’ in (**) as purely disquotational. Interestingly (and curiously), Field goes against his own
restriction in the approach (***) that will be discussed later. The problem is that he doesn’t say explicitly that he
dropped the restriction.
116
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Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 131.
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Given that 1) is understood in terms of 1*), the truth predicate in 1) cannot be construed as being
ascribed to a computational type. So, ‘Snow is green’ in 1) should be construed as a purely
orthographic type. That means the truth predicate employed in 1) isn’t purely disquotational.
To accommodate the truth predicate employed in 1), Field correlates the purely
orthographic sentence-type ‘Snow is green’ with a true sentence ‘p’ in one’s own language,
where ‘p’ is construed as a computational type. The purpose of correlating the purely
orthographic type ‘Snow is green’ with a computational type ‘p’ in one’s language is to extend
the purely disquotational truth predicate to the purely orthographic type ‘Snow is green’ by
invoking the meaning m that connects the purely orthographic type with the computational
type.117 So, strictly speaking, the truth predicate is ascribed to a sentence ‘p’ in one’s own
language, where the truth condition of this sentence is exhaustively explained in terms of the
purely disquotational schema (DS). Using the equivalence of meaning as a bridge, however, the
purely disquotational truth predicate can be indirectly ascribed to the purely orthographic type
‘Snow is green’. In this sense, the truth predicate employed in 1) is quasi-disquotational;
although it isn’t itself disquotational, it is defined in terms of the purely disquotational truth
predicate using the notion of a meaning-entity m as an additional resource.
By invoking the notion of meaning-entity m, says Field, the quasi-disquotational notion
of truth tries to “mimic” a non-purely disquotational notion of truth. Notice that one of the
essential features of the purely disquotational notion of truth is that it cannot be ascribed to a
purely orthographic type. In this sense, the ordinary notion of truth isn’t purely disquotational,
since it can also be meaningfully ascribed to a purely orthographic type, thereby yielding modal
117

Does it make sense to say that a purely orthographic type ‘Snow is green’ has the same meaning that a sentence
‘p’ in my language does? It does—the idea is to think that the semantic property of a sentence is detachable from the
sentence as a purely orthographic type.
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properties that are opposite to the modal properties of the purely disquotational notion of truth.
By introducing the quasi-disquotational notion of truth, Field tries to bridge the gap between the
ordinary notion of truth and the purely disquotational notion of truth. To see why let’s consider
how the quasi-disquotational definition of truth (QD) analyzes the substantive truth-statement 1):
‘Snow is green’ might have been true. According to (QD), 1) is to be analyzed in terms of 1qd) in
the following:

1qd) ‘Snow is green’ might have had the same meaning m that a sentence ‘p’ in my language
has in the actual world, and ‘p’ is truepd.

Analogously, to say that ‘Snow is green’ might have the truth condition that p’ is to say that
there is a meaning m such that ‘Snow is green’ has m at some possible world, and m is the
meaning of ‘p’ in the actual world. Intuitively, this is very similar to how we understand the
ordinary notion of truth as it is ascribed to a purely orthographic type. An aspect of the ordinary
notion of truth is such that a sentence x has the truth condition that p because x means that p.
(QD) captures this basic intuition, but it does so by invoking a computational type ‘p’ in one’s
own language. Once we invoke a sentence in our own language, we can define the ordinary
notion that diverges from the purely disquotational one using an additional resource as a bridge.
How plausible is this solution? To answer this question, let’s consider some concerns that
can be raised about it. One is that (QD) invokes both interpersonal synonymy and the notion of a
meaning-entity. To do so, however, doesn’t cohere with Field’s view of meaning, since Field is
skeptical about the notions of interpersonal synonymy and a meaning-entity. How serious is this
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concern? The answer is “Not so much.” First, (QD) can be easily modified into a weaker version
that doesn’t invoke interpersonal synonymy or a meaning-entity. Instead, the pure
disquotationalist can invoke the notion of a “similarity of meaning-characteristics”, which means
the similarity of conceptual/inferential roles and indication relations (or simply, the similarity of
use-properties). But then, (QD) may be modified into (QD*) as follows:

(QD*)  (S is trueqd iff Ʃp[Ǝ ( is the meaning-characteristics of ‘p’ in the actual world
and S has meaning-characteristics similar to ) and ‘p’ is truepd]),

and analogously,
 [S has the truth condition that p iff Ǝ ( is the meaning-characteristics of ‘p’ in the
actual world and S has meaning-characteristics similar to )].

As long as (QD) can be understood in terms of (QD*), it doesn’t seem a serious problem that
(QD) invokes interpersonal synonymy and the notion of a meaning-entity.
There is, however, a more serious problem with the quasi-disquotational approach: the
problem that the explanation provided by the quasi-disquotational approach (QD) puts things
“backwards”. The crux of the modal objection is that it is of no use to say that a biconditional
such as 2) in the following is a necessary truth if we construe ‘Snow is green’ at the left side as a
computational type:
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2) ‘Snow is green’ is true iff snow is green

To say this, a critic might say, is to admit that the truth of a computational type can be
understood only in terms of the semantic properties of a sentence. Unless we understand the
meaning of ‘Snow is green’ at the left side in a certain way, we could not consider 2) a necessary
truth. But then, says the same critic, it is only fair to say that the truth and truth condition of a
computational type should be understood in terms of the meaning of a purely orthographic type.
True, the quasi-disquotational definition (QD) almost captures this idea, but it makes an
incorrigible mistake---it invokes the truth of a computational type ‘p’. The whole point of my
objection, says the critic, is that it is phony or spurious to say that the truth—in particular, truth
condition—of a computational type ‘p’ is use-independent. How can it be so if the notion of a
computational type is to be understood in terms of semantic notions? A sentence of my language,
for example, ‘Snow is green’, being a computational type, has the truth condition that snow is
green because of its semantic properties. Hence, it is putting the matter backwards to invoke the
truth and truth condition of a computational type in defining the truth and truth condition of a
purely orthographic type. The pure disquotationalist may invoke the truth or truth condition of a
sentence in one’s own language in order to accommodate the truth and truth condition of a
sentence in another language (see the next section). But the modal objection is different, because
the modal objection raises a question of the very ground of the truth and truth condition of a
sentence in my own language.
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If there is a critic arguing this way, he seems right—there is something wrong with the
quasi-disquotational approach. Not surprisingly, Field later abandons it for another solution.118
Before discussing the new solution, however, let’s consider what needs to be done. What needs
to be done, as Field says, is to “mimic” a non-purely disquotational theory of truth.119 A ‘nonpurely disquotational theory of truth’ means a theory of truth that invokes a semantic notion in
the characterizations of truth and truth conditions. Field’s purely disquotational theory of truth
doesn’t do this, since the purely disquotational truth predicate is ascribed to a computational type,
not a purely orthographic type. Thus, the meaning of the purely disquotational truth predicate is
exhausted by the instances of the disquotational schema (DS): ‘p’ is true iff p.
This aspect of the purely disquotational theory—that it doesn’t invoke a semantic notion
in the characterization of truth and truth conditions—is the very reason for the modal objection.
To address the modal objection, therefore, the purely disquotational theory has to invoke a
semantic notion in the characterization of truth and truth conditions. The question is whether and
how this can be done in a way that doesn’t cause a conflict with the purely disquotational
conception of truth. Recall that Field characterizes purely disquotational truth as a useindependent notion. In order to avoid an inconsistency, Field tried to invoke a semantic notion in
such a way that the notion of truth is still purely disquotational at the bottom level, while the
semantic notion bridges the purely disquotational notion with the non-purely disquotational
notion of truth. This is the idea behind the quasi-disquotational solution, but it doesn’t seem to
work.
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He abandons in the postscript to “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,”; see “Postscript: Deflationist
Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact.
119
H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, p. 132.

93

So, the pure disquotationalist has to find an alternative way in which he can invoke a
semantic notion in the characterizations of truth and truth conditions without causing an
inconsistency within the theory. In a sense, it seems that the pure disquotationalist has arrived at
an impasse. Field’s initial idea was that the notion of truth ascribed to sentences of almost any
kind—including purely orthographic types—can be explained in terms of the purely
disquotational notion of truth ascribed to sentences in one’s own language. The modal objection
raises a serious doubt about the plausibility of this view. There is, however, another—even more
serious—problem that challenges the idea. That has to do with extending the purely
disquotational truth predicate to a sentence in another language. So, before discussing how Field
modifies his initial views, I will examine another problem challenging them.

2. 3. Attributions of Truth to Sentences in Another Language
In this section, I will discuss Field’s account of attributions of truth to sentences in
another language. This is by no means a simple matter, because he has kept changing his views.
So, unless great care is taken, a presentation of his view will be either misleading or inconsistent.
Field’s initial position was that the purely disquotational truth predicate cannot be ascribed to a
sentence in a language that one (the truth-attributor) doesn’t understand. So, his discussion on the
attribution of truth to a sentence in another language was exclusively focused on how to extend
the purely disquotational truth predicate to a sentence in a language that one understands. Even
here, Field offered several different accounts.120 A major change, however, was brought about
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Field offers two accounts—the extended disquotational and the modified disquotational theories of truth. Both of
them belong to the translational approach that will be discussed in the next section. Both of them rely on the
translation of a sentence in another language to a sentence in one’s own language while the purely disquotational
notion of truth ascribed to one’s own language serves as the rock-bottom of attributions of truth. The difference
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when Shapiro mounted a powerful argument against Field’s theory.121 Field finally changed his
position—he now grants that the purely disquotational truth predicate can be ascribed to a
sentence that one doesn’t understand.122 In doing so, however, he ends up inducing a major
change in his theory. As will be discussed shortly, the change is big enough to wonder whether
Field still holds onto the purely disquotational conception of truth.123
The discussion of this section will proceed as follows; first, I will explain Field’s original
views before they encountered Shapiro’s objection. Then, I will introduce Shapiro’s objection
and Field’s response to the objection. Third and last, I will criticize Field’s response to Shapiro’s
objection and thereby suggest a new solution that is slightly different from Field’s. This new
solution, if it works, will provide a way to hold onto the purely disquotational conception of truth.

2.3.1 Attributing Truth to a Sentence in a Language that One Understands
In this section, I will discuss Field’s original views about extending the purely
disquotational truth predicate to a sentence in another language. Since he initially denied
ascribing the truth predicate to a sentence that one doesn’t understand, the extensions of the truth
predicate in this section will be restricted to sentences that a speaker understands.

between them is that whereas the extended disquotational approach invokes the notion of
interlinguistic/interpersonal synonymy, the modified disquotational approach doesn’t. The difference between these
two approaches, however, isn’t so important in the discussion of the problems with Field’s pure disquotationalism.
So, I won’t discuss them. See H. Field, “The Deflationary Conception of Truth,” in G. McDonald and C. Wright
(eds.), Fact, Science and Value. Oxford: Blackwell, 55-117, and “Deflationary Views of Meaning and Content,” in
in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press, 2001.
121

S. Shapiro, “The Guru, The Logician, and The Deflationist: Truth and Logical Consequence,” Nous, 37 (1),
2003: 113-132.
122
123

See H. Field, “Postscript: Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact.
Field doesn’t say explicitly that he changed his views, although it is clear that he did so. See H. Field, ibid.
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Broadly, Field offers two different kinds of accounts for an ascription of truth to a
sentence in another language: the first is the translational approach and the other is the nontranslational approach.124 According to the translational approach, the truth of a sentence in
another language that one understands is defined in the manner of (Tr) as follows:

(Tr) S in another language L is trueqd iff Ʃp (S is translated into ‘p’ in my language, and ‘p’
is truepd).

According to the non-translational approach, the truth of a sentence in another language that one
understands is defined in the manner of (N-Tr) as follows:

(N-Tr) S in another language L (that one understands) is true iff S.

Of these two accounts, I will explain the non-translational approach before I explain the
translational approach.
The non-translational approach (N-Tr) is the result of applying the purely disquotational
schema (DS)

(DS) ‘p’ is true iff p
124

See H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” (1994), in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford
University Press, 2001.
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directly to a sentence in another language. Field says that it is a misconception of his theory that
the purely disquotational schema is applicable only to a sentence in one’s own language—the
schema can directly be applied to a sentence in any language as long as one understands the
language.125 Suppose I understand ‘La neige est blanch’ in French. But then, in the purely
disquotational conception of truth, to say ‘‘La neige est blanche’ is true’ is to say ‘La neige est
blanche.’ So, with this approach, the notion of truth ascribed to the French sentence ‘La neige est
blanche’ is exhausted by the biconditional 1) in the following:

1) ‘La neige est blanche’ is true iff la neige est blanche.

The biconditional 1) looks strange because it is a mixture of expressions belonging to two
different languages. Except for that, this approach seems perfect in grappling with the purely
disquotational conception of truth. The most important idea of the disquotational conception of
truth is that truth is a purely logical notion—the truth predicate is a sort of substitutional device
whose sole function is to express generalizations over sentences. The non-translational approach
(N-Tr) is faithful to this core idea of the purely disquotational conception of truth. In case one
doesn’t have a special need to express one’s understanding of a sentence in another language
using a sentence in one’s own language, 1) is all that is needed. According to Field, however,
this approach can be employed only for a sentence in a language that one understands—it cannot
be meaningfully applied to a sentence in a language that one doesn’t understand. But is this
125

H. Field, ibid.
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restriction necessary? Especially after Field recanted his initial position in response to Shapiro’s
objection, it is not clear whether this restriction is needed. I will argue later that Field’s theory
doesn’t need this restriction, and that will be my contribution to Field’s theory of truth.
Despite the fact that Field is quite content with the non-translational approach, he spends
a lot of time explaining the translational approach to an attribution of truth to a sentence in
another language. The reason, however, isn’t so much that we must understand a truth-statement
such as ‘‘La neige est blanche’ is true’ in terms of 2) in the following:

2) ‘La neige est blanche’ is true iff snow is white.

Rather, the reason is that a translational biconditional such as 2) should be explained within the
framework of the purely disquotational theory of truth. This is another misconception of Field’s
theory of truth—to construe Field as claiming we must understand an attribution of truth to a
sentence in another language in terms of a translational biconditional such as 2) above. Given
that Field grants the non-translational approach, that isn’t the reason why Field spends so much
time with the translational approach. His reason is rather that we sometimes express an
attribution of truth to a sentence in another language in terms of a translational biconditional
such as 2). A translational biconditional such as 2), however, challenges the purely
disquotational conception of truth, since the truth predicate involved in 2) cannot be considered
the purely disquotational truth predicate. According to 2), ‘La neige est blanche’ has the truth
condition that snow is white, but the nature of this truth-conditional relation cannot be explained
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independently of a semantic notion. In this sense, the notion of truth involved in 2) isn’t useindependent, and so it is at odds with the purely disquotational concept of truth.
To accommodate the notion of truth employed in a translational biconditional such as 2),
Field defines the notion of truth ascribed to ‘La neige est blanche’ in terms of the purely
disquotational notion of truth using the notion of translation as an additional resource. So, the
methodology is basically the same as the one used in addressing the modal objection; that is, the
truth predicate involved in 2) is the quasi-disquotational truth predicate (‘trueqd’), and it is to be
defined in terms of the purely disquotational truth predicate (‘truepd’), using the notion of
translation as a ‘limited additional resource’. This is the idea formulated by (Tr) above. The only
difference between (Tr) and (QD) is that whereas (QD) appeals to a prior notion of meaning as
an additional resource, (Tr) appeals to the notion of translation.126 So, like (QD), the plausibility
of (Tr) largely depends on whether the additional resource—the notion of translation—can be
explained in a suitably deflationary way. More precisely, the question is the following: can the
notion of translation be explained in a way that it doesn’t inflate the notion of truth beyond what
is allowed by the deflationary conception of truth?
In order to answer this question, it has to be made clear what it is to explain the notion of
translation in a way that doesn’t inflate the notion of truth beyond what is allowed by the
126

The idea underlying (QD) (the quasi-disquotational approach) and (Tr) (the translational approach) is the same—
truth is at bottom purely disquotational, and any notion of truth that isn’t purely disquotational should be explained
in terms of purely disquotational truth plus some additional resources. But then, why does Field invoke a prior
notion of meaning in addressing the modal objection? The main reason seems to be that he wants (as he says) to
mimic an inflationary notion of truth as much as possible. The intuition behind the modal objection is that the
sentences in our language might have had different meaning, and thereby they might have had different truth
conditions. When we make a modal statement like this, we construe sentences as purely orthographic types—
otherwise, it doesn’t make sense to say that the sentences in our language might have had different meanings and
truth conditions. So, it is indeed impossible to appeal to the notion of translation in dealing with the modal
objection—we can translate a sentence only if it is construed as an entity that has a certain meaning. That is to say,
we cannot translate a sentence construed as a purely orthographic type. On the other hand, when we ascribe truth to
a sentence in a foreign language, the sentence isn’t construed as a purely orthographic type. See H. Field,
“Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, p. 131.
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deflationary conception of truth. The deflationary conception of truth has it that truth is a purely
logical concept that doesn’t have an explanatory function. So, what is essential is that the notion
of translation be explained in a way that the notion of truth doesn’t play an explanatory role in an
account of meaning and content. There is, however, a dilemma here—that is, the notions of
meaning and truth are essentially connected to each other. Consider the meaning-to-truth schema
(M-to-T) as follows:

(M-to-T) If x means that p, then x is true iff p,

An instance of (M-to-T) is true a priori. It is a conceptual truth that if a sentence x means that p,
then x has the truth condition that p. From this it follows that the truth condition of a sentence is
a necessary condition for x’s meaning that p—to have the truth condition that p is essential to
mean that p. Speaking at the level of understanding language, (M-to-T) implies that we must
understand the truth condition of a sentence in order to understand its meaning. So, there is an
inseparable connection between the notion of meaning and the notion of truth or a truth condition.
The question is how to make sense of this connection without assigning an explanatory role to
the notion of truth or a truth condition.
It seems that the best way to make sense of this connection in a deflationary way is to
explain the nature of the connection in the way Horwich does.127 According to Horwich, a
127

Horwich offers a neat and simple explanation of the connection between the notion of meaning and the notion of
a truth condition. According to Horwich, the meaning of an expression x reduces the use-property of the expression,
U(x). The use-property U(x), however, doesn’t strongly determine its extension; namely its reference or truth
condition. So, we cannot infer the truth condition of a sentence x directly from the use-property U(x). For example,
suppose a sentence in another language x has a certain use property U(x). We cannot infer its truth condition directly
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deflationist can take the following two steps: first, a deflationist has to explain the notion of
meaning without employing a truth-conditional notion; and second, a deflationist has to explain
the connection between the notions of meaning and truth as a matter of a purely conceptual
(analytic) relation.128 Field agrees with this idea, although he doesn’t put the point as clearly as
Horwich does.129 Both Horwich and Field agree that the notion of meaning should be explicated
without employing a truth-conditional notion. In Horwich’s account, it is explicated in terms of
the notion of a use-property, and in Field’s account, it is explicated in terms of the notion of a
computation role; i.e., inferential/conceptual roles and indication roles of an expression. Given
that the notion of a use-property includes the notion of a computation role, there is no substantive
difference between their views in this regard. Field agrees with the second step as well—
according to Field, as long as a deflationist doesn’t explain the meaning-to-truth connection
without making a natural connection between them, he will be fine. What he means by ‘not
making a natural connection’ is that the nature of their connection is understood in a purely
conceptual way.130
But what is it exactly to explain the connection between the notions of meaning and truth
in a “purely conceptual” way? Put differently, what is it exactly to explain their connection
from this use-property unless we correlate the use-property U(x) with a sentence in our own language. Since the useproperty—which is the meaning-property in Horwich’s account—cannot of itself determine the extension of an
expression, truth-theoretic notions cannot be reduced to a use-property. So, there is no inconsistency between
reducing meaning to a use-property and the irreducibility of truth-theoretic notions. Once we explain a meaningattribution of the form ‘x means that p’ in terms of the notions of a use-property and translation, we “trivially” derive
the truth condition of x by appealing to the Meaning-to-Truth principle. There will be more discussion on Horwich’s
theory of meaning in Ch. 4 of this thesis. See P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.
128
P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 2 & 3.
129
The difference between Horwich and Field is that Horwich explains the connection between meaning and truth as
a matter of an instance of the schema (M-to-T), whereas Field doesn’t—he tries to define a non-purely
disquotational truth condition in terms of a purely disquotational condition plus some limited resources. He later (in
the postscript to “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact) says that he
was wrong in trying to do so. So, it seems that Field eventually accepted Horwich’s approach (which may be called
‘the schematic approach’).
130
See H. Field, “Deflationary View of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact: Oxford
University Press, 2001, p. p. 132.
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without making a “natural” connection between them? If deflationism about truth requires that
the connection between meaning and truth be explained in a “suitably deflationary” way, and if
this in turn requires that the nature of their connection be explained in a purely conceptual way, it
is important to be clear about what that implies. Field himself considers several different ways in
which we can explain the nature of the connection between meaning and truth in a purely
conceptual way; i.e., without making a natural connection between them. Broadly, there two
options available to the deflationist:

(I) There is a fact of the matter by virtue of which a sentence ‘s’ in another language L
means that p; or
(II) There is no fact of the matter by virtue of which a sentence ‘s’ in another language L
means that p.

If we accept (I), we can also accept interlinguistic synonymy. In addition, if we accept (I), we
can be equipped with a theoretical basis for accepting a meaning-entity. On the other hand, if we
accept (II), then we cannot accept interlinguistic synonymy. In addition, if we accept (II), we
cannot accept the notion of a meaning-entity. Field favors (II), but he doesn’t think that option (I)
is incompatible with the deflationary conception of truth as long as the notion of
interpersonal/interlinguistic synonymy is explained without invoking a truth-conditional notion.
Following Field, I will argue that both (I) and (II) are compatible with the deflationary
conception of truth. Suppose we explicate—as Horwich does—the notion of
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interpersonal/interlinguistic synonymy in terms of the notion of a use-property (or a
computational role). In such a case, a fact of the matter by virtue of which ‘s’ in another
language L has the truth condition that p is that ‘s’ in L and ‘p’ in my language have the same
use-property U(x). This doesn’t, however, result in a naturalistic reduction of the notion of a truth
condition; namely, (I) doesn’t lead us to an inflationary account of truth of the form (IP) as
follows:

(IP) ‘s’ in L is true iff p ↔ ‘s’ has the naturalistic property F.

First of all, a use-property is a potpourri of many distinct features of an expression; for example,
assertability conditions, inferential/conceptual roles, indication relations, etc. So, from the
statement that ‘s’ has the use-property U(x), we cannot infer that ‘s’ has a certain naturalistic
property F. Second, unless the use-property of ‘s’ in L is correlated with the use-property ‘p’ in
our own language, we cannot derive the truth condition of ‘s’ directly from its use-property. It is
one thing to say that ‘s’ has a certain use-property U(x), and another to say that ‘s’ means that p.
To say the latter, we should be able to correlate the use-property U(x) with a sentence ‘p’ in our
language. In this sense, both truth conditions and meaning are immanent notions when the notion
of meaning is explicated in terms of a use-property; we cannot talk about the meaning or truth
condition of a sentence that we don’t understand.131 If the use-property of ‘s’ in L has no match
131

The point here isn’t we don’t know the meaning or truth condition of a sentence that we don’t understand (which
is a tautology). The point is rather that neither the meaning nor the truth condition of a sentence is determined by its
intrinsic properties alone. I am sure that this is the case with Field’s disquotationalist theory of truth, but I am less
sure about whether it is with Horwich’s. One possible objection is that whether or not we can translate a sentence, it
must have a certain use-property, and this use-property determines the meaning and truth condition of a sentence.
The problem with this objection, however, is that Horwich denies that a use-property alone determines its truth-
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with a sentence in our own language, we wouldn’t be able to assign meaning or a truth condition
to ‘s’. But then, even if the notion of meaning reduces to the notion of a use-property (as it is
done in Horwich’s account), we cannot read off the meaning or truth condition of a sentence
from the use-property of a sentence alone. The fact that ‘s’ in L has a certain use-property cannot
of itself determine its meaning or truth condition—we should be able to correlate ‘s’ with ‘p’ in
our own language.
As a consequence, even if a deflationist accepts (I)—interpersonal/interlinguistic
synonymy—he doesn’t risk inflating the concept of truth. Given that the notion of meaning is
explicated in terms of many distinct features of an expression, and, in particular, meaning is a
more or less immanent notion in deflationism, there is no way to make a “natural” connection
between ‘x means that p’ and ‘x is true iff p’. The fact that a sentence in another language has a
naturalistic property F cannot of itself determine either its meaning or truth condition. But then,
the simplest way to explain the connection between meaning and a truth condition is to explain it
as a matter of the trivial, conceptual connection expressed by the schema (M-to-T).
Field, however, chooses an even safer option—option (II). It is beyond the scope of this
section to provide a full examination of Field’s account of meaning and content (see Ch. 4 for
more details). To give a brief account, though, there seem to be two reasons why Field is
skeptical about interpersonal/interlinguistic synonymy. First, Field explicates the notion of
meaning in terms of the meaning-characteristics of an expression, where this notion is further
conditional property (see Ch. 4 for a more detailed discussion. See also P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 2, 3, and 10). He
says that we can read off neither the meaning nor the extension of a predicate from its use-property alone. This can
only be understood as saying that unless we can match the use-property of an expression in another language with
the use-property of an expression in our own language, we can neither ascribe a meaning nor an extension to a
predicate. Therefore, neither Horwich nor Field seems to consider the meaning or truth condition of a sentence as
being determined by its intrinsic properties alone. But then, both meaning and truth conditions should be immanent
notions in their theories. The problem I try to solve, however, is how to recognize this feature of deflationism
without making the notion of truth per se an immanent notion.
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explicated in terms of the computational role of an expression; i.e., inferential/conceptual roles
and indication relation.. A computational role, however, is a very fine-grained notion; in
particular, the inferential/conceptual roles of an expression can vary from person to person even
within a language. For example, the computational role of ‘noodle’ in Sally’s idiolect may be
different from the computational role of ‘noodle’ in Tom’s idiolect even if both of them are
English speakers. Between speakers of different languages, the gap may well be even bigger. For
example, the Chinese word ‘麵’ is normally translated into ‘noodle’ in English. But the
computational role of ‘麵’ in a Chinese speaker’s idiolect is quite different from the
computational role of ‘noodle’ in an English speaker’s idiolect.132 But then, in Field’s theory,
what we mean by a meaning-attribution such as

3) ‘麵’ in Chinese means <noodle>,

is 4) in the following:

4) The meaning-characteristics of ‘麵’ in Chinese are most similar to the meaningcharacteristics of ‘noodle’ in English.
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First of all, Chinese people (in the past and maybe even now in rural places) use noodles as glue. So, the
inferential/conceptual roles of ‘麵’ are different from those of ‘noodles’ in English. Second, their noodles look very
different—if we say that noodles can have the shape of shell, many Chinese people will laugh at us. There are
numerous examples of this kind. The point is not merely that cultures are relative—physical circumstances are
sometimes very different alos. That means what is indicated by a word x in another language that is translated to, for
example, ‘tree’ in English can indicate things that are quite different from what is indicated by ‘tree’ in English. But
we still have to translate the word into ‘tree’, since there is no alternative. Translation is a way of trying to
understand another language by finding commonalities. Finding commonalities, however, is a matter of matching
and tailoring that can be done only from a translator’s point of view. There is a saying that translation is treason, of
which the point is just to emphasize how difficult it is to translate one language to another.
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So, by denying interpersonal/interlinguistic synonymy, Field defends the idea that a meaningattribution should be understood in terms of the “similarity”, not sameness, of meaningcharacteristics.
There is, however, another reason why Field is skeptical about
interpersonal/interlinguistic synonymy--he views meaning as not fully factual but partly
evaluative notion.133 Field defends a kind of projectivist theory of meaning and content that is
found in the theories of Quine, the simulation theory of mind, and others.134 According to this
theory, when we attribute meaning and content to another person’s utterances and mental states,
we project our own mental states—we understand another person’s utterances and mental states
by “empathizing” with the person’s mental states. To a certain extent, the idea seems like a
commonsense. It is inevitable that we project our own mental states in translation and
interpretation, because we use sentences from our own language when we translate sentences in
another language. A language, however, isn’t just a collection of words that contain information
about the world; it embodies a culture, ways the speakers of the language look at the world,
logical principles they accept, and so forth. Similarly, in interpreting other people’s mental states,
we often use ourselves as a model. We infer that a person is in mental state M by observing
behavior B because we are ourselves in the mental state M when we exhibit that behavior.
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If it is inevitable, at least to a certain extent, that we project ourselves in translation and
interpretation, in order to claim that there is a fact of the matter in meaning, it is essential to
show that there is interlinguistic/interpersonal synonymy. Consider ‘La neige est blanche’ in
French. We translate it into ‘Snow is white’, and thus say that it means that snow is white. But
the same sentence in French is translated into many different sentences in many different
languages. In order to say that there is a fact of the matter, we have to show that all the different
sentences translating ‘La neige est blanche’ mean the same thing. Unless this is shown, we have
to conclude that it is one thing that we translate it into ‘Snow is white’, and thereby claim that
‘La neige est blanche’ means that snow is white; it is another that Germans translate it into
‘Schnee ist weiss’, and thereby claim that it means that Schnee ist Weiss; it is yet another that
Koreans translate it into ‘눈은 하얗다’, and thereby claim that it means that 눈은 하얗다; and
so on.135 Each of these translations is considered “correct”, but if we cannot show that all these
sentences mean the same, we have to accept a relativistic conclusion of some sort. In other words,
although all of those translations and meaning-attributions are correct, they are not about exactly
one and the same fact; there isn’t “the” meaning-fact that all of these meaning-attributions are
about.
It is important, however, not to exaggerate this relativistic aspect of Field’s notion of
meaning. Although Field denies that there isn’t “the” correct translation, he still grants that there
are standards for translation—some translations are better than others.136 Most of all, before we

Strictly speaking, the phrases such as ‘means that Schnee ist Weiss’ and ‘means that 눈은 하얗다’ should be
written in German and Korean respectively.
136
To say that some translations are better than others is to say that a translation that is more similar in respect of
meaning-characteristics is better than a translation that is less similar in respect of meaning-characteristics. So, there
is an objective standard. However, the standards for translation and interpretation are not exhausted by an objective
standard; they also have a non-objective standard such as an interpreter’s background beliefs and values. In this
135
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project our background beliefs, we have to examine the meaning-characteristics of the foreign
expression. It is a more-or-less objective matter to examine the meaning-characteristics of an
expression, since it consists in examining the inferential/conceptual roles and indication relations
of an expression.137 Second, there should be a sufficient degree of the similarity of meaningcharacteristics. For example, we cannot translate ‘pomme’ in French into ‘banana’ in English
because there is a word in English—‘apple’—that is more similar in meaning-characteristics. So,
even if there is relativism in Field’s view of meaning, it isn’t too rampant. The kind of semantic
relativism defended by Field is that a meaning-attribution has a third parameter—the background
beliefs and values that are implicitly accepted by a translator or an interpreter.
Unfortunately, the relativistic side of Field’s theory of meaning is often exaggerated by
some of his critics. For example, Kunne states that Field’s “idiolectic disquotationalism” (as
Kunne calls the theory) cannot explain how there can be a contradiction in beliefs in the
following case.138 Suppose someone uttered ‘La neige est blanche’. Suppose further that Sally
responds to it by saying ‘That’s true’, whereas Tom responds to it by saying ‘No, that’s not true’.
Listening to their conversation, we think that Sally and Tom contradict each other. Kunne’s
objection to Field’s idiolectic disquotationalism is that Field’s theory cannot explain how Sally
and Tom contradict each other. Because Field denies interpersonal synonymy, there is no
guarantee that Sally’s understanding of ‘La neige est blanche’ is the same as Tom’s
understanding of this sentence. More precisely, even if both Sally and Tom translate ‘La neige
sense, there isn’t “the” correct translation or interpretation. See H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and
Content,” (1994), in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press, 2001.
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est blanche’ into ‘Snow is white’, there is no guarantee that ‘Snow is white’ in Sally’s idiolect
means the same as ‘Snow is white’ in Tom’s idiolect. So, in Field’s theory, when Sally said
‘That’s true’, she said that ‘Snow is whitesally’ is true, and when Tom said ‘That’s not true’, he
said that ‘Snow is whitetom’ is not true. Without assuming interpersonal synonymy, we cannot be
sure that ‘Snow is whitesally’ means the same as ‘Snow is whitetom’. Therefore, Field’s theory
cannot explain how Sally and Tom contradict each other.
The problem with Kunne’s argument is that he misses a crucial point about Field’s
skepticism about meaning—the reason why Field is skeptical about synonymy is that meaning
and synonymy are “evaluative” notions. The details of Field’s view on this point will be
explained in Ch. 4. A core idea of this view, however, is that a meaning-attribution or synonymyclaim should be understood as it is relativized to a meaning-attributor’s personal goal or interest.
Surely, this is a controversial idea, but this isn’t the place to discuss the controversies concerning
the view. Apart from the controversies, however, Field can explain the contradiction between
Sally’s and Tom’s claims by relativizing them to a listener. First, by listening to the
conversation between Sally and Tom, we infer 5):

5) Sally said that ‘Snow is white’ is true, and Tom said that ‘Snow is white’ is not true.

Second, unlike Kunne, we take ‘Snow is white’ to abbreviate ‘Snow is whiteme’. So on this
account, 5) has to be analyzed into 6):
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6) Sally said that ‘Snow is whiteme’ is true, and Tom said that ‘Snow is whiteme’ is not true.

But then, we don’t need to assume interpersonal synonymy in order to make sense of the
contradiction between Sally’s and Tom’s claims. As Kunne says, in Field’s disquotationalism,
we have to construe Sally’s truth-claim ‘‘Snow is white’ is true’ in terms of ‘‘Snow is whitesally’
is true’; similarly, Tom’s truth-claim ‘‘Snow is white’ is not true’ in terms of ‘‘Snow is whitetom’
is not true’. When we hear them talking, however, we interpret ‘Snow is white’ in terms of a
sentence in our own idiolect—‘Snow is whiteme’, and ascribe the truth predicate to this sentence.
So, even if the meaning of ‘Snow is whitesally’ ≠ the meaning of ‘Snow is whitetom’, we can make
sense of the contradiction between Sally’s and Tom’s claims.
That said, it is still perfectly possible that the meaning-characteristics of ‘Snow is whiteme’
in each person’s idiolect are “very similar.” My understanding of ‘Snow is white’ isn’t exactly
the same as your understanding of ‘Snow is white’, but they must have similar meaningcharacteristics. That is inevitable, because if they didn’t, we would not be able to get what we
want—for example, I say ‘I want an apple’, but you would give me a banana; I tell you that it
will rain tomorrow, and you would prepare a picnic in a park; and so forth. In other words,
unless the inferential patterns and indication relations of personalized/computational types (‘ptom’,
‘pmary’, etc.) are sufficiently similar, linguistic communications would fall into pieces. So, even if
there is no objective fact in the sense that an expression has “the” meaning, there is still some
objective basis for a meaning-attribution that Field should recognize. He does, but he should
have emphasized it more clearly. In order for us to have linguistic communications, our
understanding of a language should have some common basis. We can grant this common basis
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even if we don’t accept interpersonal/interlinguistic synonymy. But then, the difference between
those who accept interpersonal/interlinguistic synonymy and those who don’t isn’t so great.

2. 3. 2 Attributions of Truth to Sentences in a Language That One Doesn’t Understand

As was discussed in the previous section, Field’s account of attributions of truth to
sentences in another language doesn’t have a serious problem as long as we ascribe the truth
predicate to sentences in a language that we understand. An attribution of truth to a sentence in
another language can be accommodated by Field’s theory in terms of either (N-Tr)—by applying
the disquotational schema directly to a sentence in another language—or (Tr)—by invoking the
notion of translation. Field’s account, however, runs into a serious problem in accommodating an
attribution of truth to a sentence in a language that one doesn’t understand. As was mentioned
earlier, Field wasn’t much concerned about this problem—he declared that the purely
disquotational truth predicate cannot be extended to a sentence in a language that one doesn’t
understand.139 He simply didn’t see a reason for which we extend the purely disquotational truth
predicate to a sentence that we don’t understand. If the whole purpose of employing the truth
predicate is to express generalizations over sentences, we have no reason to extend the purely
disquotational truth predicate to sentences that we don’t understand. This idea, however, was
challenged by Shapiro’s thought-experiment. Shapiro’s thought-experiment goes as follows.140
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Suppose there is a guru who makes pronouncements about set theory; suppose further
that there is a disciple who thinks that everything the guru says is true, but who doesn’t
understand set theory; last, suppose that there is a logician who distrusts the guru’s settheoretical pronouncements, but likes to draw their number-theoretic consequences, which the
disciple understands. If the disciple trusts the logician’s acumen about logic, and if ‘p’ is a
number-theoretic sentence that the logician proves to be entailed by the guru’s set theory, then
the disciple will infer that ‘p’ is true, so p. Since the disciple believes everything that the guru
says to be true, and consequence preserves truth, the disciple infers that ‘p’ is true. According to
Field, the problem posed by Shapiro’s example is that “though the disciple understands this
conclusion, the reasoning is blocked if we can’t meaningfully apply ‘true’ to the guru’s
utterances.”141 To put the problem more clearly, the explanandum here is how the disciple infers
that p. Its explanans proceeds as follows:

The logician says ‘p’ is entailed by the guru’s utterance ‘s’ about set theory.
The disciple trusts the logician’s acumen about logic.
Therefore, the disciple infers that ‘p’ is entailed by ‘s’. (from i) and ii))
The disciple believes that consequence preserves truth.
Therefore, the disciple believes that if what the guru says about set theory is true—if
‘s’ is true—then ‘p’ is true. (from iii) and iv))
vi) The disciple believes everything that the guru says. (assumption)
vii) Therefore, the disciple believes that what the guru says about set theory—‘s’—is true.
(from vi))
viii) The disciple infers that ‘p’ is true. (from v) and vii))
ix) Therefore, the disciple infers that p. (from viii) plus the disciple’s knowledge of the
disquotational schema)
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)

The question here is how vii) can be accommodated by the pure disquotationalist theory.
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To respond to Shapiro’s objection, Field attempts several solutions. 142The first is to
construe ‘s’ as a sentence in a “potential” extension of a truth-attributor’s language. That is to
say, ‘s’ is a sentence that might exist in a truth-attributor’s future language if his understanding
were to improve.143 The problem with this solution, however, is that one’s language will never
improve to the point that he can understand all the true sentences in the world. For example,
what about a sentence that has not yet been uttered by anyone but can be potentially uttered by
someone in the future? Our ordinary understanding of the notion of truth allows us to ascribe the
truth predicate even to such a sentence. That is to say, we grant that even if we don’t understand
a sentence, it is either true or not true. Field seems to think that Shapiro’s objection is concerned
only with making sense of logical derivations, because at least here he recognizes the need to
ascribe to a sentence that one doesn’t understand. But Shapiro makes it clear that the problem
with Field’s disquotationalism (or deflationism in general) is that it “does not exhaust the
legitimate uses of the notion of truth.”144 Shapiro is right about this, since even if I don’t
understand quantum mechanics, I sometimes need to acknowledge that a sentence belonging to
quantum mechanics is true simply because most experts in the field hold that it is true. When we
accept experts’ opinions, we don’t necessarily understand what they say; we believe what they
say is true, because they are experts and we have no reason to undermine their credibility.
Knowledge by testimony provides another example. Imagine that I am in a Russian law court
where a witness is testifying in Russian. If I have no reason to doubt the witness’s reliability, I
would say that the witness’s testimony is true (even if I understand no word in Russian). Field’s
solution doesn’t work in these cases, since when we say that these sentence are true, we are not
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saying that these sentences will be true in the future when our understanding improves. Field
here changes the subject—the question is not what we will mean by a truth-attribution of the
form ‘‘s’ is true’ when our understanding improves. The question is what we mean by a truthascription now when we don’t understand a sentence.
Recognizing the problem with the solution appealing to a “potential expansion” of
understanding, Field offers a new solution.145 His new solution is formulated in (***) as follows:

(***) If SX,u is translatable as ‘p’ then (SX,u is true iff p)
[And if SX,u is translatable as ‘p’ then (SX,u has the truth condition that p).],

where ‘SX,u’ abbreviates ‘a sentence S as it is understood by an individual X in a possible world
u’, and ‘□‘ means ‘necessarily’. This new solution differs from Field’s previous solutions in two
respects. First, (***) is a schema, like the purely disquotational schema (DS) (‘p’ is true iff p).
So, according to this new proposal, we should treat a conditional statement such as 1)

1) If ‘La neige est blanche’ is translatable as ‘Snow is white’, then □ (‘La neige est blanche’
is true iff snow is white).

as an axiom.146 By treating a truth-statement such as 1) as an axiom, Field gives up the idea that
he held for a long time—that a non-purely disquotational truth predicate should be defined in
terms of the purely disquotational truth predicate (using fairly limited resources). Thus he says,
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I must have thought that the motivation for demanding a substantive theory of truth and truth
conditions and reference, like that advocated in Chapters 1 and 2, could only be undercut if
these notions are explicitly defined in terms of more-or-less logical notions plus translation.
But this seems a mistake: the argument for a substantive theory of truth conditions and
reference depends on taking truth conditions and reference as having a certain kind of
‘causal-explanatory’ role, as noted in the postscript to Chapter 1 ; and introducing a notion of
truth conditions by means of the schema (***) does nothing to make the notion ‘causal
explanatory’147

This is quite a change, since if we accept this schematic solution, we don’t need two
disquotational truth predicates—the purely disquotational and quasi-disquotational. That means
all the previous solutions invoking the quasi-disquotational truth predicate are no longer needed.
More precisely, if we accept this schematic solution, we don’t need the quasi-disquotational
solution (QD) to the modal objection (section 2.2.2) or the translational approach (Tr) that Field
offered to explain a truth-ascription to a sentence in another language that one understands. All
of these approaches attempt to define the ordinary truth predicate in terms of the purely
disquotational truth predicate using some additional resources. According to Field now, however,
all these approaches were based on a wrong idea—the idea that the notion of a substantive theory
of a truth condition would be needed unless a non-purely disquotational truth predicate is defined
in terms of the purely disquotational predicate using some additional resources. This idea is
mistaken because what really matters for the deflationary theory of truth is that the notions of a
truth condition and reference don’t have a certain kind of causal-explanatory role.
So, by proposing the schematic solution appealing to (***), Field induces a big change in
his purely disquotational theory of truth. Originally, Field characterized purely disquotational
truth as a use-independent notion; it is a notion that should be understood in a total separation
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from the semantic properties of a word. It was indeed this idea that resulted in the quasidisquotational approach (QD) and the translational approach (Tr). Field’s original ides was the
following. First, the notion of truth ascribed to a sentence in one’s own language can be
understood independently of a semantic notion, and in this sense, the notion of truth ascribed to a
sentence in one’s own language is purely disquotational. Second, the ordinary notion of truth
isn’t purely disquotational, since the notion of truth ascribed to a purely orthographic type or a
sentence in another language is not use-independent; it cannot be understood in a total separation
from a semantic notion. But this isn’t a problem as long as the ordinary notion of truth can be
defined in terms of the purely disquotational notion of truth using fairly limited resources. The
underlying idea here is to separate a truth-part from a meaning-part involved in a truth-claim; the
truth-part is exhaustively explained by the purely disquotational notion of truth ascribed to a
sentence in one’s own language, and the meaning-part is explained by invoking additional
limited resources. As was discussed throughout this chapter, however, this idea turned out to
have too many problems. It falls into infinite regress or circular reasoning when it is applied to
the modal objection, and it cannot accommodate a truth-ascription to a sentence in a language
that one doesn’t understand.148

So, at last, Field gives up the whole idea—the idea of

defining the ordinary notion of truth in terms of the purely disquotational notion of truth using
limited resources. But what does it mean to give up this idea? It means that Field gives up the
use-independent feature of the purely disquotational notion of truth. If he hadn’t characterized
disquotational truth as a use-independent notion—a notion that is entirely separated from a
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semantic notion—he wouldn’t have taken such a tortuous road. Although he doesn’t’ say it
explicitly, he makes it quite clear that he now gives up the use-independent feature of
disquotational truth. He says “I now prefer to do things in the more natural way.”149 The more
natural way is just to acknowledge that the notion of a truth condition cannot be understood
independently of a semantic notion. This new idea is exhibited by the schema (***).
Given that the purely disquotational notion of truth was originally characterized as a useindependent notion, does this have to be taken as giving up the purely disquotational theory as a
whole? In a sense, ‘yes’—Field now has no reason to keep the “purely” disquotational notion of
truth. From the broader perspective, however, this isn’t a disaster at all. It just means that a
version of deflationism—Field’s pure disquotationalism—has to be rejected. As Field says
himself above, even if the deflationary theory of truth will be sustained as long as the notions of
a truth condition and reference don’t have a certain kind of causal-explanatory role. So, even if a
deflationist has to acknowledge the inseparable connection between the notion of a truthcondition and the notion of meaning, the deflationary conception of truth can still be sustained.
But what if the schematic solution appealing to (***) is not the best solution that can be
offered by the pure disquotationalist? Although it is by no means clear whether there is a better
solution than (***), it is quite clear that the solution appealing to (***) has a problem. The
problem is that it still cannot accommodate an ascription of truth to a sentence in a language that
one doesn’t understand. According to Field, the schematic solution (***) better handles the
problem of ascribing the truth predicate to a sentence that one doesn’t understand, because it is
noncommittal when ‘SX,u’ is untranslatable. According to (***), if ‘SX,u’ is translated to ‘p’
which one understands, then it is necessary that ‘SX,u’ is true iff p. But if ‘SX,u’ is untranslatable,
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its truth condition is indeterminate—we cannot fill out the right-hand side of ‘iff’ in ‘□(SX,u is
true iff ___’.
It seems reasonable to consider the truth condition of an untranslatable sentence
indeterminate, since even an inflationist cannot do much better than that. An inflationist—for
example, a correspondence theorist or coherent theorist—may insist that the truth condition of a
sentence is determined by its intrinsic properties; for example, the causal properties of a sentence
or a sentence’s relations to other sentences. The problem with this claim is that the inflationist
has to prove that the truth condition of a sentence is determined by the intrinsic properties of a
sentence. In order to do better than the deflationist about the truth condition of an untranslatable
sentence, the inflationist should be able to show that the notions of truth and truth conditions are
reducible to the intrinsic properties of a sentence. As was discussed in Ch. 1, however, it is
extremely difficult to show that the notions of truth and truth conditions are reducible to the
intrinsic properties of a sentence. If such a reductive theory had been available, we wouldn’t now
be discussing the prospect of the deflationary theory. So, even an inflationist cannot help but
admitting that the truth of an untranslatable sentence is indeterminate.
When it comes to a deflationist, she has no other option but to accept the indeterminacy
of the truth condition of an untranslatable sentence. A deflationist cannot explain the truth
condition of a sentence by defining its truth condition of a sentence in terms of its intrinsic
properties. A deflationist cannot accept an explanation of the form as follows:

(IT) x is true iff p ↔ x has the property F.
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To accept an explanation of this form is inconsistent with the core ideas of a deflationary theory
of truth. Neither does it seem a reasonable idea to separate the notion of a truth condition from
the notion of meaning as Field did before he turned to the schematic solution (***). As was
discussed, the modal objection is raised because Field characterized the notion of truth ascribed
to a sentence in one’s own language as a use-independent notion. Besides, it would be
inconsistent to say that the truth condition of an untranslatable sentence is indeterminate if the
notion of a truth condition were not essentially connected to one’s understanding of the meaning
of a sentence. Last and the most important, even a deflationist has to offer some account of the
truth condition of a sentence. The only option available to a deflationist is to derive the truth
condition of a sentence from its meaning, while he explains the relationship between them in
terms of a purely conceptual connection. The idea is to accept an instance of the meaning-totruth schema (M-to-T)

(M-to-T) If x means that p, then x is true iff p,

as a conceptual truth. Both the meaning-to-truth schema and the schema (***) exhibit the idea
that the truth condition of a sentence is derived from its meaning as a matter of a simple
conceptual truth. In this way, the deflationist can avoid inflating a theory of truth while he
explains the minimal, conceptual connection between the notions of meaning and a truth
condition.
But if a deflationist has no other way of explaining the truth condition of a sentence
except by making use of the conceptual connection between the notion of meaning and the
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notion of a truth condition, then when the meaning of a sentence is indeterminate, he cannot but
say that its truth condition is indeterminate as well. One may here object that it is wrong to say
that the truth condition of a sentence is indeterminate just because the truth-attributor doesn’t it.
A deflationist about truth, however, has no other option. To say that meaning or a meaningascription is not immanent to one’s understanding of an expression is to say that the meaning of
an expression is determined by some intrinsic properties of an expression alone. To say this,
however, is highly dangerous to the core ideas of deflationism. Suppose the meaning of a
sentence x is determined by its intrinsic property F in the manner of (IM):

(IM) x means that p ↔ x is F.

Let’s add to (IM) the meaning-to-truth principle: x means that p → x is true iff p. The result
would a justification of the inflationary principle of truth (IT) mentioned above: x is true ↔ x is
F. Although a deflationist recognizes meaning-constituting properties (e.g. computational roles,
indication relations, and use-properties), she doesn’t say that we can read off the meaning of an
expression from these meaning-constituting properties alone.150 That is to say, even if an
expression x in another language has its use-properties intrinsically, if we cannot translate it into
an expression in our own language, we wouldn’t be able to attribute a meaning to it.
So, it seems that the notion of meaning is essentially immanent in a deflationary theory
of truth and meaning. This implies the truth condition of an untranslatable sentence is essentially
indeterminate in a deflationary theory as well. So, if the notion of meaning is essentially
150
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immanent, so is the notion of a truth condition. Therefore, if we accept the deflationary notion of
truth, we should treat the truth condition of a sentence that we don’t understand as indeterminate.
According to Field’s schema (***), however, not only the truth condition but also the
truth of an untranslatable sentence is indeterminate—according to this schema, we cannot say
anything about the truth of an untranslatable sentence. But then, the schema (***) cannot address
Shapiro’s counterexample; we cannot still make sense of the disciple’s derivation of the truth of
a number-theoretic sentence, which depends on the disciple’s believing the truth of a settheoretic sentence which he cannot understand. Besides, Field’s solution doesn’t square with the
ordinary intuition of truth; we’re inclined to think that a sentence can be true or not true even if
we don’t understand it. For these reasons, I will propose a solution that is different from Field’s.

2.3.3 A Different Approach

What I will argue for in this section is that the purely disquotational notion of truth is not
an immanent notion. The disquotational notion of truth is usually construed as an immanent
notion—the notion of truth that can be meaningfully ascribed only to a sentence that one
understands. That is also how Shapiro understands the disquotational notion of truth, and that’s
the whole motivation for his thought-experiment—to show that there is a serious problem with
this feature of disquotational truth.151 In this section, however, I will argue that it isn’t essential
that disquotational truth be understood as an immanent notion.

151

As was mentioned earlier, however, Shapiro thinks that it is a problem with a deflationary notion of truth in
general. See S. Shapiro, ibid.
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Assuming that there is no way to solve Shapiro’s problem while we keep the schema
(***), I propose a different schema—a schema that allows us to apply the disquotational schema
to a sentence that we don’t understand. The schema is (****) in the following:

(****) □(‘SX,u’ is true iff SX,u).

The major difference between this schema and Field’s schema (***)
(***) If SX,u is translatable as ‘p’ then (SX,u is true iff p)
[And if SX,u is translatable as ‘p’ then (SX,u has the truth condition that p).]
is that it doesn’t invoke the notion of translation in characterizing the truth of a sentence. So, if
we accept the schema (****), then we can make sense of the truth of a sentence in another
language or another person’s idiolect without invoking a sentence in one’s own language. This
difference is important in addressing Shapior’s objection. Shapiro’s objection is that the
disquotationalist cannot make sense of the disciple’s ascription of the truth predicate to the
guru’s set-theoretic sentence that the disciple doesn’t understand. Now, the disquotationalist can
explain it as following. First, notice that the truth predicate in (****) is ascribed a sentence
understood by a speaker X at a possible world u. Surely, this is also the case in Field’s schema
(***), which is an important improvement from Field’s initial position. Initially, Field took the
disquotational schema (DS)
(DS) ‘p’ is true iff p
to be the basis of the disquotational notion of truth. This idea led him to define a non-purely
disquotational notion of truth in terms of the purely disquotational notion of truth plus limited
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resources. By proposing the schema (***), however, Field gave up the idea—what is at the
bottom of the disquotational notion of truth is no longer the disquotational schema (DS) but the
schema (***). A big difference between (DS) and (***) is that the truth predicate in (***) is
ascribed to a sentence understood by speaker X at a possible world u—the truth predicate isn’t
ascribed to a sentence understood by me at the actual world. So, (DS) is a special case of (***)—
it is a case in which a speaker and an attributor are the same person.
The schema (****) respects this feature of (***)—that the truth predicate ascribed to a
sentence understood by a speaker is logically prior to the truth predicate ascribed to a sentence
understood by a truth-attributor. Applying this idea to Shapiro’s guru-example, we first ascribe
the truth predicate to a set-theoretic sentence understood by the guru as follows:

1)  (‘Sguru’ is true iff Sguru).

Second, if ‘S’ is a sentence in a foreign language, and ‘Sguru’ is translatable into ‘p’ in my
language, we can derive 2) from 1):

2)  (‘Sguru’ is true iff p ).

But step 2) isn’t necessary to make sense of the truth of the guru’s set-theoretic sentence; it can
be fully made sense of by 1). Suppose we don’t understand ‘Sguru’. We can still make sense of the
truth of the guru’s sentence, since the truth predicate in 1) is ascribed to a sentence understood by
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the guru, and not by me. Initially, Field ascribed the disquotational truth predicate primarily to a
sentence understood by me, and this generated Shapiro’s objection. As a response, Field
proposes the schema (***) in which the disquotational truth predicate is primarily ascribed to a
sentence understood by a speaker. So, Field’s schema (***) is close enough to solve Shapiro’s
objection except that it still invokes the notion of translation. By invoking the notion of
translation, Field in effect nullifies the effect of ascribing the disquotational truth predicate to a
sentence understood by a speaker. It is mysterious why Field still invokes the notion of
translation after he liberates disquotational truth from the narrow confinement of sentences
understood by a truth-attributor. It seems that Field is still in the grip of his initial idea that the
disquotational truth predicate is primarily ascribed to a sentence understood by me.
The schema (****) corrects this problem with the schema (***). As a consequence, it can
finally address Shapiro’s objection. A drawback with the schema (****), however, is that it
cannot characterize the truth condition of a sentence. As was stated earlier, a truth condition is an
essentially immanent notion when we construe it in the deflationary sense. In his “The
Deflationary Conception of Truth,” Field says,

Note that as I understand a theory of truth, it could equally be called a theory of truthconditions; the question that forms the subject of a theory of truth is substantially equivalent
to the question of what it is for an utterance or state of thinking to have a given set of truthconditions.152
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H. Field, “The Deflationary Conception of Truth,” in G. McDonald and C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and
Value. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, pp. 55-117, p. 55.
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Ironically, Field’s disquotational theory of truth denies the need of a theory of truth conditions
that explains what it is for an utterance or state of thinking to have a given set of truth condition.
No theory is needed—once we understand the meaning of a sentence, we derive its truth
condition trivially by applying the meaning-to-truth schema (M-to-T): if x means that p, then x is
true iff p. In Field’s theory of meaning, however, the notion of meaning—or the property ‘x
means that p’—is itself an immanent notion. The meaning of a sentence isn’t determined by its
intrinsic properties alone—we should be able to interpret (or translate) it into a sentence in our
own language. But then, we cannot talk about the truth condition of an untranslatable sentence;
for example, we cannot make sense of the truth condition of the guru’s set-theoretic sentence. In
order to explain the disciple’s logical derivation, however, we don’t need to make sense of the
truth condition of the guru’s sentence; we only need to make sense of its truth. This can be done
by appealing to the schema (****). Field’s schema (***) is derived from (****) when we can
understand ‘SX,u’. If we cannot, we cannot derive (***), and the truth condition of the sentence
should be considered indeterminate. So, by making the distinction between an ascription of truth
and an ascription of a truth condition, the disquotationalist can address Shapiro’s objection.
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Chapter 3. Deflationism and the Success Argument153

3.1 Introduction

A core idea of deflationism is that truth is a purely logical notion or property. One
important implication of this idea is that truth shouldn’t be assimilated into naturalistic properties
such as being a certain valence number, being turquoise, and being sodium chloride.154 Unlike
these naturalistic notions, a purely logical notion cannot play a causal-explanatory role. The socalled ‘success-argument’ against the deflationary theory of truth is purported to challenge this
very idea of the deflationary theory of truth—the idea that truth is a purely logical notion that
doesn’t play a causal-explanatory role.155 The gist of this argument proceeds as follows. First, the
notion of truth plays an important role in an account of the success of behavior. For example, if I
desire to drink water, and my belief that there is a fountain across the street is true, then I will
succeed in drinking water by crossing the street. Second, according to the deflationary theory of
truth, truth is a purely logical notion; the utility of the notion of truth is exhausted by its role as a
device of expressing generalizations. Therefore, third, the explanatory role played by the notion
of truth in an account of the success of behavior cannot be accommodated by the deflationary
theory of truth. So, according to the success-argument, the explanatory role played by truth in an
account of the success of behavior doesn’t square well with the deflationary conception of truth.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether and how the deflationist can
accommodate the role of truth in an account of the success of behavior. For this purpose, two
153

I use the term ‘the success argument’ as meaning the argument claiming that the role played by truth in an
account of the success of behavior cannot be accommodated by the deflationary theory of truth. Both Damnjanovic
and Kitcher use the term ‘the success argument’ in this sense.
154
See P. Horwich, Truth, 2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.
155
The expression ‘the success argument’ has different meanings in different contexts. In this thesis, it means what
is stated above—the argument is purported to show that deflationism is false on the grounds that the role played by
truth in an account of the success of behavior cannot be accommodated by the deflationary theory of truth.
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quite different criticisms drawing on the success-argument will be discussed: Nic Damnjanovic’s
and Kitcher’s criticisms of the deflationist response to the success-argument.156 Although they
both find the deflationist response to the success-argument unsatisfactory, they base their
criticisms on very different reasons. Damnjanovic’s reason is that the deflationist’s response is
inconsistent—the deflationist’s response to the success-argument shows that truth is a causalexplanatory property. To support this view, Damnjanovic brings in Jackson and Pettit’s program
explanation; when the standard deflationist response to the success-argument is conjoined with
Jackson and Petitt’s theory, it shows that the notion of truth plays a causal-explanatory role in an
account of the success of behavior.
Philip Kitcher has an entirely different agenda when he criticizes the deflationist response
to the success-argument. As an ardent advocate of scientific realism, Kitcher’s main interest is to
decide whether the deflationary theory of truth is compatible with the doctrine of scientific
realism. On Kitcher’s view, they are not compatible—more precisely, scientific realism needs a
non-deflationary notion of truth; in particular, the correspondence notion of truth. To support this
view, Kitcher focuses on the role of truth in the so-called ‘success-to-truth rule’. Two features of
the success-to-truth rule make relevant to the discussion of deflationism and realism. First,
viewed broadly, the success-to-truth rule is also an account of the success of behavior. Second, it
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Damnjanovic alludes to Field’s and Horwich’s responses to the success-argument in his criticism of deflationism.
Kitcher is mainly concerned with Horwich’s response to the success-argument; he also mentions Michael Levin and
Michael Williams as those who are sympathetic to Horwich’s response to the success-argument. See N.
Damnjanovic, “Deflationism and the Success Argument,” Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 155, 2005, pp. 53-67; P.
Kitcher, , “On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.
62 (2) 2002, pp: 346-364; P. Horwich, Truth, 2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 1999; H. Field, “The Deflationary
Conception of Truth,” in G. McDonald and C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and Value. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 55117, and “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” (1994), in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford
University Press, 2001.
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embodies one of the most important arguments for scientific realism—the idea defended by the
no-miracle argument and the abductive argument for scientific realism. The main thesis of
Kitcher’s argument is that the deflationist cannot accommodate the role of truth in this successto-truth rule. From this, Kitcher aims to infer the conclusion that scientific realism needs a nondeflationary notion of truth.
In the following, I will criticize Damnjanovic’s and Kitcher’s arguments in turn. Unlike
what Damnjanovic contends, the deflationist’s response to the success-argument doesn’t show
that truth is a causal-explanatory property. There is simply no room for applying Jackson and
Pettit’s theory to the deflationary theory of truth. To think differently indicates that one has
misunderstood either the deflationary theory or Jackson and Pettit’s theory (or both). Kitcher’s
criticism of deflationism also fails because he is confused about the goal of the success-to-truth
rule. Kitcher argues that if we construe the notion of truth in the deflationary sense, we cannot
explain systematic successes. To explain systematic successes, however, is not what the successto-truth rule is supposed to do—it is supposed to defend the doctrine of scientific realism. Once
we put aside Kitcher’s demand of explaining systematic successes, we will find that the role of
truth in the success-to-truth rule can be accommodated by the deflationary theory of truth. Indeed,
the deflationary notion of truth—contrary to what Kitcher contends—is ideally suited for the
purpose for which the success-to-truth rule is put forward.

3.2 Damnjanovic’s Criticism of Deflationism
3.2.1 The Standard Deflationist Response to the Success Argument
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Nic Damnjanovic, in his “Deflationism and the Success Argument,” tries to show that
deflationists are wrong in denying that truth is a causal-explanatory property.157 Damnjanovic
claims that the standard deflationist response to the success argument is inconsistent because
Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation shows that even logical properties can be causally
explanatory.158 The first half of this chapter will be devoted to examine the plausibility of this
view. As a first step of this task, I will in this section explain the standard deflationist response to
the success argument that Damnjanovic accuses of being inconsistent. Before embarking on this
task, I will clarify a small terminological issue. Damnjanovic uses the expression ‘causalexplanatory’ in discussing the deflationist response to the success argument. He doesn’t explain,
however, what is exactly meant by “causal” here; neither does anyone who uses this expression
in the discussion of the success argument against deflationism.159 The concept of causation,
however, is extremely complicated, and I am disinclined to getting entangled into the discussion
of this difficult concept. So, in using the notion of a causal-explanatory role in the following, I
will assume only one thing: a concept has a causal-explanatory role if and only if its role isn’t
purely logical. In other words, a causal-explanatory property isn’t a purely logical property; a
causal-explanatory property is a non-logical/natural property such as being turquoise or being
made of tin.160
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N. Damnjanovic, “Deflationism and the Success Argument,” Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 155, 2005, pp. 53-67.
There will be a brief account of Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation in the next section.
159
As Damnjanovic says, it is Field who explains the success argument using this terminology—according to Field,
the success argument challenges the deflationary theory of truth by arguing for the causal-explanatory role of truth
in an account of the success of behavior. Field doesn’t, however, explain what he means by ‘being causal’ here.
Ironically, he later expressed skepticism about causation. See “The Deflationary Conception of Truth,” in G.
McDonald and C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and Value. Oxford: Blackwell, 55-117, H. Field, “Causation in a
Physical World”, in Michael J. Loux and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2003), pp. 435–60.
158
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The only way for truth to be a causal-explanatory property is that it is a natural or physical property, since only in
such a case we can say that the truth of a belief causes the success of behavior. It is by no means clear, however,
what it is for the truth of a belief to cause the success of behavior. Two problems arise: first, we have no idea how to
define the notion of truth in terms of a physicalistic notion; second, even if we assume that the notion of truth can be
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.

According to Damnjanovic, the success argument argues from the role of truth in an

account of an agent’s success of behavior to the conclusion that truth is a causal-explanatory
property. Deflationists have typically responded to this argument in two stages as follows: first,
they try to show that the truth predicate appears only as a device of generalization in an account
of the success of behavior; and therefore, second, the notion of truth plays a purely logical—not
causal-explanatory—role in a success-explanation. Damnjanovic finds this standard deflationist
response inconsistent. To make his points more effectively, Damnjanovic recasts the success
argument against deflationism in terms of five steps as follows:

i)

If A has true beliefs about how to get what A wants, A is more likely to get what A
wants [platitude].

ii)

Therefore if A has beliefs about how to get what A wants which have the property of
being true, A is more likely to get what A wants [(i) and pleonastic transformation].

iii)

Therefore, the property of being true is appealed to in a causal-explanatory
generalization [(ii) and the definition of causal-explanatory generalization].

iv)

Therefore truth is a causal-explanatory property [(iii)].

v)

Therefore deflationism is false [(iv) and the definition of deflationism].

It is hardly imaginable that someone should raise an objection to the inference from (i) to (iii).
After all, we do appeal to the property of truth in order to explain the success of an agent’s
behavior, and neither does any deflationist as far as I know deny the intuition underlying the
inference from (i) to (iii).161 So, the potentially questionable step is the inference from (iii) to (iv).
defined in terms of some sort of a physicalistic notion, we would still be left in dark about the nature of the alleged
causal connection. What does it mean to say that the correspondence/causal connection between a belief state and
the external world causes the success of behavior?
161
Some deflationists such as prosententialists hold that truth is not a property. For them, ‘is true’ is not even an
ordinary predicate: it is a prosentence-forming operator. Horwich, however, doesn’t deny that truth is a property,
since ‘true’ should be formalized in logic as a predicate. To Horwich whether truth is a property or not is a less
interesting question than the question of what sort of property truth is. What should be emphasized, thus, is that truth
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The standard deflationist response blocks the inference from (iii) to (iv); it accepts (iii), but
doesn’t accept (iv). According to this response, the property of truth is appealed to as a device of
generalization, so to accept (iii) doesn’t lead to accepting (iv). Damnjanovic disagrees; he claims
that the deflationist can accept the inference from (iii) to (iv). Surprisingly, Damnjanovic doesn’t
think the claim (iv)—that truth is a causal-explanatory property—to be incompatible with the
deflationary theory of truth. This is a very peculiar idea, since most leading deflationists think
that truth is a purely logical notion, and they also think that if truth is a purely logical notion,
truth cannot be a causal-explanatory property. Peculiar or not, Damnjanovic’s very purpose is to
show this seemingly impossible combination is possible. To be more precise, Damnjanovic
wants to show that there is no inconsistency between the following two claims a) and b):

a) The deflationary theory of truth is correct.
b) Truth is a causal-explanatory property.

I am too conservative to agree with Damnjanovic—I don’t think a) and b) both can be sustained.
There are, however, things to be done before I mount criticisms of Damnjanovic’s view; first,
there should be a more detailed explanation of the standard deflationist response to the success
argument; and second, there should be a scrutiny of Damnjanovic’s arguments.
As was mentioned, the standard deflationist response that Damnjanovic has in mind is
Horwich’s response to the success argument. The upshot of Horwich’s response to the success
argument is that although the property of truth is appealed to in a causal-explanation of the

is not a complex or a naturalistic property, unlike properties such as being a tree, being a dog, having a certain
valence, and etc.
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success of behavior, all the work done by the property of truth can be exhaustively explained by
assuming no more than what is implied by an instance of the equivalence schema (E) below:

(E) The proposition that P is true iff P.

Suppose that we endorse a statement which goes as follows162:

1)

If Bill desires to have a beer, and he believes that merely by nodding he will get one,
then if his belief is true, he will get what he wants.

According to Horwich, the following derivation suffices as an account of the role of truth in the
success-explanation 1):

a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)
j)

Bill wants <Bill has a beer>163.
Bill believes <Bill nods → Bill has a beer>.
[Bill wants <Bill has a beer> & Bill believes <Bill nods → Bill has a beer] → Bill nods.
Bill nods.
Bill’s belief is true.
<Bill nods → Bill has a beer> is true.
Bill nods → Bill has a beer.
Bill has a beer.
<Bill has a beer> is true iff Bill has a beer
<Bill has a beer> is true.

a), b), and c) are assumptions. Given these assumptions, d) is derived. e) is another assumption;
in addition to these assumptions, let’s further assume that Bill’s belief b) is true. Assuming that
Bill’s belief b) is true and the instances of the equivalence schema (E) are true, we can derive g).

162
163

P. Horwich, Truth, 2nd ed. pp. 22-23
The brackets are used to express ‘the proposition that …’.
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From g) and d), we can derive h). From a) and i) + j), we can derive the conclusion that Bill
achieves his desire. This exhausts Horwich’s explanation of the success of Bill’s behavior.
What makes this explanation deflationary is that this explanation appeals to no other
theory of truth than the deflationary theory in deriving the success of the agent’s behavior. The
explanation from (a) to (j) appeals to the truth of the agent’s belief in explaining the success of
his behavior (that is the step (e) above). As we can see in the steps (f) and (g), its role is
exhaustively explained in terms of what is implied by an instance of the equivalence schema (E)
in the following:

(E) <P> is true iff P.

Hence, Horwich concludes that the success argument doesn’t pose a real threat to the
deflationary theory of truth.
But in what sense does the deflationist hold that the truth predicate appears as a purely
logical device in an explanation of the success of behavior? The deflationist response explains
why we don’t need to assume a theory of truth other than the deflationary one in order to explain
the role of truth in a success-explanation. It doesn’t explain, however, why the deflationist
objects to the inference from (iii) to (iv) of the success argument against deflationism. The
reason has to do with role of truth in a generalized success-explanation such as 2) in the
following

2) An agent’s behavior is more likely to succeed in satisfying the agent’s goal when the
agent has a true belief.
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When the truth predicate is ascribed to a single belief that is articulated as it is in the explanation
1) above, the deflationist says that the truth predicate is eliminable. We can see this in the
derivation (e) to (g) above. But when the truth predicate appears in a generalized successexplanation such as 2), the truth predicate is not eliminable. According to the deflationist, the
sole utility of the notion of truth lies in enabling us to express a generalization such as 2) above.
The deflationist explains the role of truth in a generalization such as 2) in terms of the following
steps. First, 2) abbreviates an infinite conjunction such as 3) in the following164:

3) If one believes <one nods →one gets a beer> and one nods → one gets a beer, then one is
more likely to succeed in achieving one’s goal by nodding; if one believes <one exercises
164

Gupta objects to this very idea that the notion of truth enables us to express infinite conjunctions and disjunctions
(see his “A Critique of Deflationism” Philosophical Topics, Vol. 21, 1993). Gupta’s criticism, however, seems to be
based on a misunderstanding of deflationism. According to Gupta, in order for the deflationist to make this claim,
she needs to say that a generalization such as 2) means the same as an infinite conjunction such as 3). The
deflationist, however, doesn’t have to make such a strong claim. All she needs to say is that the generalization 4)
abbreviates the infinite conjunction 5) in the same way that the generalization i) abbreviates the infinite conjunction
ii) in the following:
i) (x) (x is human →x is mortal)
ii) If Madonna is human → Madonna is moral; if Lady Gaga is human → Lady Gaga is mortal; and so on.
In order to say that i) abbreviates ii), we don’t have to say that i) means the same as ii); all we need to say is that i) is
materially equivalent to ii). Nobody would say that i) means the same as ii), but everybody accepts that i) is a
generalization of ii). But then, why does Gupta says so? Gupta seems to be confused between the two slightly
different but related aspects of deflationism. The first is the deflationist’s claim that the truth predicate is eliminable
when it is ascribed to a single sentence (or proposition) that is explicitly given. For example, the truth predicate in iii)
in the following is eliminable:
iii) ‘Snow is white’ is true.
But then, iii), as Field says, iii) is cognitively equivalent to the truth-less statement iv) as follows:
iv) Snow is white.
The second aspect of deflationism is that the truth predicate isn’t eliminable when it appears in a generalization such
as 2). But if the truth predicate is not eliminable in a generalization such as 2), then 2) cannot be considered
cognitively equivalent to the infinite conjunction 3). So, it seems that Gupta wrongly assimilates the second aspect
of deflationism into its first aspect. These two aspects are related because both of them are grounded on the
equivalence schema (E). But they should be distinguished from each other for a proper understanding of the
deflationary theory of truth.
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→ one becomes healthier> and one exercises → one becomes healthier, then one is more
likely to succeed in achieving one’s goal by exercising; and so on.

As Quine says, second, we cannot generalize 3) using ordinary objectual quantification because
of some technical difficulties.165 We may appeal to non-objectual quantification—i.e.,
substitutional quantification—in the way below:

4) (Πp) (If one believes that p and p, then one is more likely to succeed in achieving one’s
goal).

Even if we accept 4) as a formal generalization of 3), we still need an informal generalization
that is couched in ordinary language. The truth predicate serves this purpose; indeed, the truth
predicate may have been created exactly for such a purpose. Viewed this way, it is clear why we
need to assume nothing more or less than what is implied by an instance of the equivalence
schema (E). Here, I will quote one of the most often-quoted passages in the literature of
deflationism:

It is not surprising that we should have use for a predicate P with the property that " ‘____’ is
P" and "____" are always interdeducible. For we frequently find ourselves in a position to
assert each sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g., when all the members of z share a
common form); lacking the means to formulate infinite conjunctions, we find it convenient to
have a single sentence which is warranted precisely when each member of z is warranted. A
predicate P with the property described allows us to construct such a sentence: (x)(x ϵ z 
P(x)). Truth is thus a notion that we might reasonably want to have on hand, for expressing
semantic ascent and descent, infinite conjunction and disjunction.166
165

There are two well-known technical difficulties; first, the second occurrence of ‘one nods → one gets a beer’ or
‘one exercises → one becomes healthier’ is a sentence, but a sentence is not a name. So, it cannot be replaced by an
objectual variable. Second, the same sentence-type occurs both inside and outside a ‘that’-clause in 3). See W. O.
Quine, Philosophy of Logic, Eaglewood Cliff; Prentice-Hall, 1970.
166
S. Leeds, "Theories of Reference and Truth," Erkenntnis 13 (1978): 111-29, p. 121.
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What Leeds says above offers a clear and intuitive account of why we consider the instances of
the equivalence schema (E) epistemologically fundamental. Given the genetic explanation
offered by Leeds, we cannot but consider the instances of the schema (E) conceptually
fundamental.
As was stated in the footnote above, the second aspect of the deflationary conception of
truth is that the notion of truth is ineliminable when it is invoked in a generalization such as 2).
According to the deflationist, the truth predicate exists solely for this purpose. So, although the
truth predicate appears in a generalized success-explanation such as 2), its role is purely
logical—it appears merely as a device of generalization. This is the reason why the deflationist
doesn’t accept the inference from iii) to iv). The deflationist explains why the truth predicate is
appealed to in a causal-explanatory generalization while she construes truth as a purely logical
property. So, she doesn’t accept iv).

3.2.2 Damnjanovic’s Criticism of the Standard Deflationist Response

A. The Distinction Between Causal Efficacy and Causal Relevancy
The main inspiration of Damnjanovic’s argument comes from Jackson and Pettit’s
distinction between causally efficacious properties and causally relevant properties.167 I have no
intention to go into the details of their account except for noting that the distinction between
casually efficacious properties and causally relevant properties was drawn as a means of
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Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, “Causation in the Philosophy of Mind,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, Fall, 1990
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vindicating the causal relevance of “functionally defined higher-order properties” (of which the
particular emphasis being laid upon commonsense psychological properties).168 According to
Jackson and Pettit, higher-order functional properties are not themselves causally efficacious
properties but they are causally relevant properties in the sense that they supervene on some
lower-level basic properties which are themselves causally efficacious. The examples presented
by Damnjanovic are properties such as being a sleeping-pill and having a pain. Let’s suppose, for
example, Ann ingested a sleeping-pill and is now face down in her bowl of soup. By pleonastic
transformation, we can also say that she is face down in her soup-bowl because she ingested
something having the property of being a sleeping-pill. However, there arises a question whether
we can say that the property of being a sleeping-pill is a causal-explanatory property, in other
words, whether it played a role in causing Ann to be face down in her soup-bowl now.
Damnjanovic’s answer, as may be expected, is that even though the property of being a
sleeping-pill is not itself a causally efficacious property, it is a causally relevant property.
Damnjanovic says that we cannot suppose that the property of being a sleeping-pill—in addition
to the lower-level property the property of being a sleeping pill supervenes on—is causally
efficacious because to do so would result in the problem of causal over-determination. The
problem of causal over-determination occurs when we suppose that there are two distinct
properties both of which are causally efficacious in bringing about an event or a phenomenon
simultaneously, where each property alone is sufficient in bringing about the event or
phenomenon at the time. Assuming that this is a legitimate problem, we cannot say that both the
property of being a sleeping pill and its supervenient basis are causally efficacious, because a
property is causally efficacious if it doesn’t need another property in order to cause an event or
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phenomenon.169 A causally efficacious property is one that can alone cause an event or a
phenomenon. Hence, to say that both the property of being a sleeping pill and its supervenient
basis are causally efficacious is to say that there are two distinct properties both of which are
sufficient in causing Ann’s facing down in her soup-bowl. Therefore, to avoid the problem of
causal over-determination, we should say that only one of them is a causally efficacious property.
In this case, we should say that the supervenient basis of the higher-order property—the property
of being a sleeping pill—is the causally efficacious property.
Nonetheless, the property of being a sleeping-pill, according to Jackson and Pettit’s
account, can still be said to be causally explanatory because the higher-order property of being a
sleeping pill “ensures” that there is a lower-level, chemical, property that instantiates the higherorder property. In Jackson and Pettit’s account, the fact that a higher-order property isn’t reduced
to a lower-level property confers an explanatory power on the higher-order property. Their
argument is that if a higher-order property can be instantiated by distinct lower-level properties,
we cannot explain the explanatory power of the higher-order property in terms of the explanatory
powers of lower-level properties that instantiate the higher-order property. In particular, they
argue that an explanation that invokes a higher-order property provides the kind of modal
information that an explanation invoking only a lower-level property cannot supply.170 It is
possible that the same higher-order property be instantiated by a lower-level property that is
different from what underlies it now. Hence, the information provided by an explanation such as
1) below is different from the information provided by an explanation such as 2):
169

See F. Jackson and P. Pettit, “Program Explanation: A General Perspective,” Analysis, Vol. 50. No. 2, 1990: 107117.
170

A higher-order property can be instantiated by different lower-level properties at different possible worlds. So, an
explanation that invokes a higher-order property conveys information that the same phenomenon can be caused by
different lower-level properties at different possible worlds. See F. Jackson and P. Pettit, , “Causation in the
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1) Ann is face down in her soup-bowl because she ingested something that has the property
of being a sleeping-pill.

2) Ann is face down in her soup-bowl because she ingested something that has the chemical
property C.

The information provided by 1) cannot be reduced to what is provided by 2), because the higherproperty of being a sleeping pill may be instantiated by a lower-level property that is distinct
from the chemical property C. The presence of the higher-order property of being a sleeping pill,
however, ensures the presence of a lower-level property (whatever it might be). In this sense, the
higher-order property of being a sleeping pill is causally “relevant” to the effect although it is not
causally efficacious.171
Now, the upshot of Damnjanovic’s argument is that the deflationary concept of truth can
be understood in terms of Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation. More precisely, his idea is
that, first, we can understand the deflationary concept of truth in terms of a supervenience
relation, and second, we can justify the causal relevance of deflationary truth by applying
Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation to the property of truth. So, Damnjanovic’s goal is to
prove that deflationary truth is a causally relevant property by applying Jackson and Pettit’s
program explanation to the deflationary concept of truth. But then, the plausibility of
Damnjanovic’s idea depends on, first, whether the deflationary concept of truth can be defined in
terms of a supervenience relation, and second, whether Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation
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is correct. The logical order of these two questions is clear—only after we answer the first
question, we need to be worried about the second.
The crux of my criticism of Damnjanovic’s argument will be centered on the first
question—whether the deflationary concept of truth can be understood in terms of the notion of
supervenience. The notion of supervenience is a jack of all trades—as McLaughlin and Bennett
say, it has been invoked in almost every corner of analytic philosophy.172 The supervenience
relation that Jackson and Pettit’s theory draws upon, however, is a supervenience relation of a
special kind--it is a supervenience relation that obtains between a higher-order property and
lower-level properties, where the lower-level properties are physical properties.173 So, in order to
apply Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation to the deflationary concept of truth, the
deflationary concept of truth should be defined in terms of the supervenience relation of this
specific kind. The most serious problem with Damnjanovic’s argument, however, is that he
totally misses this point—he wrongly thinks that a supervenience relation of any kind can do the
trick.174

B. Deflationary Truth is a Supervenient Property
According to Damnjanovic, the deflationary concept of truth can be understood in terms
of the notion of supervenience because what is implied by the instances of the equivalence
schema can be re-construed in terms of the notion of supervenience. According to Horwich’s
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deflationary theory of truth, the concept of truth is implicitly defined by the instances of the
equivalence schema (E):

(E) <P> is true iff P.

So, on this theory, to say that

<P> is a true proposition. .

is to say that

<P> is true = <Snow is white> & snow is white; or <P>= <Grass is green> & grass is green;
or . . .

In other words, to accept the deflationary theory of truth is to accept 1) in the following:
1) <P> is a true proposition iff <P> = <Snow is white> & snow is white; or <P>= <Grass is
green> & grass is green; or . . .

Unlike other critics of deflationism, Damnjanovic agrees with all the core ideas of the
theory; for example, he agrees with the idea that the concept of truth is implicitly but
exhaustively defined by 1) above. So, he agrees with deflationists that we need to assume no
theory of truth other than the deflationary one. In particular, Damnjanovic accepts the
deflationist idea that whatever role played by the notion of truth can exhaustively be explained
by the instances of the equivalence schema (E). So, he doesn’t find Horwich’s response to the
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success argument to be inadequate per se; he thinks that a Horwich-style success-explanation is
all we need for an account of the success of behavior. Damnjanovic doesn’t take this, however,
as showing that truth isn’t a causal-explanatory property. To the contrary, he thinks that a
Horwich-stype success-explanation shows that truth is a causal-explanatory property. How on
earth does a Horwich-style success-explanation show that truth is a causal-explanatory property?
Damnjanovic’s super-economic, low-cost strategy is to insert the concept of supervenience into
Horwich’s deflationary theory of truth.
Damnjanovic’s idea is simple—maybe too simple. First, he claims that the deflationary
definition of truth 1) above entails 2) in the following:

2) The truth of <P> supervenes on <P> = <Snow is white> & snow is white; or <P> =
<Grass is green> & grass is green; or . . .

Second, from 2), Damnjanovic derives 3) in the following:

3) The subvenient properties of the property of truth are disjuncts such as ‘<P> = <Snow is
white> & snow is white’ or ‘<P> = <Grass is green> & grass is green’; or . . .175
175

Damnjanovic says:
But in just the same way, the property of truth requires a combination of truth-bearer and state of the world. If
truth is instantiated in an agent's set of beliefs, for example, then either he believes that p, and p; or he believes
that q, and q; or .... In fact, the standard deflationist method for explaining the generalization linking truth and
practical success relies heavily on this point. What is more, truth's subvenient disjuncts (like believing that p
when p) are, at least relatively, efficacious. (N. Damnjanovic, “Deflationism and the Success Argument,” The
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 55, pp. 53-67. Emphasis is done by me.)
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Third, Damnjanovic applies Jackson and Pettit’s theory to 3), the result of which, according to
Damnjanovic, is as follows:
In particular, the property of being in pain requires a certain combination of agent and neural
event. If pain is instantiated, then either John has his C-fibres firing or Dave has his D-fibres
firing, or … But in the same way, the property of truth requires a combination of truth bearer
and state of the world. If truth is instantiated in an agent’s set of beliefs, for example, then
either he believes that p, and p; or he believes that q, and q; or … In fact, the standard
deflationist method for explaining the generalization linking truth and practical success relies
heavily on this point. What is more, truth’s subvenient disjuncts (like believing that p when
p ) are, at least relatively, efficacious.176

According to Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation, the causal relevance of a higher-order
property such as being a sleeping pill or being in pain is explained in terms of the causal efficacy
of its lower-level properties on which the higher-order property supervenes. Damnnajovic’s
grand proposal is that the causal relevance of the property of truth can be explained in the same
way—in terms of the causal efficacy of its subvenient properties. Although the property of truth
doesn’t directly enter into the explanation of the success of behavior, it is indirectly relevant to
bringing about the success of behavior. What makes this possible, says Damnjanovic, is that
deflationary truth is a sort of supervenient property.

3.2.3 The Problems with Damnjanovic’s Argument

I have always wondered whether anyone attempted a supervenience theory of truth; if a
reductive theory of truth is unlikely to be forthcoming, what about a supervenience theory of
176
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truth? A correspondence theorist may benefit himself by developing a supervenience theory of
truth that explicates the nature of the correspondence relation in terms of its subvenient
properties. I couldn’t find anyone, however, who has made a serious attempt of this kind.177 The
reason may be that it is extremely difficult to develop a supervenience theory of truth. Let’s
suppose, as suggested by Damnjanovic, that we model a supervenience theory of truth on a
supervenience theory of a mental property. A difference between the reductive theory and the
supervenience theory of a mental property is that the latter allows that one and the same mental
property can be realized by different lower-level physical properties in different domains. For
example, the supervenience theory of a mental property may characterize the property of being
in pain in the manner of 1) as follows:

1) x is in pain iff x is a human & x’s C-fibres are firing; or x is a Martian & x’s D-fibres are
firing; or . . .

Hence, if there is a supervenience theory of truth and it is to be modeled upon the supervenience
theory of a mental property, it should proceed in the manner of 2) as follows:

2) x is a true proposition iff x is a proposition belonging to the domain D1 & x has the
physical property F1; or x is a proposition belonging to the domain D2 & x has the
physical property F2; or . . .
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David Armstrong seems to defend a supervenience theory of truth of a very simple kind in connection with his
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It is not clear what those domains D1, . . , Dn should be, and even less clear what those physical
properties F1, . . , Fn should be. Most of all, in order to have a supervenience theory of truth in
the form of 2), it is essential that we should be able to give a functionalist (of functional)
definition of the concept of truth. Notice that the supervenience theory of mental properties such
as 1) wouldn’t even get off the ground unless we can give a functionalist definition of the
concept of being in pain.178 Only after we show that the concept of being in pain can be defined
in terms of a functionalistic property ϕ, we can give a supervenience theory of the property of
being in pain by showing that the functionalistic property ϕ can be multiply realized by distinct
lower-level physical properties. Indeed, the very motivation of Jackson and Pettit’s program
explanation is the worry that the functionalist theory of mental concepts may not explain the
causal relevance of mental properties if an agent’s behavior can exhaustively be explained by the
agent’s internal physiological properties.179 The program explanation is the solution offered by
Jackson and Pettit—the causal relevance of mental/functionalistic properties can be justified via
the causal efficacy of the lower-level physical (neural) properties. Now, Damnjanovic’s goal is
to defend the causal relevance of the property of truth in the way Jackson and Pettit defends the
causal relevance of mental properties. But then, he should show, first, how to define the concept
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The functionalist definition of pain is to define the concept of pain in terms of its causal-functional role; for
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of truth in terms of a certain functionalist property Ψ; second, how the functionalistic property Ψ
can be multiply realized by distinct lower-level physical properties in distinct domains.
The supervenience theory of truth advocated by Damnjanovic is basically as follows:
3) x is a true belief (or proposition) iff x =<Snow is white> & snow is white; or x = <Grass
is green> & grass is green; or . . .

Now, let’s compare 3) with 2)—what similarities do they bear? They only bear a superficial
similarity—both of them are defined in terms of multiple disjunctions. Other than that, they are
very different, where their difference may be summed up in terms of the following two
statements:
i) First, unlike 2), 3) doesn’t define the concept of truth in terms of lower-level physical
concepts; therefore
ii) Second, unlike 2), 3) is not a metaphysical or ontological analysis of the concept of
truth.

As a result, Damnjanovic’s supervenience theory of truth cannot be combined with Jackson and
Pettit’s theory—it is not the kind of supervenience theory that is needed by Jackson and Pettit’s
theory.
As McLaughlin and Bennett say, the notion of supervenience has been used almost every
corner of analytic philosophy.180 So, it may not be incorrect to construe the deflationary theory of
truth in terms of a concept of supervenience. A supervenience relation, however, comes in many
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different kinds, and so it is important to invoke a supervenience relation that fits the purpose at
hand. Damnjanovic’s argument fails in this respect—he thinks that to invoke supervenience
relation of any kind will give him what he needs. What Damnjanovic needs, however, is a
supervenience relation of a specific kind—the one that is connected to ontological dependence.
Consider 1); i.e., the supervenience theory of the property of being in pain. 1) states that the
property of being in pain supervenes on lower-level physical properties (e.g. the property of Cfibres’ firing) in the sense that the higher-order mental property depends for its existence on the
lower-level physical properties.181
The question, however, is whether 3) fits this type of supervenience theory of truth. We
can construe 3), as Damnjanovic insists, by invoking the notion of supervenience—that the truth
of a belief supervenes on the belief is <Snow is white> & snow is white; or the belief is <Grass
is green> & grass is green; or . . . This doesn’t give, however, Damnjanovic what needs—the
kind of supervenience invoked here is not concerned with ontological dependence. What he
needs is the supervenience theory that connects the property of truth—being a higher-order
property—with lower-level physical properties that the property of truth depends on for its
existence. 3) can never be turned into a supervenience theory of truth of this kind, because it is
the (Horwich-style) deflationary definition of the concept of truth. According to Horwich, the
notion of truth is implicitly defined by the instances of the equivalence schema (E), and 3)
embodies this very idea. Recall, however, how Horwich characterizes the notion of truth—he
characterizes it as a non-natural/purely logical property which cannot be assimilated into
properties such as being turquoise, being a tree, or being made of tin. So, 3) is characteristically

181

The nature of the ontological dependence of mental properties on physical properties should further be explained.
J. Kim says that it can be explained by invoking modal operators or possible worlds. See J. Kim, Mind in a Physical
World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation, MIT Press, 2000, Ch. 1.

147

different from 1)—whereas 1) is aimed to reveal the ontological bases of the concept of being in
pain, 3) isn’t. What is then the aim of 3)? The statement 3) is aimed at revealing the functional
property of the concept of truth—it is a functional characterization of the property of truth. It
tells us when we can use the truth predicate ‘true’—we can use the truth predicate when a belief
(or proposition) is <Snow is white> & snow is white; or when a belief (or proposition) is <Grass
is green> & grass is green; or . . . So, according to 3), we can derive a statement of the form
‘<P> is true’ from a statement of the form ‘P’, and vice versa. According to Horwich’s
deflationary theory, however, this exhausts whatever role played by the notion of truth. But then,
there is no point of trying to uncover the ontological bases of this concept—its role is in its
nature purely logical in the sense that the role of a logical constant such as ‘ʌ’ is purely logical.
So, Damnjanovic’s comparison between the property of being in pain and the property of
truth is incorrect—we shouldn’t understand 3) on the par with the supervenience theory of the
property of being in pain; i.e., the statement 1). If Damnjanovic is to vindicate the causal
relevance of the property of truth in the way Jackson and Pettit vindicates the causal relevance of
the property of being in pain, he should have given a supervenience theory of truth of the form 2)
above. Namely, he should have attempted to connect the property of truth with lower-level
physical properties with respect to different domains. I have no objection to construing the
deflationary definition of truth—the statement 3)—in terms of the concept of supervenience. To
do so, however, doesn’t give what Damnjanovic needs. Only when he offers a supervenience
theory of truth of the type 2) can he appeal to Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation in order
to vindicate the causal relevance of the property of truth. The real problem with Damnjanovic’s
overall proposal is that this can never be done if he accepts the core ideas of deflationism.
Damnjanovic’s overall proposal is to show that a deflationist can recognize the causal-
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explanatory role of truth without stepping outside the deflationary theory of truth. This is the
reason why Damnjanovic turns the deflationary definition of truth into a supervenience theory of
truth leaving the core ideas of deflationism intact. Supervenience is an elastic notion, so the
deflationary definition of truth may be turned into a supervenience theory of truth of some kind.
But the kind of a supervenience theory of truth that Damnjanovic needs is the supervenience
theory of truth of the type 2). Only in such a case can he plug Jackson and Pettit’s theory into the
property of truth. A supervenience theory of truth of the type 2), however, is inconsistent with
the Horwich-stype deflationary theory of truth. Someone can pursue a supervenience theory of
truth of the type 2) only if he assumes that truth is a natural or physicalistic notion. Horwich
denies this, which is implied by his contention that truth is a purely logical property.
In conclusion, Damnjanovic makes a typical mistake in dealing with the deflationary
conception of truth—he fails to understand what it means to say that truth is a purely logical
property. He is right in saying that a logical property can also have a causal-explanatory role.
The deflationist’s view of truth, however, isn’t simply that truth is a logical property but that
truth is nothing but a logical property, implying that it isn’t a causally explanatory property. In
order to see the point let’s compare 3) with 4) in the following:

4) x is in pain iff x produces the output O1 under the input I1 & goes to another mental state
M1; or x produces the output O2 under the input I2 & goes to another mental state M2;
or . . .

Like 3), 4) is a functional characterization of the property of being in pain. Indeed, if
Damnjanovic is to make an analogy between the concept of truth and the concept of being in
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pain, he should have begun by comparing 3) with 4), not with 1). Although 3) and 4) are both
functional characterizations, their epistemological statuses are different—whereas 4) is an
empirical truth, 3) is a purely conceptual truth. This is the reason why the role of truth
characterized by 3) is purely logical, whereas the role of being pain characterized by 4) isn’t.182
Moreover, 4) leads to 1)—namely, we need 1) as an explanation of why the mental property of
being in pain has the functional role that is characterized by 4). On the other hand, we don’t need
such an explanation for 3)—it is a purely conceptual truth that the property of truth has the
functional role that is characterized by 3). Consequently, as long as we accept the deflationary
definition of truth 3), we don’t need a supervenience theory of truth of the type 2). However, this
is exactly what Damnjanovic needs in order to justify the causal explanatory role of truth by
appealing to Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation. Hence, Damnjanovic’s proposal collapses
due to an internal conflict—either he has to deny the deflationary theory or he should give up the
causal-explanatory role of truth. He cannot have both.

3.3 Kitcher’s Realist Attack against Deflationism: A Case For the Causal-Explanatory Role Of
Correspondence Truth In the Success-To-Truth Rule
3.3.1 Introduction183
182

In other words, we don’t need any explanation why we can derive a statement of the form ‘P’ from a statement of
the form ‘<P> is true’, and vice versa. This is guaranteed by the meaning of ‘true’ alone. In order to derive the
functional role characterized by 4) from the property of being in pain, however, we need empirical observation. To
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state if they are cured). This explanation is provided by the reductive or supervenience theory of the property of
being schizophrenic—it is explained as the operation of some neurological properties. The deflationist’s point is that
neither the reductive nor supervenience theory of truth is needed because truth is a purely logical property.
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Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 64(2), 2002, pp:346-364; P. Kitcher, “Real Realism: The
Galilean Strategy,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 110, No. 2. 2001, pp:151-197; and P. Kitcher, “Explanatory
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Is there any rational relationship between the problem of truth and the problem of realism?
According to Horwich, there is no interesting connection between a theory of truth and the
debate between realism and anti-realism. A commitment to realism or anti-realism, says Horwich,
doesn’t make one embrace a particular theory of truth. Or to speak conversely, to embrace the
deflationary theory of truth doesn’t constitute a basis to take up or avoid any particular position
in the realism debate. In other words, a theory of truth is neutral in the debate between realism
and anti-realism.184
In his “On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth”, Kitcher aims to show
otherwise; he aims to show that realism—more precisely, scientific realism—requires the
correspondence theory of truth.185 Scientific realism comes in many varieties (and so does
scientific anti-realism). The purpose of my discussion of Kitcher isn’t to determine the
plausibility of scientific realism per se but to determine whether scientific realism, as Kitcher
claims, requires a non-deflationary theory of truth; i.e., the correspondence theory of truth. That
said, it is inevitable to say a few words about scientific realism. I will here briefly define
scientific realism in terms of two doctrines respectively called ‘SR’ and ‘SSR’ by Michael Devitt:

(SR)

Most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories
exist mind-independently.

Unification,” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 48 (4), 1981, pp:507-531.
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(SSR) Most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories
exist mind-independently, and mostly have the properties attributed to them by
science.186

Kitcher is committed to both (SR) and (SSR) and so he states that a scientific statement that has
passed appropriate scrutiny of its epistemic credentials—including the one that involves an
expression for an unobservable entity—should be considered true or approximately true.187
Kitcher also characterizes scientific realism he defends as a “homely doctrine, vested in
commonsense appraisals rather than weighty metaphysics.”188 To explain what Kitcher means by
this, it has to be pointed out that Kitcher builds the correspondence notion of truth into his
characterization of scientific realism. According to Kitcher, a scientific statement that has passed
scrutiny of its epistemic credentials isn’t merely true but true in the correspondence sense. So, on
Kitcher’s view, scientific realism presupposes the correspondence theory of truth. What Kitcher
means by ‘the correspondence theory of truth’, however, is a theory that accepts only i) and ii),
but not iii) in the following:

i) Reference relations are causal relations between mind-independent entities and linguistic
tokens.
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ii) It's possible to give a naturalistic account of these relations; that is, semantics can be
conducted as a natural science.
iii) There's a physicalist reduction of semantics.189

So, the reason why Kitcher calls his realism a ‘homely’ or ‘modest’ doctrine is that the
correspondence theory of truth that he considers an essential aspect of scientific realism doesn’t
require the notions of reference and truth to be reduced to physicalistic terms. Kitcher says

Here I should note explicitly that the type of correspondence theory I envisage is one like that
originally sketched by Hartry Field in "Tarski's Theory of Truth," Journal of Philosophy 69
(1972): 347-75. One important difference, however, is that I don't see a naturalistic account
of reference as necessarily involving a reduction to a physicalist vocabulary. Naturalists who
are antireductionists with respect to some sciences (for example, parts of biology) should
allow that the basis for a reduction of the notion of reference may out-strip the resources of
physics.190

But why does Kitcher consider the correspondence theory of truth an essential aspect of
scientific realism. ? Namely, what is Kitcher’s reason for holding that scientific realism requires
a non-deflationary theory of truth? Kitcher’s reason in a nutshell is that the correspondence
notion of truth plays an essential role in the so-called ‘success-to-truth’ rule that can be
formulated as follows:

(Success-to-Truth Rule)
S plays a crucial role in a systematic practice of fine-grained prediction and intervention.
_______________________________________________________________________
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S is approximately true.191

Two things should be noted about the success-to-truth rule: first, this rule embodies a successexplanation of a certain type—a success-explanation that accounts for the success or
effectiveness of a scientific theory. A success-explanation of a scientific theory, however, can be
construed as a success-explanation of behavior of a specific type; i.e., behavior caused by a
scientific belief. That is to say, a success-explanation of a scientific theory is supposed to explain
how scientists who follow a certain scientific theory are so successful in achieving their goals;
for example, how bio-engineers who accept the main claims of molecular genetics are so
successful in manufacturing new organisms.192 So, the success-to-truth rule doesn’t have to be
construed as a success-explanation of an entirely new kind. Kitcher also treats it as continuous
with a success-explanation of behavior. Second, the success-to-truth rule embodies an important
argument for scientific realism; namely, the argument called ‘the no-miracle argument’ or ‘the
abductive argument’ for scientific realism.193 According to the no-miracle argument, the
empirical success of a scientific theory would not be explained unless it is true or approximately
true. The abductive argument defends the same idea; from the empirical success of a theory, we
can derive the conclusion that the theory is true as a hypothesis that best explains the success of
the theory. Thus, Kitcher's argument proceeds as follows: first, scientific realism relies on the
success-to-truth rule, and second, the success-to-truth rule relies on the correspondence notion of
truth. So, according to Kitcher, the correspondence notion of truth plays an essential role in the
191
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success-to-truth rule, and in that sense scientific realism requires the correspondence theory of
truth.
In the remaining of this chapter, I will try to discern whether Kitcher is right about this—
whether the success-to-truth rule requires the correspondence notion of truth. By maintaining
that the success-to-truth rule and thereby scientific realism requires the correspondence theory of
truth, Kitcher aims to criticize the deflationary theory of truth from a realist point of view. On
Kitcher’s view, deflationism about truth is not compatible with scientific realism—as a real
realist, Kitcher says he cannot embrace the deflationary theory of truth. For a while I was
somewhat sympathetic to Kitcher’s view, mainly because many scientific realists presuppose the
correspondence notion of truth when they invoke the notion of truth to characterize scientific
realism. According to Horwich, however, it is a commonly made mistake to think that scientific
realism has anything to do with a theory of truth of a certain kind. I now think that Horwich is
right about the neutrality of a theory of truth in the realism debate. At least, the correspondence
notion of truth doesn’t seem to play a role in the success-to-truth rule. Some other arguments for
scientific realism might need the correspondence theory of truth, but the success-to-truth rule
doesn’t. This is what I will argue for in the remaining of this chapter.

3.3. 2.Horwich’s View on Truth and the Realism Debate

Among all the deflationists, Horwich seems to be Kitcher’s major opponent. Horwich’s
views are in direct opposition to Kitcher’s views in two respects. First, whereas Kitcher holds
that deflationism is not compatible with realism, Horwich holds that deflationism is absolutely
neutral between realism and anti-realism. Second, whereas Kitcher thinks that the explanatory
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role played by truth in the success-to-truth rule cannot be accommodated by the deflationary
theory of truth, Horwich thinks it can. As we have seen 3.2.1, this is the gist of Horwich’s
response to the success argument. Here, in order not to mislead readers with similar terms, I shall
make the following distinction:



Success-Explanation: an explanation that accounts for the success of behavior or the
effectiveness of a scientific theory.



Success-Argument: an argument criticizing the deflationary theory of truth on the
grounds that the explanatory role of truth in a success-explanation cannot be
accommodated by the deflationary theory of truth.

Kitcher’s argument begins with his criticism of Horwich’s response to the success-argument.
Before examining Kitcher’s argument, however, I shall first explain briefly why Horwich claims
that deflationism is neutral between realism and anti-realism.
Let’s first consider what Horwich says:

The important thing, rather, is to see that it is not settled one way or the other by deflationism
about truth . . . Not only is deflationism neutral with respect to the disputes between realism
and antirealism, but so are the other well-known theories of truth . . . [N]ot only is the right
account of truth (namely, deflationism) absolutely neutral regarding realism, but even if one
adopted what I have suggested are wrong points of view on truth (either the correspondence
or the coherence accounts) it would be a further mistake to think that any of the
epistemological or metaphysical issues that constitute the realism debate would be settled.194

What Horwich says here is that not only can deflationists be either realists or anti-realists but
also that endorsing a non-deflationary theory doesn’t help solve problems facing the realism
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issue. Consider one of the most challenging problems facing realism: that we cannot have
epistemological access to phenomena involving unobservable entities. One may try to solve this
problem by endorsing the verificationist theory of truth—that is, by “promoting the accessibility
of facts at the expense of their autonomy.”195 The problem with the verifiability theory of truth,
according to Horwich, is that it assumes the equivalence schema: <P> is true iff P. Horwich says,

[O]ne might reason that, since it is relatively easy to tell regarding, for example, the
proposition that there are infinitely many stars, whether or not it is verifiable, then—given
the identification of truth with verifiability—it would be equally easy to tell if that
proposition is true, hence easy to tell if there are infinitely many stars. And, moreover, since
the verifiability of the proposition is a fact about our methodology, then so would be the truth
of the proposition, i.e. the fact that there are infinitely many stars.

To elaborate Horwich’s point (which wasn’t easy at all), the verificationist would first identify
the truth of <There are infinitely many stars> with its verifiability (e.g. its verification condition),
and then, second, infer that there are infinitely many stars (or that there aren’t infinitely many
stars) from the fact about the verifiability of <There are infinitely many stars>.
The problem with this approach, however, is that it stealthily appeals to the equivalence
schema (E): <P> is true iff P.196 The verificationist can infer that there are infinitely many stars
(or there aren’t infinitely many stars) from the fact about the verifiability of <There are infinitely
many stars> because he assumes the truth of an instance of the equivalence schema; i.e., <There
are infinitely many stars> is true iff there are infinitely many stars. Can the verificationist assume
the equivalence schema? The answer is no, because that’s exactly what needs to be justified by
the verificationist theory of truth. So, the attempt to defend realism by identifying truth with
verifiability doesn’t work—it faces the problem of circularity. A similar problem confronts a
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correspondence theorist who attempts to defend realism by defining truth with a correspondence
relation. Horwich says,

[T]he correspondence theory of truth provides no quick path to sceptical anti-realism or to
metaphysical realism. For again, those conclusions can be obtained only given the
equivalence schema which, as in the previous case, will be no easier to establish than the
realist or anti-realist theses it is being used to support.197

Consider again the proposition that there are infinitely many stars. The correspondence theorist
claims that <There are infinitely many stars> is true iff it corresponds to the fact that there are
infinitely many stars. From the correspondence theorist point of view, however, the truth of this
claim should be justified by the correspondence theory. If the correspondence theorist is to
simply assume that <P> is true iff <P> corresponds to the fact that P, there is no point of
invoking the correspondence theory of truth in arguing for realism or anti-realism. The whole
point of invoking a non-deflationary theory of truth is that to invoke a non-deflationary theory of
truth—for example, the correspondence theory of truth—is essential to argue for realism or antirealism. But if so, it is unlikely that anyone would be able to argue for realism or anti-realism—
to establish a non-deflationary theory of truth is as difficult as establishing realism or antirealism.
But then, what explains the prevalence of the idea that the realism debate is about the
notion of truth? Horwich’s explanation is that those who think that the realism debate is about
the notion of truth are misled by the role played by the notion of truth appearing in the theses of
realism and anti-realism. The notion of truth is often employed in articulating the theses of
realism and anti-realism. For example:
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All truths are verifiable.
Theoretical hypotheses are truth-value-less.
Science aims at truth.
No contingent statement about the future can be true.

Horwich’s point is that the notion of truth appears as a purely logical device in all of these claims;
it appears as a device of generalization. To see why, let’s consider the third claim in the list
above; the claim that science aims at truth. This statement is a generalization of particular
statements such as 1) in the following:

1) Scientists want it to be that they believe that there are infinitely many stars only if there
are infinitely many stars; or scientists want it to be that they believe that electrons ARE
almost perfectly round only if electrons are almost perfectly round; or . . .

By appealing to the equivalence schema (E), we can derive from 1) the following: 1*).

1*) Scientists want it to be that they believe that there are infinitely many stars only if it is
true that there are infinitely many stars.

Now, we can generalize 1*) into 1**) in the following:

1**) Scientists want it to be that they believe x only if it is true that x.
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The claim above—that science aims at truth—is a colloquial way of expressing 1**).198 So, the
role of truth in this claim is purely logical—we appeal to the notion of truth in order to generalize
an infinite disjunction such as 1) above. Similar accounts can easily be given for other claims
listed above.
On the basis of these considerations, Horwich concludes that truth is irrelevant to the
realism debate. Horwich isn’t alone thinking this way; for example, Devitt also contends that
realism is compatible with a totally deflationary theory of reference and truth. A deflationist,
says Devitt, can be a realist or an anti-realist.199 Like Horwich, Devitt says that the notion of
truth appears as a device of generalization in the realism debate. Of course, Kitcher disagrees,
and his arguments will be presented in the next section.

3.3.3 Kitcher’s Arguments

A. Kitcher’s Criticism of Horwich’s Explanation
As was mentioned earlier, Kitcher’s main argument is that the correspondence notion of
truth plays an essential role in the success-to-truth rule. In order to establish this point, Kitcher
examines Horwich’s response to the success-argument. The gist of Horwich’s response to the
success-argument is that the explanatory role played by truth in an account of the success of
behavior or a scientific theory can exhaustively be accommodated by the deflationary theory of
198
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truth. An example of Horwich’s explanation was already introduced in the previous section
(3.2.1), but since Kitcher’s criticism is also concerned with the same example, it should be
repeated here:

1) Bill wants <Bill has a beer>. [Premise]
2) Bill believes <Bill nods → Bill has a beer>. [Premise]
3) [Bill wants <Bill has a beer> & Bill believes <Bill nods → Bill has a beer>] → Bill nods.
[Premise]
4) Bill nods. [from 1), 2), and 3)]
5) Bill’s belief is true. [Premise]
6) <Bill nods → Bill has a beer> is true. [From 2) and 5)].
7) <Bill nods → Bill has a beer> is true iff Bill nods → Bill has a beer. [An instance of the
equivalence schema]
8) Bill nods → Bill has a beer. [From 6) and 7)]
9) Bill has a beer. [From 4) and 8)]
10) <Bill nods → Bill has a beer> is true iff Bill nods → Bill has a beer. [An instance of the
equivalence schema]
11) Bill nods → Bill has a beer. [From 6) and 7)]
12) Bill has a beer. [From 4) and 8)]
13) <Bill has a beer> is true iff Bill has a beer. [From the equivalence schema]
14) <Bill has a beer> is true. [From 9) and 10)]
15) Bill gets what he wants. [From 1) and 11)]200

As was stated in the previous section (3.2.1), the derivation from 1) to 15) is Horwich’s
deflationary explanation of the success of behavior—by explaining the success of behavior this
way, Horwich responds to the success argument against deflationism. According to Kitcher,
however, Horwich’s deflationary explanation “stops rather at a shallow level,” implying that
200
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there is more to be explained about the success of behavior.201 If we stop with Horwich’s
explanation, we wouldn’t need the correspondence notion of truth. But Horwich’s explanation,
says Kitcher, doesn’t tell us the whole story of what underlies the success of behavior. The
following is what Kitcher says about Horwich’s explanation of the success of behavior:

This appears to be a very powerful debunking of the realist’s insistence that correspondence
truth was required to explain success, for we seem to be able to give an explanation without
looking at any notion of correspondence. All that’s needed is the minimal theory of truth. But
we should ask exactly what has been explained. The answer, surely, is that if an agent has a
true belief about means-ends relations, then that agent is likely to be successful. That isn’t
quite the explanandum that realists have taken to be crucial in their defenses of
correspondence truth. Correspondence truth has been supposed to be necessary because of
the way in which true beliefs about means-ends relations, or behavior that is as if the agent
has true beliefs about means-ends relations, result from true beliefs about the objects that
figure in the desired goal-state. The problem with Horwich’s explanation is that it stops at a
rather shallow level. Indeed, it’s akin to the classic paradigms of “explanation” that
subsumed facts about bird plumage under putative ornithological laws. The major instances
of scientific explanation go much deeper, and I think we can emulate them in this case.
Specifically, we can deepen our understanding of what is going on in successful actions by
considering, among other things, the causal relations that connect items in the world with the
tokens that figure in the agent's psychological states.202

Kitcher’s criticism may be summarized as follows:
i) Horwich’s deflationary explanation gets the explanandum wrong;
ii) Horwich’s deflationary explanation is shallow because it doesn’t invoke causal relations
that connect the constituents of psychological states with the entities in the mindindependent world.
I shall elaborate these points as follows. First, according to Kitcher, Horwich gets the
explanandum wrong because what needs to be explained isn’t merely how successful behavior
results from an agent’s true beliefs about means-ends relations. From the realist’s perspective,
201
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what needs to be explained is how the agent obtains his true beliefs about means-ends
relations—it is the source of an agent’s true beliefs about means-ends relations that should be
explained. An example of an agent’s true beliefs about means-ends relations is Bill’s belief that
if he nods, then he will get a beer (i.e., Bill’s believing <Bill nods → Bill gets a beer>). Horwich
doesn’t explain where Bill got this belief, and this, according to Kitcher, makes Horwich’s
explanation remain at a “shallow” level.
Kitcher’s quest for the source of a belief about means-ends relations, however, is
connected to his quest for the principles that can explain “systematic successes”. The notion of
systematic successes looms large in Kitcher’s criticism of deflationism. To understand what he
means by that notion, let’s consider the following:
Bill’s performance is extremely local. We hear one success on an occasion in which Bill had
a commonplace belief about means-ends relations. But I've insisted, from the beginning, that
the realist's argument concerned systematic successes. What exactly does that mean? I
answer that the cases of concern are those in which our agent has a device, or set of devices,
from which beliefs about means-ends relations (or behavior that is as if the agent had beliefs
about means-ends relations) flow.203

Kitcher is one of those who regard “systematic unification” as a criterion of a good scientific
explanation.204 A good explanation is the one that has the capacity to unify a wide variety of
phenomena under one or a small number of ultimate principles. Kitcher’s emphasis on
systematic successes should be understood from this perspective as well—the concept of
systematic successes assumes that a wide variety of successful behavior can be explained in
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terms of one or a small number of underlying principles. To take a related example, we don’t use
the term ‘systematic failure’ when one or two schools in the nation are doing badly; we use the
term when a large number of schools in the nation are doing badly for a long period of time.
Some may object that there isn’t necessarily a systematic failure just because a large number of
schools are failing. Kitcher disagrees; if a large number of schools are failing, there should be a
common cause in terms of which those massive failures can be explained. Similarly, a successexplanation should offer an account of systematic successes. A Horwich-style deflationary
explanation, however, cannot account for systematic successes; it can explain only individual
successes.
But why can’t a Horwich-style deflationary explanation offer an account of systematic
successes? The reason, says Kitcher, is that a Horwich-style deflationary explanation fails to
relate all the true beliefs about means-ends relation to their ultimate sources. In order to explain
systematic successes, we should be able to explain a wide variety of successful behavior in terms
one or a small number of ultimate principles. To do so in turn requires tracing all the true beliefs
about means-ends relations back to their ultimate source, and the explanatory role of
correspondence truth emerges in the search of the ultimate source of true belief. In order to argue
for these points, Kitcher brings in the example of a map.

B. The Map-Example
Suppose Ophelia uses a map to go to various places she wants to; she obtains various true
beliefs about means-end relations from the map, and she adjusts her behavior in accordance with
these beliefs. By doing so, she succeeds in arriving various places that she wants to go. One day,

164

Ophelia wants to go to the brook in her vicinity. So, she refers to the map, and she obtains the
belief that if she follows the path past the willows, she will get to the brook. She follows the path
past the willows, and she succeeds in arriving at the brook.
The standard deflationary explanation of the success of Ophelia’s behavior proceeds in
the same way that its explanation of the success of Bill’s behavior does. It begins with Ophelia’s
having the desire <Ophelia wants to get to the brook>, and Ophelia’s believing <Ophelia follows
the path past the willows → Ophelia gets to the brook>. The rest of the explanation will be
omitted here, since it proceeds in the exactly same way that the explanation of Bill’s success
does. As was stated above, Kitcher finds this explanation stops at a shallow level, because it
doesn’t trace Ophelia’s belief about means-ends relation back to its source. The source of her
belief is the map. So, Kitcher expands the Horwich-style explanation of Ophelia’s success by
adding the following explanation:
1) Ophelia believes <the map is accurate>.
2) Ophelia is competent to read the map.
3) Ophelia desires q [possible instances: <Ophelia gets to the brook>, <Ophelia gets to the
cliff>, <Ophelia gets to the graveyard>].
4) [Ophelia believes <the map is accurate> & Ophelia is competent to read the map &
Ophelia desires q] → Ophelia does A(q).
5) The map is accurate.
6) [The map is accurate & Ophelia does A(q)] → q.
7) q.

Here, ‘q’ is to be replaced by Ophelia’s desires; ‘A(q)’ is to be replaced by the action that
Ophelia performs to achieve her desire q. What Kitcher is concerned with in this derivation is the
contrast between step 4) and step 6). According to Kitcher, step 4) tells us that the action A(q) is
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psychologically pertinent to achieve Ophelia’s desire q. An action A(q) is psychologically
pertinent to an agent’s goal as long as the agent thinks that the action will lead to the satisfaction
of her goal. The derivation from 1) to 4) explains why Ophelia thinks that doing the action A(q)
is pertinent to her goal. The psychological pertinence of an action, however, should be
distinguished from the objective pertinence of an action. An action A(q) is objectively pertinent
to the agent’s goal q only if the agent succeeds in achieving her goal by doing A(q). Step 6) tells
us that Ophelia’s action A(q) is objectively pertinent to her goal q.
Now, the question that Kitcher is most interested in is what explains an action A(q) that is
both psychologically and objectively pertinent to an agent’s goal. Kitcher says, “The explanatory
mystery is precisely why there should be any action that meets these two constraints.”205 And
here comes Kitcher’s main criticism of the deflationary explanation of the success of behavior.
He says, “To read 5) in the deflationist’s sense leaves at least one of 4), 6) unexplained.”206 That
is to say, the deflationist can explain either the psychological pertinence or the objective
pertinence of A(q) to q, but not both. On Kitcher’s view, the deflationist can easily explain the
psychological pertinence of an action to a goal. The deflationist, however, cannot explain how a
psychologically pertinent action can also be objectively pertinent. Kitcher’s reason, in short, is
that the deflationist cannot explain systematic success; that is to say, on Kitcher’s view, if the
deflationist cannot explain systematic success, she cannot explain the objective pertinence of an
action A(q) to a goal q, either. I will argue in the next section, however, that this view is wrong.

3.3.4. The Criticisms of Kitcher’s Argument
205
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What I will argue for in this section is as follows; first, although the deflationist cannot
explain systematic successes, he can explain the objective pertinence of an action to a goal; and
second, for Kitcher’s ultimate purpose—the defense of realism—the objective pertinence of an
action is all that needs to be explained. In particular, I will argue that the success-to-truth rule
can be sustained as long as the objective pertinence of an action is explained. Kitcher’s
requirement for an account of systematic successes seems orthogonal to the defense of the
success-to-truth rule.
First, let’s examine whether the deflationist can explain how there can be an action A(q)
that is both psychologically and objectively pertinent to an agent’s goal q. To do so, let’s return
to Kitcher’s expansion of a Horwich-style explanation of the success of Ophelia’s action. I will
reproduce it here for the sake of convenience:
1) Ophelia believes <the map is accurate>.
2) Ophelia is competent to read the map.
3) Ophelia desires q [possible instances: <Ophelia gets to the brook>, <Ophelia gets to the
cliff>, <Ophelia gets to the graveyard>].
4) [Ophelia believes <the map is accurate> & Ophelia is competent to read the map &
Ophelia desires q] → Ophelia does A(q).
5) The map is accurate.
6) [The map is accurate & Ophelia does A(q)] → q.
7) q.

According to Kitcher, when we understand 5) in the deflationary sense, we cannot explain how
there can be an action A(q) that is both psychologically and objectively pertinent to Ophelia’s
goal q. But the deflationist has no problem explaining it. First, the psychological pertinence of
A(q) is fully explained by the step from1) to 4) above. To say that an action A(q) is
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psychologically pertinent to an agent’s goal q is to say that the agent believes that doing an the
action A(q) will satisfy his goal. The step from 1) to 4) shows that Ophelia believes that doing
the action A(q) will satisfy her goal q. Given that each step from 1) to 4) is satisfied, Ophelia will
do the action A(q). But then, in order to explain the psychological pertinence of Ophelia’s action,
it isn’t even necessary to invoke 5). Namely, the psychological pertinence of an action can be
explained independently of the truth of a belief or the accuracy of the map. So, at this stage, it
doesn’t matter how we understand the notion of accuracy or truth; we don’t even have to invoke
5).
At the second stage, however, we need to invoke the accuracy of the map; an account of
the objective pertinence of an action requires the step 5). To say that an action A(q) is objectively
pertinent to a goal q is to say that if an agent does A(q), he will succeed in satisfying the goal q;
namely, it is to say that OS) in the following is true:

OS) Ophelia does A(q) → q.

But then, to say that OS) is true amounts to saying that the action is successful; it means that if
an agent does A(q), he will succeed in achieving his goal q. Therefore, to explain the objective
pertinence of an action is to explain the success of behavior; they amount to the same thing. But
then, it is weird for Kitcher to say all of sudden that the deflationist cannot explain the objective
pertinence of an action. We all agreed from the beginning that the success of an action should be
explained, among other things, by the truth of a belief. But then, the objective pertinence of an
action should be explained by the truth of a belief. In the map-example, the truth of Ophelia’s
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beliefs about means-ends relations originates from the accuracy of the map. Kitcher questions
whether the deflationist can make sense of the role played by the accuracy of map in an account
of the objective pertinence of Ophelia’s action. Contrary to Kitcher’s skepticism, the deflationist
can easily explain it by offering the derivation in the following:

5) The map is accurate.
51) The map says <One does A(q) → q>.
52) <One does A(q) → q> is true. (from 5) and 51))
53) One does A(q) → q. (from 52) and the equivalence schema (E))
OS) Ophelia does A(q) → q. (an instantiation of 53))

The derivation from 5) to OS) shows how the objective pertinence of Ophelia’s action A(q) is
derived from the accuracy of the map. This explanation assumes no principle of truth other than
the equivalence schema. So, unlike what Kitcher says, the deflationist has no problem explaining
both the psychological and objective pertinence of an action.
But then, what is the nature of Kitcher’s complaint of the deflationary account of the
success of behavior? The nature of Kitcher’s complaint is that the deflationary account cannot
explain systematic successes. As was noted above, to explain systematic successes is to explain a
wide variety of successful behaviors in terms of a small number of ultimate principle(s). In order
to do so, we have to find a common feature shared by all successful behaviors. In the mapexample, the common feature is that they all flow from 5)—the accuracy of the map. More
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precisely, any successful behavior in the map-example is caused by a true belief about meansends relations, and a true belief about means-ends relations originates from the accuracy of the
map. So, it appears, at a first glance, that the deflationist should have no problem explaining
systematic successes—the underlying principle of all successful behaviors is the accuracy of the
map. At a second glance, however, we find something wrong with this explanation—when we
understand the notion of truth in the deflationary sense, it is trivial to say that the underlying
principle of successful behaviors is the accuracy (truth) of the map. When we understand the
accuracy of the map in the deflationary sense, 5) is equivalent to 5D) in the following:
5D) The map says <One walks past the willows → one gets to the brook> & (One walks
past the willows → one gets to the brook; or the map says <One crosses the river →
one gets to the castle> & (One crosses the river → one gets to the castle); or . . .

To say that 5D) is the underlying principle of all successful behaviors trivializes the very idea of
systematic successes—the idea that a wide variety of successful behavior can be explained in
terms of a small number of principles. 5D) consists of infinite disjunctions, and this already
betrays the idea that 5D) can be an underlying principle of a wide variety of successful behaviors.
Given that 5) is equivalent to 5D), to say that an action A(q) is successful because the map is
accurate amounts to saying 5D*):

5D*)

<Ophelia follows the path past the willows → Ophelia gets to the brook> because the
map says <One follows the path past the willows → one gets to the brook> & (One
follows the path past the willows → one gets to the brook); or <Ophelia crosses the
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river → Ophelia gets to the castle> because the map says <One crosses the river →
one gets to the castle> & (One crosses the river → one gets to the castle); or . . .207

To be sure, 5D*) isn’t what Kitcher means by an account of systematic successes; there is nothing
systematic about 5D*). But this is all we can afford if we understand 5) in the deflationary sense.
Since the deflationist denies that phenomena about truth can be reduced to a small number of
more basic facts, to invoke the accuracy of the map in an account of the success of behavior
means nothing more or nothing less than 5D*). The utility of a truth-expression—for example,
‘true’ or ‘accurate’—is that it enables us to generalize 5D*) into G) in the following:

G) An action A(q) is successful because its ultimate source—the map—is accurate.

The explanatory role of truth or accuracy is exhausted by such a logical, generalizational,
function. But to say that the nature of the explanatory role of truth is purely logical is to say that
the notion of truth doesn’t have any other explanatory function. To make the point vivid, let’s
compare the explanatory role played by notion of truth with the explanatory role played by the
notion of oxygen in Lavoisier’s theory of combustion. Roughly speaking, Lavoisier’s theory of
combustion is that oxygen is the underlying principle in terms of which various phenomena of
combustion can be explained. In this theory, the notion of oxygen doesn’t play a merely logical,
generalizational, function; the notion of oxygen determines well-defined physical properties, and
these properties cause combustion by interacting with other physical properties. By contrast, the
207

Relevant agents go beyond Ophelia; they can be anybody.
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deflationary notion of truth doesn’t determine well-defined properties, let alone physical
properties. Therefore, it doesn’t make sense to say that the property of truth explains a wide
variety of successful behaviors; truth isn’t even the kind of property that can have such an
explanatory power.
Michael Levin—whose view Kitcher mentions in his discussion—claims that the notion
of truth has nothing to do with the success of behavior (including successful predictions and
interventions made by scientists).208 Levin says,
Why do airplanes stay up? Surely the reason airplanes stay up is not
(1) “The pressure on the underside of a moving airfoil is greater than the pressure on its
overside” is true,
but rather
(2) The pressure on the underside of a moving airfoil is greater than the pressure on its
overside.209

Levin isn’t here advocating the redundancy theory of truth; he only tries to identify what really
does the causal-explanatory work; the causal-explanatory work is done by the properties invoked
in 2). The notion of truth invoked (1) is a purely disquotational device doing no causalexplanatory work. Similarly, the notion of truth invoked in G) above doesn’t do a causalexplanatory work—it is a device of generalization. The causal-explanatory work is done by
Ophelia’s believing <One follows the path past the willows → one gets to the brook> & (One
follows the path past the willows → one gets to the brook); Ophelia’s believing <One crosses the
river → one gets to the castle> & (One crosses the river → one gets to the castle); and so forth.
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M. Levin, “What Kind of Explanation is Truth?”, in J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984, pp:124-39.
209

M. Levin, ibid., p. 126.
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The notion of truth is appealed to only as a device of generalization such an infinite conjunction
(or a disjunction).
So, Kitcher is right when he claims that if we construe the notion of truth in the
deflationary sense, we cannot expect truth to explain systematic successes. Let’s recall, however,
what Kitcher aims to prove eventually—he aims to prove that scientific realism requires a nondeflationary notion of truth; in particular, correspondence truth. To prove this point, Kitcher
brings in the success-to-truth rule:
(Success-to-Truth Rule)
S plays a crucial role in a systematic practice of fine-grained prediction and intervention.
_______________________________________________________________________
S is approximately true.

This rule embodies one of the most important arguments for scientific realism—it embodies
ideas underlying the “no-miracle” argument and the abductive argument for scientific realism.
So, according to this rule, we would not be able to explain how a theory yields successful
predictions and interventions unless we take the theory to be true; put differently, from the
premise that a theory yields successful predictions and interventions, we are allowed to infer that
the theory is true. Kitcher maintains that the deflationist cannot make sense of this argument for
scientific realism on the grounds that the deflationist cannot accommodate the role of truth in this
argument; i.e., the success-to-truth rule.
The deflationist has no problem, however, accommodating the role of truth in the
success-to-truth rule—he can explain it in the same way he explains the role of truth in an
account of the success of Ophelia’s behavior. The nature of the role played by truth in the
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success-to-truth rule, says the deflationist, is purely logical, because the success-to-truth rule
generalizes an infinite disjunction 8) in the following:

8) If Newton’s theory is composed of propositions <P1>, <P2>, . . , <Pn>, and Newton’s
theory plays a crucial role in a systematic practice of fine-grained prediction and
intervention, then P1, P2, . . , Pn; or if Einstein’s theory is composed of propositions <R1>,
<R2>, . . , <Rn>, and Einstein’s theory plays a crucial role in a systematic practice of finegrained prediction and intervention, then R1, R2, . . , Rn; or . . .

Given that the success-to-truth rule is purported as an argument for scientific realism, 8) exhausts
what is stated by the success-to-truth rule. The reason the success-to-truth rule supports scientific
realism is that if this rule is accepted, the two main theses of scientific realism will be accepted
as well: (SR) and (SSR) (see 3.3.1 and the footnote below).210 That is to say, if we accept the
success-to-truth rule, we will accept the existence of the entities—including unobservable
entities—that feature in well-established scientific theories; we will also believe that those
entities have the properties attributed to them by science. The same effect will be obtained if we
accept 8). For example, suppose we infer the conclusion that masses warp space and time from
the premise that Einstein’s theory states <Masses warp space and time> and Einstein’s theory
plays a crucial role in a systematic practice of prediction and intervention. This is enough to
show that we accept (SR) and (SSR); it shows that we believe that masses, space, and time exist
mind-independently, and these entities have the properties attributed by Einstein’s theory.
210

(SR)

Most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories exist mindindependently.
(SSR) Most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories exist mindindependently, and mostly have the properties attributed to them by science.
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Therefore, as long as the success-to-truth rule is construed as a generalization of the infinite
disjunction 8), the success-to-truth rule can support scientific realism. In order to explain how the
success-to-truth rule generalizes the infinite disjunction 8), we need to assume no theory of truth
other than the instances of the equivalence schema (E): <P> is true iff P. Therefore, the
deflationist has no problem accommodating the role of truth in the success-to-truth rule.
Kitcher may respond to this response by pointing out that the deflationist cannot offer an
account of systematic successes. Kitcher may argue that if the success-to-truth rule is nothing but
a generalization of 8), then we could not explain systematic successes. What he would mean by
‘systematic successes’ in this context is that many, diverse, scientific theories—for example,
Newton’s theory, Einstein’s theory, Boyle and Charles’ theory, and so forth—result in successful
predictions and interventions, and the success of all these theories should be explained in terms
of a small number of ultimate principles. If the meaning of the success-to-truth rule is exhausted
by the infinite disjunction 8), however, we cannot expect that we will find some ultimate
principles in terms of which we can explain how all those theories result in successful
predictions and interventions. Therefore, says Kitcher, we cannot give an account of systematic
successes if we construe the notion of truth invoked in the success-to-truth rule in the
deflationary sense.
Two responses can be offered by the deflationist. First, for the purpose of defending
scientific realism, it isn’t essential that we give an account of systematic successes. As was
discussed earlier, Kitcher places two very different requirements on a success-explanation—the
requirement of explaining the objective pertinence of an action and the requirement of explaining
systematic successes. Of these two requirements, it is only the requirement of explaining the
objective pertinence of an action that is relevant for the defense of scientific realism. The core
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theses of scientific realism are (SR) and (SSR), but to defend (SR) and (SSR) doesn’t require us
to give an account of systematic successes. Whether or not we can derive the success of all those
theories from a small number of ultimate principles has no bearing upon endorsing (SR) or
(SSR). To be sure, if a success-explanation—an explanation of the success of behavior—can
derive all the successful action from a small number of ultimate principles, its explanatory power
would increase. The success-to-truth rule, however, isn’t any kind of a success-explanation—the
purpose of the success-explanation is to defend realism. If the success-to-truth rule were any
kind of success-explanation, then one may insist that the notion of truth should play a role in
accounting for systematic successes. The purpose of the success-to-truth rule, however, isn’t
simply to explain the success of an action—it is to show that only the doctrine of scientific
realism can explain the success of predictions and interventions. The notion of truth is invoked to
make this point—to state that the extra-mental and extra-linguistic conditions of reality plays an
essential role in an account of the success of scientific predictions and interventions. Explaining
systematic successes is totally orthogonal to the role of truth in the success-to-truth rule.
Therefore, it is wrong for Kitcher to require the deflationist to explain systematic successes.
Another response that can be offered by the deflationist is that to invoke the
correspondence notion of truth isn’t helpful in giving an account of systematic successes. Kitcher
maintains that if we construe the notion of truth in terms of the correspondence notion, we can
have both—not only can we make sense of the success-to-truth rule but we can also have an
account of systematic successes. This expectation can be met, however, only if the
correspondence notion of truth is properly defined. Unless the correspondence notion of truth is
defined in a clear and substantive way, we would have no idea how the empirical success of
many, diverse, scientific theories are derived from the property of correspondence truth. Besides,
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unless the correspondence notion of truth is properly defined, there would be no difference
between invoking truth and invoking correspondence truth in an account of the success of
scientific theories. Kitcher’s characterization of correspondence truth, however, is far from being
clear and substantive. He rarely explains what the property of correspondence truth is. In
particular, Kitcher uses the notion of correspondence relations in two different ways without
differentiating one from the other. He sometimes means by it a congruence-relation between a
mental/linguistic representation and the states in the world. At other times, he means by it a
causal relation between the elements of a mental/linguistic representation and the entities in the
world. It hardly makes sense, however, to construe the nature of a correspondence relation
between a linguistic/mental representation and the world in terms of a congruence relation. To
construe a correspondence relation in terms of a congruence relation makes sense only when we
deal with a pictorial representation such as a map. A mental/linguistic representation, however,
isn’t a pictorial representation.
So, the notion of a correspondence relation, if there is such a relation, should be
construed in terms of a causal relation, not a congruence relation. As was discussed in Ch. 1,
however, there are many difficulties in defining a correspondence relation in terms of a causal
relation. Kitcher’s problem, however, is even more acute—Kitcher has to show that there is a
causal relation that essentially enters into an explanation of the empirical success of a scientific
theory. Kitcher’s idea is that we could not explain how scientists succeed in making predictions
and interventions without invoking the causal relations between the elements of their beliefs and
the entities in the world. Is there however, any causal relation that should exist in order for
scientists to make successful predictions and interventions? It seems that as long as scientists
have true beliefs—in other words, the scientific theories they accept are true—their predictions
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and interventions would be successful. How the entities in the world are causally related to the
scientists’ beliefs doesn’t seem to play an essential role in their making successful predictions
and interventions. It is possible that two scientists have the same belief about science while the
causal relations between the elements of their beliefs and the entities in the world are not the
same. For example, a Martian scientist and a scientist on the earth have the same scientific belief,
although the way the elements of a Martian’s belief are causally connected with the entities in
the world is different from the way the elements of the earthling’s belief are causally connected
with the entities in the world. To say this doesn’t deny the role played by a scientific method in
an account of successful predictions and interventions. The causal relation between the elements
of a belief and the entities in the world, however, has no bearing upon a scientific method—it
bears upon the semantics of scientific beliefs. Unfortunately, Kitcher often confuses a
methodological question with a semantic question. The deflationist doesn’t deny the importance
of a methodological question in bringing about successful predictions and interventions. He
denies, however, that a semantic question has anything to do with the empirical success of a
scientific theory. In order to argue for the correspondence theory of truth, Kitcher has to prove
that a semantic question has any bearing upon the empirical success of a scientific theory. It is
doubtful, however, that he can do so; a Martian, a blind person, a deaf person, or even an android
may have the same success in their predictions and interventions. What matters, thankfully, is the
truth of their beliefs, not the semantic mechanism involved in their beliefs.
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Chapter 4. Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content

4.1. Introduction

What should a theory of meaning and content be like when the notion of truth is
construed in the deflationary sense? This is a big question, and involves vagueness as well. First,
the term ‘theory of meaning’ can mean a theory that explicates the nature of the meaning of an
expression, a theory that explains the underlying facts by virtue of which an expression has the
particular meaning it has, or something else.211 Second, there are a variety of deflationary
theories of truth. So, before discussing what theory of meaning is best suited for a deflationary
theory of truth, it is essential to be clear about what the kind of deflationary theory of truth is
being considered.212 In this chapter, the term ‘theory of meaning’ will be used both as an account
of the nature of meaning and as an account of the underlying facts by virtue of which an
expression has the particular meaning it has.213 The kinds of deflationary theory of truth being
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David Lewis says:
I distinguish two topics: first, the description of possible languages or grammars as abstract semantic systems
whereby symbols are associated with aspects of the world; and, second, the description of the psychological and
sociological facts whereby a particular one of these abstract semantic systems is the one used by a person or
population. Only confusion comes of mixing these two topics. (D. Lewis, “General Semantics,” Synthese, Vol.
22, 1970, pp. 18-67)

Drawing upon Lewis’s distinction, Jeff Speaks (“Theories of Meaning,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010)
distinguishes a semantic theory from a foundational theory of meaning, where a semantic theory is to assign
semantic contents to expressions, and a foundational theory of meaning is to explicate the facts by virtue of which
expressions come to have their semantic contents. There seems to be, however, the third kind of a theory of meaning
which, like Davidson’s, aims to generate theorems knowledge of which is sufficient to understand what a speaker of
a language says in uttering a sentence in the language. See D. Davidson, Inquires into Truth and Interpretation,
Oxford: Clarendon Press,2nd ed., 2001.
212
Following Horwich, we may call ‘semantic deflationism’ a combination of a deflationary theory of truth and a
deflationary theory of meaning. See P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, Ch. 1.
213
Horwich uses the term ‘theory of meaning’ as meaning a theory explicating underlying facts (or properties) by
virtue of which an expression possesses the particular meaning it has. (P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 3, p. 43) Field, on
the other hand, uses the term ‘theory of meaning’ as meaning both a theory explicating the nature of the meaning of
an expression and a theory explicating the facts by virtue of which an expression possesses the particular meaning it
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considered are those developed and advocated by Horwich and Field. In this thesis, I have
concentrated more on their commonalities than their differences. In discussing their matching,
deflationist theories of meaning, I will adopt the same approach—I aim to show that there are
more commonalities than there appears to be.
In discussing the commonalities between Horwich’s and Field’s theories of meaning, I
will focus on a specific issue—how their theories of meaning deflate the role of truth-theoretic
notions in an account of meaning. According to Devitt, one of the most important characteristics
of a deflationary theory of meaning and truth is that it denies a systematic connection between an
account of meaning and an account of truth.214 Considering what motivates the deflationary
concept of truth in the first place, what Devitt says makes perfect sense. The most important
argument for the deflationary concept of truth is that the role played by the notion of truth is
purely expressive as opposed to being explanatory. The truth term such as ‘is true’ is a device
that enables us to express things that we could not do easily without it—it enables us to
abbreviate a long series of conjunctions (or disjunctions); it enables us to express an agreement
(or a disagreement) with a belief that we cannot articulate; and so forth. In this very sense,
deflationists construe truth as a purely logical notion not playing an important explanatory role.
So, a deflationist theory of meaning should be deployed without having the notion of
truth playing a central role. In this regard, Horwich says, “[W]hen it comes to semantics, truth
really has got nothing to with it,” implying that his deflationist view of meaning is opposed to
orthodox, mainstream semantics characterizing facts of meaning in terms of truth-theoretic

has. Ironically, Field’s deflationist theory of meaning denies there is either a meaning expressed a word or facts by
virtue of which an expression possesses a particular meaning. (See H. Field, Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford
University Press, 2001)
214
This is one of the many valuable comments given by Prof. Devitt on this thesis.
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terms.215 Field agrees—he says, “[A]ccepting deflationism requires dethroning truth conditions
from the central place in the theory of meaning and the theory of intentionality . . .”216 Thus,
Horwich and Field offer theories in which non-truth-theoretic notions play a central role in an
account of meaning and content. Horwich’s use theory of meaning and Field’s linguistic view of
meaning attributions are those theories respectively.
Both Horwich’s use theory of meaning and Field’s linguistic view of meaning
attributions deal with a wide range of issues concerning a theory of meaning and content.
Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss all of them. So, the aim of this chapter
is modest—in the first part of this chapter, I will explain the core ideas of Horwich’s use theory
of meaning. In discussing some of the core ideas, I will bring in Horwich’s response to Kripke’s
skeptical argument regarding Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning. A brief excusatory remark is
needed here—this discussion wasn’t part of my original plan. Working on this topic upon Prof.
Levin’s request, however, I got interested in the later Wittgenstein’s view of meaning especially
with regard to its influence on contemporary deflationist views of meaning. This is the reason
why I will give somewhat lengthy discussion on Kripke’s treatment of Wittgenstein’s view of
meaning. In the second part of this chapter, I will compare Horwich’s view of meaning with
Field’s view of meaning. As was mentioned earlier, I will deal with this topic by concentrating
more on their commonalities than differences. In the last part of this chapter, I will discuss
Field’s treatment of a version of success arguments against the deflationist theory of truth and
content. The purpose of this discussion is to see how a deflationist can explain the success of
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P. Horwich, “Semantics: What’s Truth Got to Do with It,” in his Truth—Meaning—Reality, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010, p. 165.
216
H. Field, “Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse,” Philosophical Review, 1994, 103, pp.405-52.
As Field emphasizes in many of his writings, Field regards one’s stance on the role of truth as being decided by
one’s stance on the role of truth conditions. A more discussion on this point will be given shortly.
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behavior while she explains the content of a belief-state without assigning a central role to a
truth-theoretic notion.

4. 2. Horwich’s Use Theory of Meaning and its Response to Kripke’s Skeptical Paradox

Horwich says that his use theory of meaning is intended to answer the question: in virtue
of which of its underlying properties does a word come to possess a particular meaning.217 To
understand how Horwich’s use theory answers this question, we should first be clear about what
he means by the ‘meaning’ of a word. The meaning of a word, in his theory, is a concept
expressed by the word, where a concept is an abstract entity that constitutes a proposition and
state of mind (e.g. a belief, desire, etc.).218 Horwich uses capitalization convention to name a
concept expressed by an expression. For example, ‘DOG’ refers to the concept, DOG, and it is
the meaning of ‘dog’; ‘SNOW IS WHITE’ refers to the concept, SNOW IS WHITE, and it is the
meaning of ‘snow is white’; and so on. Now, in Horwich’s use theory, ordinary meaning
attributions of the forms 1) and 2) are construed in terms of 3) and 4) in the following:

1) x means <dog>.219
2) x means that snow is white.

3) x means DOG.
217

P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 43.
Ibid., p. 44.
219
Here, I use Field’s formulation of an ordinary meaning-attribution for a sub-sentential expression, which is
intended to be neutral to the question of what sort of entity if the bracket-term refers to. In Horwich’s use theory of
meaning, the bracket-term refers to the concept expressed by the word inside the bracket-term. Since I will use this
formulation in discussing Field’s deflationist theory of meaning, I use this formulation for the sake of consistency.
See H. Field, “Attributions of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press,
2001, p. 157.
218
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4) x means SNOW IS WHITE.

As will be argued later, however, Horwich’s theory of meaning doesn’t seem to involve the
claim that ordinary meaning-attributions of the forms 1) and 2) are reducible to meaningattributions of the forms 3) and 4). Instead, it involves the claim that meaning-attributions of the
forms 3) and 4) are reducible to the use-properties of relevant expressions; i.e., ‘dog’ and ‘snow
is white’ as they are understood in English. In this sense, Horwich says that his use theory of
meaning involves a series of reductive analyses such as 5):

5) x means DOG = u(x)
x means ELECTRON = v(x)
. . . and so on,

where the underlying use-properties u(x), v(x), . . ., and so on stem from the basic acceptance
properties possessed by relevant expressions.220 The basic acceptance properties of an expression
are explanatorily fundamental properties that designate circumstances in which certain specified
sentences containing the term are accepted.221 For example, the basic acceptance property
underlying the use-property of ‘red’ is the disposition to apply ‘red’ to an observed surface when
and only when it is clearly red. Similarly, the explanatorily fundamental acceptance property
underlying the use-property of ‘dog’ is our disposition to utter or accept a sentence such as ‘This
is a dog’ when and only when there is an object having the property of doggyness.222 The
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P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 3 (“Meaning as Use”).
P. Horwich, Meaning, p. 45.
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Here, as Horwich says, the term ‘property’ is to be understood in a sufficiently fine-grained sense; that is to say,
the property of ‘doggyness’ is distinct from the property of ‘caninity’ (just as the property of ‘water’ is distinct from
the property of ‘H2O’). According to Horwich, the identity criterion of properties is as follows:
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primary explanatory function of these basic acceptance properties is to account for the
acceptance of other sentences containing relevant words; for example, the basic acceptance
property of ‘dog’ accounts for our acceptance of sentences such as ‘Dogs are friendly animal’
and ‘Dogs are humans’ favorite pet’. So, according to Horwich’s use theory of meaning, what
explains a word x’s having a particular meaning property such as ‘x means DOG’ is that x has a
certain use-property u(x). For example, if the word ‘chien’ in French means DOG, then it should
have the use-property u(x) to which the meaning-property ‘x means DOG’ is reduced. Given that
it is a trivial truth that ‘dog’ means DOG, if ‘chien’ means DOG, then the two words ‘chien’ and
‘dog’ should have the same basic acceptance property.223 In this sense, Horwich’s use theory of
meaning involves the claim that two words express the same concept in virtue of having the
same basic acceptance property.224
What makes Horwich’s use theory of meaning distinctively deflationary is the way in
which Horwich appeals to this theory in explaining why many constraints that philosophers have
traditionally placed in a theory of meaning are “pseudo”-constraints.225 There are several pseudoconstraints examined throughout his book Meaning—the understanding constraint, the
relationality constraint, the representation constraint, the aprioricity constraint, the
compositionality constraint, and the normativity constraint.226 By calling them ‘pseudoconstraint’, Horwich doesn’t intend to weaken the importance of these constraints; he rather
intends to remove obstacles in the way of developing a theory of meaning satisfying these

the property f-ness = the property g-ness iff the predicate ‘f’ means the same as the predicate ‘g’.
See P. Horwich, Meaning, p. 21.
223
To say that ‘dog’ means DOG is trivially true because ‘DOG’, by definition, names the meaning of the word
‘dog’. See P. Horwich, Meaning, p. 15.
224
P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 3 (“Meaning as Use”), p. 46.
225
See P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 1 (“Introduction”).
226
P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, Ch. 2 (“Pseudo-Constraint on an Adequate Account of
Meaning”).
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constraints.227 The main obstacle in satisfying these constraints, says Horwich, is a cluster of
misguided assumptions. For example, the difficulty with meeting the understanding constraint
emerges from the misguided assumption that our understanding the meaning of a word should be
explained by an explicit knowledge.228 Horwich explains why this assumption is misguided by
showing how his use theory of meaning satisfies the understanding constraint while it doesn’t
presuppose the assumption.229 Taking another example, the normativity constraint is the
requirement that an adequate theory of meaning should explain the normative import of a
meaning-property. For example, the meaning-property ‘x means DOG’ has the normative import
that x ought to be applied only to dog. Hence, the property that reduces this meaning-property
must be capable of having such normative import as well. This constraint has been considered
extremely difficult to satisfy, because no naturalistic (factual) property is intrinsically
normative.230 According to Horwich, however, this impression emerges from the misconception
that a meaning-property is intrinsically normative—that the property reducing a meaningproperty should be intrinsically normative. Horwich explains why this is a misconception, and
then proposes his use theory of meaning as an alternative approach in which the normative
import of a meaning-property is explained in terms of a factual property; i.e., a use-property.231
In this way, Horwich argues for the dual aspects of his deflationist view of meaning—
eliminating various misconceptions plaguing a theory of meaning, and providing an alternative
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P. Horwich, Meaning, pp. 16-18.
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Since the main focus of the discussion will be the relationality constraint and the representation constraint, the
detailed account of other constraints will be omitted. To be brief, however, Horwich’s point about the understanding
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As Horwich says, Kripke’s skeptical argument in his Wittgenstein on Rules and private Language is a good
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and Private Language,
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theory of meaning that meet all the constraints listed above. It would be nice if I could go over
each of his solutions to these constraints. Instead, I will in the following focus on Horwich’s
solutions to two of those constraints—the relationality constraint and the representation
constraint. Horwich’s solutions to these constraints are particularly relevant to his response to
Kripke’s skeptical argument against Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning. To be sure, Kripke’s
argument is concerned with the normativity constraint—that there is no fact in the world that can
explain the normative import of a meaning-property. Krikpe’s skeptical argument, however, is
also concerned with the relationality and representation constraint. Especially, Horwich responds
to Kripke’s skeptical argument by relating it to the relationality and representation constraints.
Moreover, Horwich’s treatment of these constraints shows how the inflationary conception of
truth engenders some of the misguided assumptions presupposed by traditional theories of
meaning.
The relationality constraint stems from the surface form of a meaning-attribution: ‘x
means y’, where x is to be replaced by a phonological and orthographic entity and y is to be
replaced by its meaning. Given that a meaning-attribution has such a relational form, an adequate
theory of meaning must explain, first, the nature of meaning-entities, and second, the nature of
the meaning-relation in which expressions stand to the meaning entities. As was mentioned, in
Horwich’s use theory of meaning, meaning-entities are concepts expressed by words or
sentences; for example, DOG or SNOW IS WHITE. But then, to meet the relationality constraint,
Horwich’s use theory of meaning should explain the nature of the meaning-relation between
expressions and concepts.
In explaining the nature of the meaning-relation, Horwich’s use theory of meaning makes
an important departure from other theories of meaning. Most theories of meaning that have been
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seriously entertained assume that the meaning-relation should be reduced to a relational
property.232 If we accept this assumption, we would require that the relational property ‘x means
DOG’ be analyzable into a relational property of the form 6) in the following:

6) T(x, dog).233

Horwich argues, however, that nothing compels us to analyze a meaning-property into 6); to
think otherwise involves several misconceptions. First, it involves committing the Constitution
Fallacy—to suppose that what constitutes a relational property has to be itself a relational
property.234 The surface form of a meaning-property is relational, but it doesn’t follow from this
that the property by virtue of which an expression has a meaning-property should be relational as
well.235 One may object here that if what constitutes a meaning-property isn’t relational, a
meaning-property isn’t genuinely relational, either. The problem with this objection is the
obscurity with the notion of being “genuinely relational”; the distinction between a relational and
non-relational property is obscure in the first place, and so it is by no means clear what a
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According to Horwich, the Davidsonian truth-conditional theory, the teleological theories defend by Papineau,
Dretske, Millikan, and Jacob, and Kripke’s skeptical argument against the naturalistic reduction of meaning-facts
implicitly assume this idea. See P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 2.
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I omitted an explanation for the sake of simplicity. The omitted explanation is as follows. Assuming that a
meaning-property should be reduced to a relational property, ‘x means DOG’ would first be analyzed into T*(x,
DOG). Since ‘DOG’ names the meaning of ‘dog’, T* couldn’t be construed as a non-semantic relation. In order to
reduce the semantic property ‘x means DOG’ into a non-semantic, relational property, ‘x means DOG’ has to be
further analyzed into T(x, an exemplification of DOG (i.e., doggyness)). This leads us to 6): T(x, dog). See P.
Horwich, Meaning, pp. 21-27.
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More precisely, the Constitution Fallacy (Horwich uses capital letters) is an error to suppose that reductive
analysis must preserve logical structure. In other words, it is a fallacy to assume that whenever a fact has a certain
component, then whatever constitutes this fact must contain the same component or something that constitutes it
(see P. Horwich, Meaning, p 21).
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I suppose Horwich is right about this; for example, John may have the relational property ‘x is taller than Tom
Cruise’ by virtue of having the non-relational property ‘x is 6 feet tall’. Field expresses a disagreement with
Horwich’s constitution fallacy (in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, p. 71). I won’t discuss it here.
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“genuinely relational” property consists in.236 That doesn’t mean that there is no distinction at all
between relational and non-relational properties; for example, there is a difference between
properties such as ‘x kicks y’ or ‘x loves y’ and properties such as ‘x is sick’ or ‘x is alive’.
Horwich takes note of such difference by distinguishing a strongly relation property and a
weakly relational property. A meaning-property would be strongly relational if it were
constituted by a relational property at a deeper level; and if it were, we would be justified in
analyzing ‘x means DOG’ into 6) above: T(x, dog). But the surface form of a meaning-property
doesn’t by itself show that a meaning-property is constituted by a relational property at its
deepest level. In this sense, Horwich argues that most meaning theories have assumed a
misconception that a meaning-property is a strongly relational. Horwich calls this misconception
‘the strongly relational constraint’, and this is another misconception associated with the
relationality constraint.
Freed from these misconceptions, Horwich argues that we can explain the nature of the
meaning relation without invoking a relational property such as ‘T(x, dog)’. Thus, Horwich
claims that what constitutes a meaning-property such as ‘x means DOG’ is simply the following:

7) The concept, DOG, is present within some mental state of a speaker who utters x.237

We infer 7) from the use-property u(x) which the meaning-property ‘x means DOG’ is reduced to;
namely, by observing how a speaker uses a certain word, we infer 7). So, Horwich’s use theory
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For example, is a property such as ‘x is red’ a relational property or not? We tend to think it to be a non-relational
property. However, in order for an object to have this property, it should stand in relations to certain conditions;
indeed, according to Locke, an object must stand in relations to a perceiver. But then, it is hard to say that the
property ‘x is red’ is “genuinely” relational or non-relational.
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See P. Horwich, Meaning, pp. 20-21.
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satisfies the relationality constraint easily while it doesn’t presuppose the strong relationality
constraint.
Horwich’s solution to the relationality constraint is closely connected to his solution to
the representation constraint. Interestingly, the representation constrain is in turn closely related
to Kripke’s skeptical argument against Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning. More precisely,
Kripke’s complaint about Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning is that it doesn’t meet the
representation constraint. The restraint constraint is that an adequate theory of meaning must
explain how an expression comes to represent a certain part of the world by virtue of possessing
a certain meaning-property. A rationale for this constraint is that we accept a meaning-to-truth
conditional such as 8) in the following:

8) x means DOG → x is true of all and only dogs.

For example, we accept that if the word ‘개’means DOG, then ‘개’ should be true of all and only
dogs. The question is then how to explain the connection between the antecedent and the
consequent of a meaning-to-truth conditional such as 8).
The core idea of Kripke’s argument against Wittgenstein’s dispositional (use) theory of
meaning is that meaning-properties such as ‘x means DOG’ cannot be reduced to a dispositional,
use property u(x) because a use-property u(x) doesn’t determine a representational (truththeoretic) property such as ‘x is true of all and only dogs’.238 Here, Horwich summarizes
Kripke’s argument as follows:
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The main references for Kripke’s skeptical argument and Horwich’s response are: S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on
Rules and Private Language, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982; L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, tran., by G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, 1958; P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon
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i)

Whatever constitutes the meaning of a predicate must determine its extension.

ii)

The use of a predicate doesn’t determine its extension.

Therefore,
iii)

The meaning of a predicate isn’t constituted by its use.

To substantiate the premise ii) Kripke brings in the famous “quus”-example; when I answer ‘125’
to the problem ‘68+57’, is my answer justified by my disposition to use the plus sign (‘+’ or
‘plus’) in a certain way? Kripke’s answer is that no fact about my disposition to use the plus sign
justifies that ‘+’ means PLUS as opposed to QUUS. Kripke (the self-proclaimed skeptic) says:

The sceptic argues that when I answered '125' to the problem '68+57', my answer was an
unjustified leap in the dark; my past mental history is equally compatible with the hypothesis
that I meant quus, and therefore should have said '5'.239
Here, an assumption is that I have never performed a computation that involves a number bigger
than 57.240 Another assumption is that there is the quus-function (symbolized ‘ⱷ’ as) that is
defined as follows: x ⱷ y = x + y if x, y <57, and x ⱷ y = 5 otherwise. But then, we can justify
‘68 + 57 = 125’ only if we can justify the metalinguistic assertion that my employment of the
plus sign (‘+’) means PLUS, not QUUS. Kripke’s skeptical conclusion is that nothing justifies
this metalinguistic assertion; in particular, my disposition to use the plus sign can never justifies
that it means PLUS as opposed to QUUS. Kripke emphasizes that the point of his skeptical
Press, 1998; P. Horwich, “Meaning, Use, and Truth,” Mind Vol. 104, 1995, pp. 355-368; P. Boghossian, “The RuleFollowing Considerations,” Mind Vol. 98, 1989, pp. 507-549; A. Miller, “Horwich, Meaning, and Kripke’s
Wittgenstein,” The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 199, 2000, pp. 161-174.
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S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 15.
S. Kripke, ibid., pp. 8-9.
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argument isn’t epistemological—it isn’t that we don’t have an access to the fact by virtue of
which the plus sign means PLUS as opposed to QUUS.241 The point is rather semantic—that
there is simply no fact of the matter determining that I meant PLUS by the plus sign.242 Once he
establishes such skeptical conclusion, Kripke deploys his skeptical solution. Before discussing
Kripke’s skeptical solution, however, I shall first examine Horwich’s response to Kripke’s
skeptical argument.
Horwich offers a two-pronged response to Kripke’s skeptical argument. Its first prong is
that Kripke’s argument is threatened to be invalidated by equivocation—the concept of
determination can be construed in two different ways, but Kripke’s argument rests on only one of
them.243 Its second prong is that the concept of determination Kripke’s argument rests on
involves the inflationary conception of truth. I shall both points in the following. First,
concerning the problem of equivocation, Horwich claims that we should make the distinction
between the strong and the weak determination of the representational property of an expression
by its use-property. That is to say, the use property of a predicate either strongly determines
(DETERMINES) or weakly determines (determines) its extension. The use property of a
predicate DETERMINES its extension when we can read off the extension of the predicate from
its use-property.244 According to Horwich, it is this notion of determination that Kripke’s
skeptical argument rests on; namely, the skeptical conclusion iii) above follows from the
premises i) and ii) only when ‘determines’ is understood as meaning DETERMINES. Construed
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S. Kripke, ibid., p. 21.
Kripke says that even God looked at my mind, he could not find the fact by virtue of which I meant addition
(PLUS) by ‘plus’. Kripke’s skeptical argument, however, isn’t just intended to show that there is no internal fact by
virtue of which an expression means anything; it is also intended to show that there is no external fact determining
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Private Language. See especially the part in which he makes an analogy to Hume’s skeptical argument against
private causation (S. Kripke, ibid, p. 69).
243
P. Horwich, “Meaning, Use, and Truth,” Mind Vol. 104, 1995, pp. 355-368.
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this way, the crux of Kripke’s objection to Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning is that we
cannot read off the extension (any other truth-theoretic properties) of an expression from its use
property.
What’s wrong, however, with the concept of DETERMINATION? Horwich’s answer is
that it assumes the inflationary concept of truth. To see why let’s examine what we need in order
to be able to read off the extensional (truth-theoretic) property such as ‘x is true of all and only
dogs’ from the use-property, u(x). What we need, says Horwich, is an inflationary principle of
the form 9) in the following:

9) u(x) → T(x, dog),

where ‘T’ names a non-semantic, naturalistic relation. It goes without saying that we would be
able to read off the extension of a predicate from its use property if we had a principle of the
form 9). But consider what it amounts to accept 9)—it amounts to accepting an inflationary
definition of being true of such as 10) in the following:

10) x is true of all and only dogs ↔ T(x, dog).

A definition of the form 10) is inflationary, since it offers a substantive analysis of the truththeoretic concept being true of—it analyzes this truth-theoretic property in terms of a naturalistic
property. From the deflationist perspective, however, it is neither needed nor possible to analyze
the property of being true of in terms of a naturalistic property. The deflationist construes truth as
a purely logical or expressive device the nature of which can exhaustively explained by the
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equivalence schema (E): <P> is true iff P. Similarly, in the deflationary truth, the concept of
being true of can exhaustively explained by what is implied by the instance of schemas such as

The concept F is true of y ↔ F(y).245

So, when we construe truth-theoretic concepts such as being true of in the deflationary sense, we
don’t need inflationary principles such as 9) and 10). But we need these principles if we are to be
able to read off the extension of a predicate from its use property. Therefore, when Kripke
criticizes Wittgenstein’s use theory on the grounds that we cannot read off the extension of a
predicate from its use property, Kripke assumes the inflationary conceptions of truth-theoretic
notions. Put more precisely, Kripke’s assumes that meaning-constituting properties are strongly
relational in the sense that meaning-properties strongly determine (DETERMINE) the truththeoretic properties of expressions. Horwich’s point is that these are “pseudo-contraints”, which
are ultimately rooted in the inflationary conceptions of truth-theoretic notions. When we construe
truth-theoretic notions in the deflationary sense, it is only expected that we cannot read off truththeoretic properties from use properties. But then, Kripke’s skeptical argument doesn’t provide a
legitimate reason to object to Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning.
I agree with Horwich’s response to Kripke’s skeptical argument—most of all, the
concept of meaning presupposed by Kripke’s skeptical argument is not Wittgensteinian.246 Since
245
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See P. Horwich, Meaning, Ch. 2.
Horwich makes the same point. He says:
Just because most of the properties we encounter have one, we shouldn’t assume that all do. Such an
assumption about truth-the inflationary view-would seem to be a paradigmatic Wittgensteinian example of a
philosophical misconception and pseudo-problem generated by an overdrawn linguistic analogy.
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the Wittgensteinian concept of meaning seems to be closely related to the deflationist view of
meaning, I will briefly discuss in the following some problems with Kripke’s criticism of
Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning.
Kripke’s skeptical argument involves two distinct arguments neither of which shows that
dispositional use properties don’t constitute meaning properties. First, it involves the argument
questioning whether I will have the same disposition to use the plus sign the disposition that I
have had. Kripke says that it is possible that I proceed to compute—in conflict with my previous
linguistic intentions—that 68 + 57 = 5.247 On the basis of this consideration, Kripke concludes
that nothing in my mind determines whether I mean PLUS or QUUS by the plus sign.248 This
argument doesn’t seem valid; even if we agree that my past and present dispositions don’t
determine my future dispositions, from this we cannot infer that my dispositions to use the plus
sign don’t determine its meaning-constituting properties. Suppose I proceed to compute
‘68+57=5.’ If this happens, we would have to say that I have been meaning QUUS by the plus
sign all along. By Kripke’s own definition, meaning QUUS involves an abrupt change of
dispositions—to compute ‘x ⱷ y = x + y if x, y <57’ but to compute ‘x ⱷ y = 5 otherwise’. This
only proves that meaning-properties are constituted by dispositional properties. Kripke may
respond back that at the present moment we cannot determine whether my plus sign means
PLUS or QUUS (because my present disposition is compatible with meaning PLUS and meaning
QUUS). The problem with this response is that the issue, as Kripke says himself, isn’t
See P. Horwich, “Meaning, Use, and Truth,” Mind Vol. 104, 1995, pp. 355-368, p. 359.
247
248

See S. Kripke, ibid., p. 9. (He says that although it sounds insane to say so, it is still logically possible.)
S. Kripke, ibid., p. 82. Kripke says,
The point is the sceptical problem, outlined above, that anything in my head leaves it undetermined what
function `plus' (as I use it) denotes (plus or quus), what 'green' denotes (green or grue), and so on.
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epistemological—whether we can determine the meaning of the plus sign is orthogonal to the
issue. The issue is whether meaning-properties are constituted by dispositional properties. So,
even if we cannot determine, by observing how I am disposed to use the plus sign, whether my
plus sign means PLUS or QUUS, it shouldn’t undermine the dispositional theory of meaning.
The question, therefore is whether Kripke’s counterexample (the quus-example) shows that
meaning-properties are not constituted by dispositional use-properties. The answer is that it
doesn’t; to the contrary, it only adds weight to the dispositional theory. Notice how Krikpe
defines the meaning-property ‘x means QUUS’—he defines it as ‘x ⱷ y = x + y if x, y <57, and x
ⱷ y = 5 otherwise’. This definition can easily be accommodated by the dispositional theory of
meaning—what constitutes meaning QUUS is the disposition to compute numbers in the same
way you compute an addition (x + y) if numbers are smaller than 57, but compute them 5
otherwise. Similarly, what constitutes ‘x means PLUS’ is the disposition to compute numbers in
the way we compute addition for all numbers. Surely, my past and present disposition to use an
expression are compatible with many different semantic hypotheses; that it means PLUS, it
means QUUS, it means QUUS*, and so forth. So, we cannot determine, just on the basis of
dispositional use-properties—whether an expression means anything. But by Kripke’s own
definition, meaning-properties are constituted by dispositional use-properties—what makes a
sign mean QUUS is how a user of the sign is disposed to compute numbers. Despite that Kripke
warns us not to confuse an epistemological question with a semantic question, he himself mixes
up these two questions.
Kripke’s another argument is that whereas the notion of meaning has an infinitary
character, the notion of dispositions doesn’t; we are finite beings, so our dispositions are also
finite. Therefore, meaning-properties cannot be constituted by dispositional, use-properties. It is
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doubtful, however, whether meaning has an infinitary character; is it really an infinite matter that
the plus sign (‘+’) means PLUS? Although Wittgenstein says at times as if meaning is an infinite
matter (a rule is like a rail to infinity), he also says that a rule can be altered.249 Wittgenstein says
that following a rule is like a practice or custom.250 We usually follow a practice or custom
blindly, without asking for a justification, but a practice or custom can change. Therefore, it
seems wrong to take what Wittgenstein means by ‘infinity’ literally. Instead, we should take it as
saying that although the first step of following a rule contains its future steps, it does so only
finitely, not infinitely.251 But then, the notion of a disposition best captures Wittgenstein’s notion
of meaning; a dispositional property has the kind of the regularity that a meaning property has,
but a dispositional property, like a meaning property, can change over time.
So, Kripke’s argument begs the question—it involves the dubious assumption that a
meaning property is fundamentally different from a dispositional use property. Kripke assumes
that whereas it is an infinite matter that the plus sign (‘+’) means PLUS, it is a finite matter that a
speaker (or a linguistic community as a whole) has a relevant disposition. It is by no means clear,
however, that we have to understand the notion of meaning in such an exaggerated way. Neither
does Wittgenstein construe the notion of meaning in this way.
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See §218 for Wittgenstein’s analogy between a rule and a rail. Also consider the following:
The whole time they are playing a ball-game and following definite rules at every throw. And is there not also
the case where we play and—make up the rules as we go along? And there is even one where we alter them—as
we go along. (L. Wittgenstein, ibid., §83, p. 39).
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See L .Wittgenstein,
Wittgenstein says,
It may now be said: "The way the formula is meant determines which steps are to be taken". What is the
criterion for the way the formula is meant? It is, for example, the kind of way we always use it, the way we are
taught to use it. (Philosophical Investigations, §190.)
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The most serious problem with Kripke’s criticism of the use theory, however, is that his
own solution to the skeptical problem—the skeptical solution—isn’t really different from the use
theory of meaning. The core idea of Kripke’s skeptical solution is that we should understand a
meaning-attribution such as ‘John means PLUS by the plus sign (‘+’)’ in terms of its assertability
condition, not truth condition.252 Kripke says,

All that is needed to legitimize assertions that someone means something is that there be
roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable, and that the
game of asserting them under such conditions has a role in our lives. No supposition that
'facts correspond' to those assertions is needed.253
So, on this view, we are entitled to assert ‘John means PLUS by the plus sign’ if John’s
responses to sum-questions seem acceptable from the perspective of the members of his
linguistic community. This is the reason why Kripke considers Wittgenstein’s argument against
private language a key to the solution to the skeptical paradox. Just as Hume solves the problem
of causation by recognizing the impossibility of private causation, so does Wittgenstein solve the
skeptical paradox by recognizing the impossibility of private language.254 When a person is
considered isolated, the meaningfulness of a meaning attribution such as ‘Jones means PLUS by
the sign ‘+’’ cannot be made sense of.255 Kripke says:

Wittgenstein finds a useful role in our lives for a 'language game' that licenses, under certain
conditions, assertions that someone `means such-and-such' and that his present application of
a word `accords' with what he `meant' in the past. It turns out that this role, and these
252
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conditions, involve reference to a community. They are inapplicable to a single person
considered in isolation. Thus, as we have said, Wittgenstein rejects 'private language'. . .256
We expect another person’s usage of ‘+’ to agree with ours because our lives are dependent upon
it. Therefore, the meaning-attribution ‘John means PLUS by ‘+’’ doesn’t involve John alone; it
involves the whole linguistic community that he belongs to. Only when a meaning attribution is
conceived from this non-individualistic point of view can we make sense of the meaningfulness
of a meaning attribution.257 This is the gist of the skeptical solution that Kripke attributes to
Wittgenstein.
But if this is Kripke’s own solution to the skeptical problem, it is mysterious why he
objects to the use theory of meaning in the first place.258 How can Wittgenstein’s argument
against private language be different from the dispositional use theory of meaning? There seems
no way to understand the ‘assertability condition’ associated with an expression independently of
the way the members of a linguistic community are disposed to use the expression. So, the
problem with Kripke’s skeptical solution to the skeptical problem isn’t that his solution is wrong;
it is that his skeptical solution is inconsistent with his criticism of the use theory of meaning.
Kripke’s skeptical solution supports—rather than criticizes—the use theory of meaning.

4.3 The Commonalities Between Horwich’s and Field’s Deflationist Views of Meaning
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As Horwich says, Kripke sympathetically presents Wittgenstein’s view of meaning, not attacking it. (P. Horwich,
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argument can be understood as an indirect means to advocate Wittgenstein’s view of meaning. There still remains
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skeptical paradox as a means of highlighting the contrast between the early Wittgenstein’s view of meaning with the
later Wittgenstein’s.
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In this section, I will compare Horwich’s view of meaning with another deflationist’s—
Field’s—view of meaning. In comparing their deflationist views of meaning, I found some
interesting and complicated dynamics among Wittgenstein, Kripke, Horwich, and Field. First,
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations seems to contain all the important seeds for
contemporary deflationist views of meaning. Its influence on Horwich’s view is obvious—
Horwich says that the purpose of his book Meaning is to clarify and support Wittgenstein’s view
that the meaning of a word is its use in the language.259 Its influence on Field’s deflationist view
is less obvious—Field indeed doesn’t mention the later Wittgenstein’s view of meaning at all.260
Field’s deflationist view of meaning, however, bears interesting similarities with the later
Wittgenstein’s view of meaning.261 Consider what Dummett says about the later Wittgenstein’s
view of meaning:

[T]he Investigations contains implicitly a rejection of the classical (realist) Frege—Tractatus
view that the general form of explanation of meaning is a statement of the truth conditions.262

Compare this passage with what Field says in the following:

I see the philosophy of language, and the part of philosophy of mind concerned with
intentional states like believing and desiring and intending and the like, as pretty much
bifurcated into two traditions. The traditions differ over the role that the notion of truth
conditions plays in the theory of meaning and in the theory of the content of intentional
259
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states. One of the traditions, whose early advocates include Frege, Russell, the early
Wittgenstein, and Ramsey, has it that truth conditions play an extremely central role
in semantics and the theory of mind; a theory of meaning or content is, at least in large
part, a theory of truth conditions. . . However, it isn't easy to say precisely what this central
role is that truth conditions allegedly play; that I think is a main motivation for the alternative
tradition.263
Field considers the Frege-Russell-(the early)Wittgenstein-Ramsey tradition the “inflationary”
tradition, where its distinctive feature is assigning a central role to the notion of a truth condition
in an account of meaning and content. Field finds this inflationary tradition of meaning and
content troublesome; he doubts the role that a truth condition allegedly has.
Besides, Field denies that there is a fact of the matter about meaning-attributions, which
concurs with Kripke’s skeptical interpretation of the later Wittgenstein’s view of meaning.
Relatedly, Field denies that translations and meaning-attributions are matters of being correct or
incorrect; they are matters of being better or worse.264 Again, according to Kripke, this is the
later Wittgenstein’s view of meaning. According to Kripke, all we can afford for a meaningattribution is the assertability condition, and not the truth condition. So, although Field also
defends a deflationist view of meaning, his view of meaning has more skeptical elements than
Horwich’s.265 On Horwich’s view, skepticism about a theory of meaning is largely due to
mistaken constraints placed on an adequate theory of meaning.266 Related to this point, Horwich
disagrees with Kripke’s claims that meaning-attributions have only assertability conditions, and
not truth condition. Horwich says “[T]he ‘use‐theoretic’ truth conditions for attributions of
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meaning are entailed—and are certainly not precluded—by the assertibility conditions that
Kripke endorses”.267
In situations like this, a natural way to discuss Horwich’s and Field’s deflationist views
of meaning may be to take sides with one of them. That’s not, however, how I will deploy the
discussion in the following—I will rather focus on the commonalities between Horwich’s and
Field’s deflationist views of meaning. There are two reasons why I take this approach; first, the
approach is helpful in having an overarching view of what a deflationist view of meaning and
truth is about. After all, they are two leading deflationists whose views of truth are more or less
in agreement. So, by focusing on the commonalities of their views of meaning, one can develop
a holistic understanding of what the deflationary approach to truth and meaning is about. Second,
Horwich’s and Field’s accounts of meaning have more in common than they appear to. This
shouldn’t be taken as saying that there is no important difference between their accounts of
meaning. Many of their differences, however, are not the differences in principle—they are
differences in how to accomplish the ultimate goal of the deflationary concept of truth; i.e., the
idea that the role of truth is expressive rather than explanatory. In order to discuss the
commonalities between Horwich’s and Field’s views of meaning in an orderly manner, I will
divide the discussion into two large topics: meaning-entities and a fact of the matter (about
meaning-attributions).

4.3.3 Meaning-Entities
In Field’s deflationist view of meaning and content, the question of the object of a
meaning-relation looms large. More precisely, one of the main questions discussed in Field’s
deflationist view of meaning is whether we are to construe a meaning-attribution as a relation to
267
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a meaning-entity, where a meaning-entity is construed as an extra-mental/extra-linguistic,
abstract entity. According to the orthodox (traditional) view of a meaning-attribution, we should
a meaning-attribution as a relation to a meaning entity.268 After all, the term ‘mean’ involved in a
meaning-attribution is a two-place transitive verb just like ‘love’ in ‘Mary loves John’. This
surface structure of a meaning-attribution—that it has the form ‘x means y’—supports the
traditional view that there should be something referred to by an expression that replaces ‘y’.
Moreover, what is referred to by an expression replacing ‘y’ should be an abstract entity—it
cannot be located in space and time; it should also be a language-independent entity, since what
is meant by an expression (for example, what is meant by the Korean word ‘개’) isn’t dependent
on the existence of a particular language; and it should also be a mind-independent entity, since
the meaning of an expression exists independently of what anyone says or thinks.
According to Field, however, we’d better not construe a meaning-attribution as a
relation to a meaning-entity. Instead, we’d better construe it as a relation to a linguistic entity;
namely, an expression in a meaning attributor’s language. Field calls this view ‘the linguistic
view of a meaning attribution’.269 So, if we accept this view, we are to understand ordinary
meaning attributions of the form 1) and 2) in terms of 1L) and 2L) in the following

1) x means <dog>.270
2) x means that snow is white.

268

I extended Schiffer’s face-value theory of a belief-attribution to a meaning-attribution. See S. Schiffer, The
Things We Mean, Oxford University Press, 2003, Ch. 1 (“The Face-Value Theory”).
269
H. Field, “Attributions of Meaning and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press,
2001.
270
Field’s use of brackets can be understood in the same way Horwich uses capital letters such as DOG to formally
represent a meaning attribution for a subsentential expression. Field says that a formulation such as 1) is intended to
be neutral to the question of what sort of entity if any bracket-term refers to. See H. Field, “Attributions of Meaning
and Content,” in his Truth and the Absence of Meaning, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 157.
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1L) Means-the-Same-as (x, ‘dog’).
2L) Means-the-Same-as (x, ‘snow is white’),

where ‘dog’ and ‘snow is white’ are a meaning-attributor’s words as they are computationally
typed.271 On this view, to say that an expression x means <dog> is to say that it means the same as
the word ‘dog’ does in my own language; also, to say that a sentence x means that snow is white
is to say that it means the same as the sentence ‘Snow is white’ does in my own language. So,
this view not only avoids invoking a meaning-entity in an analysis of meaning-attributions, it
also revises the logical form of meaning-attributions; whereas ‘means’ is a transitive verb,
‘means the same as’ is a comparative verb on the par with ‘is as tall as’. Both involve relations
but relations of different kinds; whereas ‘means’ expresses a non-symmetric relation, ‘means the
same as’ expresses a symmetric relation. Field isn’t the first advocating the linguistic analysis of
meaning- and content-attributions; it seems that his linguistic view of meaning- and contentattributions was influenced by Carnap’s linguistic analysis of propositional-attitude
attributions.272 In my thesis, however, I won’t discuss the historical background of Field’s
linguistic view of a meaning- and content-attribution. Instead, I will devote the discussion for the
examination of its implication in the debate between the inflationary and the deflationary views
271

In Field’s theory, to say that a word is computationally typed is to say that a word is typed in terms of its
computational role, which is in turn characterized in terms of its inferential/conceptual roles and indication relations.
See H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content.”
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Field mentions Church’s criticism of Carnap’s sententialist (non-propositionalist) analysis of a propositional
attitude ascription. (A. Church, “On Carnap’s Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief,” Analysis Vol. 10.
1950, pp. 97-99) Quine’s sententialist approach may be another influence on Field’s linguistic view of meaning
attributions. (W. V. Quine, “Quantifier and Propositional Attitudes,” The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 53, 1956, pp.
177-187.) (See H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content” and “Attributions of Meaning and Content,”
both in his Truth and the Absence of Fact.
See H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content” and “Attributions of Meaning and Content,” both in his
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of meaning. For that purpose I shall first contrast this view with Horwich’s analysis of a meaning
attribution.
Horwich says that he defends a non-revisionist (traditional or orthodox) approach to a
meaning attribution;

Attributions of meaning in the style of ‘“dog” means DOG’, ‘“Il pleut” means IT'S
RAINING’, and so on, will be taken at face value as claiming, in each case, that the relation
‘x means y’ links a certain noise or mark (such as the English word ‘dog’ or the French
sentence ‘Il pleut’) with a further, more mysterious entity—a meaning (such as DOG or IT'S
RAINING).273

So, on Horwich’s deflationist view of meaning, meaning attributions of the form 1) and 2) are
analyzed in terms of 1M) and 2M) in the following:

1M) Means (x, DOG).
2M) Means (x, SNOW IS WHITE),

where DOG and SNOW IS WHITE are meaning-entities; they are non-linguistic, abstract
entities which are the meanings of ‘dog’ and ‘Snow is white’ respectively.274
Viewed this way, Field’s and Horwich’s analyses of meaning-attributions are vastly
different from each other; whereas Horwich analyzes the logical form of a meaning-attribution
273

P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999, p. 4.
Horwich identifies meanings with concepts; for example, DOG is the concept expressed by ‘dog’, and as such it
is the meaning of ‘dog’. SNOW IS WHITW is the concept expressed by the indicative sentence ‘Snow is white’, and
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by invoking abstract meaning-entities, Field analyzes it by invoking a non-abstract, linguistic
entity. Despite this appearance, however, their analyses of meaning-attributions are not
fundamentally different from each other. To the least, there are very important commonalties
underneath the superficial difference. In the debate over deflationism, whether one invokes a
meaning-entity is less important than how one characterizes the nature of a meaning-entity. As I
will argue in the following, Horwich characterizes the nature of a meaning-entity in such a way
that his non-revisionist analysis is compatible with Field’s revisionist analysis of meaningattributions. To argue for this point, I shall first explain why Field objects to invoking a meaningentity in an analysis of a meaning-attribution.
There are three reasons for which Field is opposed to invoking a meaning entity in the
analysis of a meaning-attribution. First, there is an ontological (or metaphysical) reason: being a
physicalist, Field is declined to invoke abstract entities such as propositions or concepts. This is,
however, the least important reason among three.275 The other two, much more important,
reasons are that, first, invoking a meaning-entity tends to create a conflict with the deflationary
conception of truth; and second, it isn’t a meaning-entity but a linguistic entity that plays an
explanatory role in an account of meaning. In the following, I shall first elaborate these two
reasons, and then argue that if these are the reasons why Field objects to invoking meaningentities, there is no irreconcilable gap between Field’s and Horwich’s deflationist views of
meaning.
First, why does invoking a meaning-entity tend to create a conflict with the deflationary
theory of truth? The deflationary theory of truth defends the idea that truth is a purely logical
notion that serves as an expressive—not as an explanatory—device. Field thinks that this view of
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truth will get into trouble if meaning-entities are invoked as the objects of the meaningattributions. Consider a meaning-attribution of the form 2) illustrated above:

2) x means that snow is white.

To say that we construe a meaning-attribution of this form as a two-place relation between x and
a meaning-entity is to say that we construe the ‘that’-clause embedded in 2)—‘that snow is
white’—as a singular term referring to a meaning-entity.276 In philosophy, we call a meaningentity referred to by a ‘that’-clause embedded in a meaning- or content-attribution a
‘proposition’.277 A ‘proposition’ is a term of art, and therefore, it isn’t defined uniformly—
different theories of propositions define the nature of propositions in different ways.278 A
proposition, however, is a meaning-entity. Therefore, it has the basic features that are attributed
to a meaning-entity; that it is an abstract, mind- and language-independent entity. These are,
however, not the features that make Field avoid a proposition. As was mentioned above, Field’s
main reason for avoiding a proposition isn’t ontological. What makes Field avoid a proposition is
that a proposition is typically defined as a truth-theoretic entity; as Schiffer says, a proposition is
typically defined as an entity that has a truth condition essentially and absolutely.279 Now, it is
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There seems no alternative here—there seems no other way but considering ‘that snow is white’ as referring to a
meaning-entity as long as we construe a meaning-attribution of the form 2) as a relation to a meaning-entity.
277
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clear why Field avoids a proposition in his analysis of a meaning-attribution—as long as a
proposition is construed as an intrinsically truth-theoretic entity, if we analyze a meaningattribution by invoking a proposition, we should assign a central role to a truth-theoretic notions
(e.g. the notions of truth, reference, and a truth-condition). The central thesis of the deflationary
theory of truth is that truth-theoretic notions don’t play a heavy-duty explanatory role. Therefore,
to invoke a proposition as an object of a meaning-relation may contradict the core idea of the
deflationary theory of truth. To make the point vivid, suppose we analyze 2) (x means that snow
is white) into 2P) in the following:

2P) Means (x, the proposition that snow is white).

Suppose further that a proposition is construed as an intrinsically truth-theoretic entity—that it is
primarily defined in terms of the notion of a truth-condition. But then, by analyzing the meaningattribution 2) in terms of 2P), we would assign a central role to the notion of a truth-condition in
an account of meaning. In this account, to say that a sentence x means that snow is white is to say
that it stands in a meaning-relation to an entity that has the truth-condition that snow is white
essentially and absolutely. The consequence is quite unpalatable to the deflationary theory of
truth; the notion of truth is at the center of an account of the meaning of a sentence. Thus, Field’s
qualm about invoking a meaning-entity as the object of a meaning-relation is that once we
invoke a meaning-entity as the object of a meaning-relation, then via the traditional theory of a
proposition, we would end up assigning a serious explanatory role to truth-theoretic notions.

proposition is an abstract and mind- and language-independent entity—make a proposition essentially different from
a sentence, a linguistic entity. See S. Schiffer, The Things We Mean, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 14.
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Field’s argument is compelling, but it is open to one possible objection—a deflationist
may invoke a proposition in his analysis of meaning-attributions if he defines a proposition in a
non-traditional way. Horwich attempts this approach by characterizing a proposition as
something other than an intrinsically truth-theoretic entity. Thus, Horwich suggest that we
understand the notion of a proposition along the lines of (UP) in the following:

(UP) u expresses the proposition that p ↔ Int(u)  *p*.280

Here, ‘Int(u)’ abbreviates ‘the interpretation of u’, where to interpret u means nothing more or
less than translating u into a sentence ‘p’ in my language.281 ‘*p*’ picks out the word type with a
certain shape and a certain meaning, which is motivated in order to handle ambiguous
expressions. For example, ‘*bank*’ picks out two different sets of that combination; one is
composed of ‘bank’ and the use-property of a ‘river bank’, and the other composed of ‘bank’ and
the use-property of a ‘money-bank’. So, on this view, to say that an utterance u in another
language expresses the proposition that p is to say that u is translated into ‘p’ in my own
language, where the meaning of ‘p’ is in turn explicated in terms of *p*. Nowhere is a truththeoretic notion such as the notion of reference or truth condition invoked. In this account, 2) is
analyzed into 2P), but 2P) is analyzed into 2M): x means SNOW IS WHITE. But SNOW IS
WHITE—which amounts to the proposition that snow is white in Horwich’s sense—is a usetheoretic, not truth-theoretic, entity. In the same breath, the concept, SNOW or the concept,
WHITE is a use-theoretic entity which is primarily characterized in terms of a use-property. To
be sure, from ‘x means SNOW IS WHITE’ we can infer ‘x is true iff snow is white’; and from ‘x
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means SNOW’ we can infer ‘x stands for (or is true of) the property of being snow’. But this is
the consequence, not constitutive, of ‘x means SNOW IS WHITE’ and ‘x means SNOW’. So,
Horwich’s theory of propositions accommodates the ordinary conception of proposition within
the framework of the deflationary theory of meaning. That is to say, it accommodates the
commonsense idea that if a sentence expresses the proposition that p, then it has the truth
condition that p. In doing so, however, Horwich doesn’t assign an explanatory role to a truththeoretic notion, because a proposition is primarily characterized in terms of a use-theoretic
property, and only derivatively in terms of a truth-theoretic property. But then, Horwich’s
invocation of a meaning-entity—such as a proposition and concept—doesn’t conflict with
Field’s linguistic view of a meaning attribution. Therefore, although Horwich and Field
superficially disagree on the logical form and the object of a meaning-relation, they agree at the
fundamental level—they both object to invoking an intrinsically truth-theoretic entity in an
analysis of meaning-attributions. That is to say, they both deny that truth-theoretic notions play a
central role in an account of meaning-attributions.
There is, however, another reason why Field objects to invoking a meaning-entity—a
meaning-entity plays no explanatory role. To invoke a meaning-entity such as a proposition, says
Field, “obscure(s) the fact that the explanatory role of propositions derives from that of the
sentences that they ‘shadow’.”282 Consider a meaning-attribution such as 3) in the following:

3) ‘La neige est blanche’ means that snow is white.

What explains our acceptance of 3) is not that we somehow know that ‘La neige est blanche’
stands in a meaning-relation to the proposition that snow is white. It is rather that we take the
282
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meaning-characteristics of ‘La neige est blanche’ are the same or sufficiently similar to those of
‘Snow is white’ in our language. Field defines ‘meaning-characteristics’ as the combination of
the conceptual/inferential roles and indication relations of an expression. But then, what plays an
explanatory role in an account of meaning-attributions is not a proposition; it is a linguistic entity.
Therefore, from the perspective of an explanatory role, a proposition is nothing but a shadow of a
sentence; whatever explanatory roles we may attribute to a proposition, they are derived from the
explanatory roles played by the meaning-characteristics of a linguistic entity; i.e., a sentence.283
This argument is appealing; one piece of evidence is that if we don’t understand a
sentence ‘p’ embedded in ‘the proposition that p’, invoking the proposition that p is of no use.
For example, if someone tells me that a sentence x means the proposition that eukaryote is
pelagic, I learn nothing about the meaning of x. On the other hand, if someone tells me that a
sentence x means that a cell having a nucleus pertains to oceans, I can understand the meaning of
x. Let’s suppose here that ‘Eukaryote is pelagic’ and ‘A cell having a nucleus pertains to oceans’
are synonymous; namely, they express one and the same proposition. If a proposition is more
than the shadow of a sentence, there shouldn’t any difference between my understanding the
proposition that eukaryote is pelagic and my understanding the proposition that a cell having a
nucleus pertain to oceans. But there is a difference; I understand the one, but not the other. So,
whatever properties a proposition has, they are derived from the properties of a sentence.
Field says that he isn’t strongly opposed to an intentional entity as long as an intentional
entity is construed in a sufficiently bland way.284 What he means by this is that if a proposition is
construed as nothing but a shadow of a sentence, and a concept as nothing but a shadow of a
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subsentential expression, he isn’t opposed to invoking a proposition or concept.285 But then,
Field shouldn’t be opposed to Horwich’s invoking a proposition and concept as objects of
meaning-relations. To see why let’s first consider what the later Wittgenstein says of a
proposition. He says,

'A proposition is a queer thing!' Here we have in germ the subliming of our whole account of
logic. The tendency to assume a pure intermediary between the propositional signs and the
facts. Or even to try to purify, to sublime, the signs themselves.—For our forms of
expression prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing out of the ordinary is
involved, by sending us in pursuit of chimeras.286
The later Wittgenstein, the father of the use theory of meaning, invokes a proposition in his
account of meaning. He objects, however, to the idea of construing a proposition as a mysterious
entity that is distinct from a propositional sign; he says that our forms of expressions engender
the misguided idea that a proposition is a sublime, extraordinary, chimerical entity. It isn’t clear
what he mean by ‘our forms of expressions’ here, but a good example of those expressions may
be a ‘that’-clause embedded in a meaning- and content-attributions. The surface structure of a
meaning-attribution such as ‘x means that snow is white’ makes us construe ‘that snow is white’
as a singular term referring an abstract entity such as a proposition. Given that we cannot change
the surface structure of a meaning-attribution, it may be inevitable that we appeal to a
proposition in an analysis of a meaning-attribution. That said, it isn’t inevitable that we construe
the nature of a proposition as entirely distinct from the nature of a propositional sign; i.e., a
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sentence. We may construe a proposition, as Schiffer says, as a pleonastic entity; an entity that
emerges from our use of a linguistic entity.287
This pleonastic character of a proposition is also found in Horwich’s notion of a
proposition. Speaking generally, an advocate of the use theory of meaning should admit that the
primary explanatory role in an account of meaning is played by a linguistic entity, and not by an
abstract entity such as a concept or proposition. The core idea of the use theory of meaning is
that a meaning-property is constituted by a use-property. A use-property, however, is a property
possessed by a linguistic entity, not by an abstract entity. This shouldn’t be taken as saying that
an advocate of the use theory of meaning isn’t allowed to invoke a proposition or a concept in an
analysis of a meaning-attribution. Nevertheless, it is a linguistic entity, not an abstract entity, that
plays a primary explanatory role in the use theory of meaning. Consider what Horwich says of a
concept:

[G]eneralizing, our concept of concept will be explained by the schematic principle
The concept F = that which is meant (i.e. indicated) by our word “f” and
by any word with the same meaning-constituting property.
Thus we cannot arrive at the underlying analysis of, for example, ‘x means DOG’ in the way
suggested by its superficial form—that is, by adding an analysis of the component, ‘x means
y’, to an analysis of the concept, DOG. Rather, we must first uncover the nature of meaning
properties and then arrive (by ‘subtraction’ as it were) at the character of meaning entities (i.e.
concepts).288
It isn’t that a meaning-entity exists first, and then we derive a meaning-constituting property
from the meaning-entity. The order of explanation is the opposite—we first uncover a meaning287
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constituting property—a use-property—and then derive the nature of a meaning-entity from the
nature of a use-property. A similar account should apply to the nature of a proposition; the order
of explanation is that we first uncover the use-property constituting the meaning-property ‘x
means that snow is white’, and then arrive (by subtraction) at the nature of the proposition that
snow is white. But then, if we didn’t have the concept of a use-property of a linguistic entity, we
couldn’t have the concept of a meaning-entity such as DOG or SNOW IS WHITE. So,
conceptually speaking to the least, a meaning-entity such as a concept or a proposition is a
shadow of a linguistic entity such as a word or a sentence. But then, Field has no reason to be
strongly opposed to Horwich’s invoking a meaning-entity. Both in Field’s and Horwich’s
accounts of meaning-attributions, the primary explanatory role is played by a linguistic entity,
and not by an abstract, meaning-entity.

4.3.4 A Fact of The Matter
Horwich’s and Field’s deflationist theories of meaning seem to disagree more sharply in
another aspect of their accounts—whether there is a fact of the matter in virtue of which an
ordinary meaning attribution of the form 1) or 2) is true:

1) x means <dog>.
2) x means that snow is white.

As was mentioned, Field denies that there is a fact of the matter in virtue of which a meaning
attribution of the form 1) or 2) is true; a meaning-attribution isn’t a matter of being correct or
incorrect but a matter of being better or worse. Horwich, by contrast, claims that there is a fact of
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the matter by virtue of which a meaning attribution of the form 1) or 2) is true; a meaning
attribution has a truth condition, and therefore, it is a matter of being correct or incorrect. Viewed
this way, the difference between Field’s and Horwich’s views of meaning in this respect is too
big to be reconciled. When we give a closer look at their views of meaning, however, we can
find room for reconciliation.
First, what is Field’s argument for denying that there is a fact of the matter in virtue of
which a meaning attribution is true? In Field’s linguistic view of a meaning attribution, an
ordinary meaning attribution of the form 2) above—

2) x means that snow is white.

is analyzed into 2L) in the following:

2L) x means the same as ‘Snow is white’.

So, on Field’s theory, to say that there is no fact of the matter for a meaning attribution of the
form 2) is to say that there is no fact of the matter in virtue of which 2L) is true. A statement of
the form 2L), however, states that the sentence replacing x and the sentence ‘Snow is white’ in a
meaning-attributor’s language mean the same; i.e., synonymous. Here, the sentence replacing x
may be a sentence uttered by a speaker in my own language or in a foreign language. But then,
2L) may be understood in terms of 2LP) and 2LL) in the following:

2LP) x uttered by another English speaker means the same as ‘Snow is white’.
2LL) x uttered by a speaker in a foreign language L means the same as ‘Snow is white’.
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To say that there is a fact of the matter for a statement is to say that there is an objective standard
for the truth of the statement. But then, to say that there is no fact of the matter by virtue of
which a meaning statement of the form 2) is true is to say that there is no objective standard for
interpersonal synonymy (2LP) or interlinguistic synonymy (2LL). In short, by denying that there is
a fact of the matter for a meaning attribution, Field expresses his skepticism about interpersonal
and interlinguistic synonymy.
But why is Field skeptical about interpersonal or interlinguistic synonymy? Field offers
several related arguments all of which point toward one final conclusion. To see what it is, I shall
first examine what he says about skepticism about synonymy:

The skeptic about interpersonal synonymy holds that though we of course have standards of
translation, they are a matter of being better or worse, not of right and wrong, and also are
highly context-dependent (since the purposes for which they are better or worse vary from
one context to the next); and that these features together keep them from generating any
useful notion of synonymy.289
Let’s consider a claim about interlinguistic synonymy; namely, a claim involving a translation of
an expression in a foreign language into an expression in our own language. In order to do so, we
have to compare their meaning-characteristics; i.e., inferential/conceptual roles and indication
relations. In this sense, Field says that we have standards of translation; for example, translating
‘Comment ça va?’ into ‘You have just passed your French exam’ grossly violates any reasonable
standard of good translation, because the meaning-characteristics of these sentence-types are
vastly different.290 But then, why does Field deny that there is an objective standard of
translation? He offers two related reasons in the passage quoted above; the first is that one and
289
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the same expression in a foreign language can be translated into two different expressions in my
own language, where none of them can reasonably be said to be “wrong”.291 In such cases, there
is no way of determining which translation is “the correct” one—both of them meet minimal
objective standards, but beyond that it is a matter of personal taste or preference. Some may say
that this is better, and others may say the other is better; but there is no objective standard that
can determine who is right. In this sense, Field claims that the standards of translation are a
matter of being better or worse, not of right or wrong. Another, related, reason is that translation
or interpretation is context- and goal-relative—when we compare the meaning-characteristics of
a foreign expression with those of our own expression, we often do so relative to a certain
context and a goal (interest or purpose). But then, on Field’s view, we are to understand a
synonymy-claim such as 2LL) above along the line of 3) in the following:

3) x in a foreign language L is translated into ‘p’ in my own language relative to a context and
a goal.

To say that translation (or interpretation) is often relativized to a context and goal, however,
doesn’t necessarily show that there is no fact of the matter or objective standard for
interlinguistic synonymy. We can still talk about “the best” translation within the framework of a
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given context and goal. Being aware of this, Field gives a much stronger reason than that
translation is relative to a context and goal. He says:

I'm inclined to think that the problem isn't just that interpersonal synonymy (‘is a good
translation of’) is a highly vague notion, but that it isn't a fully factual notion at all; rather, it
is an evaluative notion. This is compatible with many claims of interpersonal synonymy
being factual relative to the goals of the translator; but not all interpersonal synonymy claims
need be factual even relative to the goals.292
According to Field, meaning-related notions—such as ‘synonymy’ and ‘is a good translation’—
are not straightforwardly factual—they are evaluative notions. So, the main reason why Field
denies that there is a fact of the matter as to a meaning-attribution is that meaning and synonymy
are not straightforwardly factual notions—they are evaluative notions.
By maintaining that synonymy and meaning are evaluative notions, however, Field
doesn’t intend to defend “radical relativism”—the view that different people have radically
different standards for a synonymy-claim and meaning-attribution. Field instead aims to defend
“moderate relativism”—the view that different people may have slightly different standards for a
synonymy-claim and meaning-attribution.293 Now, if this is Field’s idea behind his ‘no-fact-ofthe-matter’ thesis, there doesn’t seem to be an unbridgeable gap between Field’s and Horwich’s
views. To see why, l shall consider Quine’s example for the indeterminacy of translation.294
Suppose a native speaker in a remote language utters ‘Gavagai’. Suppose there are two
different translation manuals both of which are acceptable according to all available
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H. Field, “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content,” Fn. 27.
Field doesn’t explain clearly what he means by the claim that meaning and synonymy are evaluative notions. But
he offers a detailed explanation of what he means by his claim that apriority is an evaluative notion (see H. Field,
“Apriority as an Evaluative Notion,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact).
294
The discussion on Quine in the following may not be literally faithful to Quine’s own presentation of his thesis of
indeterminacy of translation. But my concern isn’t so much Quine’s thesis per se as its connection to Field’s view of
meaning.
293
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observational evidence.295 Suppose further that we don’t accept mentalism: the idea that the
meaning of an expression is determined in the mind just as a label is attached to an exhibit in a
museum.296 According to Quine, from these premises we can derive the conclusion that there is
no fact of the matter by virtue of which a statement such as 4T) in the following is correct.

4T) ‘Lo, gavagai’ is translated into ‘There is a rabbit’.

Quine’s well-known reason involves a counterfactual consideration; imagine a counterfactual
world in which people use a different translational manual, T* according to which ‘Lo, gavagai’
is translated into ‘There is an undetached rabbit-part’:

4T*) ‘Lo, gavagai’ is translated into ‘There is an undetached rabbit-part’.297

According to Quine, the difference between 4T) and 4T*) wouldn’t be manifested by
observational evidence. The reason is that if we make a compensatory adjustment in the
translation of more basic terms in native language, both 4T) and 4T*) would turn out to be equally
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There is a controversy whether Quine’s indeterminacy of translation and meaning is essentially grounded on
Skinnerian behaviorism. Quine’s own answer is that the ‘observable evidence’ isn’t limited to assent or dissent
(overt behavior). He says that it includes “any observable behaviour that one can exploit in trying to get a clue to
how to translate the language.” That’s why I use here the phrase ‘according to all available observational evidence’.
W. V. Quine, “Comment on Hintikka,” in R. B. Barrett & R. Gibson (eds.), Perspectives on Quine, Blackwelll,
Oxford, 1990. P. Raatikainen, “On How to Avoid Indeterminacy of Translation,” The Southern Journal of
Philosophy, 43, 2005.
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W. O. Quine, “Ontological Relativity,” in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University
Press, 1969.
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acceptable according to all available observational evidence.298 To be more precise, if we
construe ‘is’ in 4T*) in terms of the notion of genidentity, it would compensate for the difference
between ‘rabbit’ and ‘undetached rabbit-part’ thereby making 4T*) as equally acceptable as
4T).299 Therefore, the translation of ‘Lo, gavagai’ is indeterminate between 4T) and 4T*); there is
no fact of the matter by virtue of which either 4T) or 4T*) is correct.300
Now, let’s consider Field’s and Horwich’s responses to Quine’s example in turn. First,
Field basically agrees with Quine—we cannot say only one of 4T) or 4T*) is correct. Neither can
we say that both of them are correct.301 Rather, we should construe 4T) as being inseparably
correlated with a semantic standard involving the notion of identity, and 4T*) with a semantic
standard involving the notion of genidentity.302 So, neither 4T) nor 4T*) is straightforwardly true;
4T) is acceptable relative to the notion of identity, and 4T*) is acceptable relative to the notion of
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W. V. Quine, “Ontological Relativity,” in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University
Press, 1969.
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Quine doesn’t specifically uses the term ‘genidentituy’, but it is obvious that what he means by a ‘compensatory
adjustment’ is an adjustment of this kind; that whatever difference between translation the native’s sentence into
‘There is a rabbit’ and ‘There is an undetached rabbit-part’ is compensated for by a difference at a more deeper level
(by correlating ‘undetached rabbit part’ with genidentity). Field calls this ‘correlative indeterminacy’ (H. Field, “A
Reply to Anil Gupta and Jose Martinez-Fernandez,” Philosophical Studies, 124, 2005, pp. 105-128). The notion of
‘genidentity’ is introduced by Kurt Lewin, and it means here the identity-relation between two states of the same
object. Blackwell Reference Online.
300
Quine says that the indeterminacy of translation of this kind cuts across both extension and intension—both
meaning and reference are rendered indeterminate or inscrutable. W. V. Quine, ibid.
301
Field proposed the partial-reference solution to Quine’s indeterminacy (inscrutability) of reference. It isn’t clear,
however, this solution can be extended to solve the problem of indeterminacy of meaning. Even if it can, it doesn’t
support the conclusion that both 4T) and 4T*) are correct. Instead, it may support that ‘Lo, Gavagai’ partially means
that there is a rabbit, and it partially means that there is an undetached rabbit-part. See H. Field, “Quine and the
Correspondence Theory,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact.
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Field says,
[T]he basic indeterminacy is in the identity predicate, and that (putting aside ordinary vagueness) predicates like
‘rabbit’ get a fixed extension relative to the interpretation of identity. (For example, its extension is the set of
rabbits relative to identity and the set of time-slices of rabbits relative to genidentity.) (H. Field, “A Reply to Anil
Gupta and Jose Martinez-Fernandez,” Philosophical Studies, 124, 2005, pp. 105-128.)
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genidentity.303 This view is consistent with Field’s moderate relativism—different people can
have slightly different standards, and there is sometimes no way of telling who is right in an
entirely objective sense. We prefer 4T) to 4T*), but we do so because 4T) meets our semantic
standard, which is different from saying that our semantic standard is “correct” in an entirely
objective sense. This shouldn’t be taken as saying that our choice of 4T) is entirely arbitrary—
that isn’t supported by any objective evidence. As was stated earlier, Field’s view isn’t that any
translation will do; an acceptable translation should preserve the meaning-characteristics. For
example, translating ‘Lo, gavagai’ into ‘There is an apple’ isn’t acceptable, because their
meaning-characteristics are too dissimilar. Field doesn’t think, however, that a translation and
meaning-attribution can fully be explained by evidence pertaining to meaning-characteristics.
Just as Quine says, we cannot choose one of meaning-attributions between 5) and 5*)

5) ‘Lo, gavagai’ means that there is a rabbit.
5*) ‘Lo, gavagai’ means that there is an undetached rabbit-part.

as the correct one because if we made an adjustment at a more fundamental level, both 5) and 5*)
would be acceptable. 5) is acceptable relative to the background assumption that ‘is’ is construed
as identity, whereas 5*) is acceptable relative to the background assumption that ‘is’ is construed
as genidentity. Surely, we choose 5), but that doesn’t show that 5) is correct. It only shows that
meaning isn’t a straightforwardly factual notion; it shows that meaning is an evaluative notion.
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This is what Field says about nonfactualism about a moral sentence. Field says, “The factualist/nonfactualist
debate about evaluatives, then, is the debate about whether evaluatives are straightforwardly true.” See H. Field,
“Disquotationalism and Factually Defective Discourse,” in his Truth and the Absence of Fact, p. 436.
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Unlike Field, Horwich responds negatively to Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy of
translation. In the section called ‘Quelling Quine’s Qualms’ in his book Meaning, Horwich
offers a detailed criticism of Quine’s arguments for the thesis.304 I will here discuss only parts of
Horwich’s argument against Quine’s indeterminacy of translation.
First, Horwich argues that even if there are nonequivalent multiple translations all of
which are acceptable on observational grounds, from this meaning skepticism that Quine intends
to establish doesn’t follow.305 What Horwich means by ‘meaning skepticism’ is the idea that no
word means anything. According to Horwich, in order for this radical view to follow from the
indeterminacy of translation, the thesis (M) in the following has to be assumed:

(M) If a word has a meaning then an adequate translation of that word must have the same
meaning.306

But the thesis (M) isn’t true; it subscribes to the implausible verificationist view.307 Therefore,
meaning-skepticism doesn’t follow from Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy of translation.
Horwich’s view of (M) seems right—as Horwich says, (M) can easily be refuted by the
plausible anti-verificationist view that being true (or correct) should be distinguished from being
justified.308 That is to say, although multiple translations are all justified on empirical grounds, it
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P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999, Ch. 9. The following discussion on Horwich’s criticism of
Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy of translation is all based on Ch. 9 of Horwich’s Meaning.
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As will be discussed shortly, Horwich raises an objection to the narrowness of Quine’s notion of observational
evidence. Here, for the argument’s sake, that objection is put aside.
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P. Horwich, Meaning, p. 199.
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See P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999, p. 199.
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There is a debate, however, whether Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy of translation rests upon verificationism.
See P. Raatikainen’s “Is Quine a Verificationist?” The Southern Journal of Philsophy, 41, 2003, pp. 399-409. As
Raatikainen states, the dispute seems to be concerned with how the notion of verification is to be understood. If the
notion of verification is construed broadly, the verification theory of meaning amounts to nothing but the empiricist
theory of meaning. That is to say, by defending the verification theory of meaning, Quine might have defended the
empiricist approach—as opposed to the mentalist approach—to an explication of meaning. If so, Quine’s approach
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is still possible that only of them is correct.309 Therefore, Quine’s meaning skepticism doesn’t
follow from his thesis of indeterminacy of translation. Now, given that Horwich’s criticism of
Quine’s meaning skepticism is correct, how can this be balanced with Field’s moderate
relativism? According to Field’s moderate relativism, there is no fact of the matter as to the truth
of a meaning attribution; a meaning attribution isn’t a matter of being correct or incorrect, but a
matter of being better or worse. But then, isn’t Field’s view of meaning committed to meaning
skepticism?
The answer seem ‘no’.310 Field distinguishes two kinds of skepticism; skepticism being
defined as the view that we should abstain from making all meaning-related claims, and
skepticism being defined as the view that there is no fact of the matter by virtue of which a
meaning attribution is true.311 Field says that skepticism of the first kind is idiotic—it is foolish
to say that no word means anything or we are barred from making a meaning-related claim.312
Indeed, a main virtue of evaluativism about meaning is that it enables us to avoid skepticism of
this radical type; it is intended to render our meaning talk legitimate. On the other hand,
to meaning isn’t substantially different from Horwich’s. Horwich seems to agree with this point. See P. Horwich,
Meaning, Ch. 9.
309
Horwich says,

[O]ne might distinguish between determinate truth, which requires decidability on the basis of underlying facts,
and truth simpliciter, which does not. . . And in this way one would be able to hang on to meanings as those
entities that are preserved in correct (not merely adequate, and not necessarily determinate). P. Horwich,
Meaning, p. 199.
310

Field doesn’t discuss skepticism about meaning directly. But he discusses skepticism about epistemology; in
particular, epistemological properties such as default reasonableness. Field’s view of epistemological properties is
similar to his view of semantic properties (such as meaning and synonymy)—he argues that epistemological
properties don’t reduce to either natural or non-natural properties. So, on Field’s view, reasonableness doesn’t
consist in anything; it is not a factual property but an evaluative property. I extrapolated Field’s view of
epistemological properties to semantic properties. See H. Field, “Apriority as an Evaluative Notion,” in his Truth
and the Absence of Fact.
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evaluativism about meaning denies that there is a fact of the matter as to a meaning-attribution.
For this reason one might think that Field’s view of meaning embraces skepticism of the second
type to the least. But Field also objects to this idea—he says that it is a totally “perverse”
definition of skepticism.313 It is perverse because unless one assumes the factualist view of
meaning, one couldn’t derive skepticism from the absence of a fact of the matter about a
meaning attribution. From the perspective of an evaluativist, it is only the nature of meaning that
it doesn’t have a fact of the matter corresponding to a meaning-related statement. So, on Field’s
view, semantic evaluativism shouldn’t be considered advocating skepticism; to the contrary, it
should be considered a solution to get out of meaning skepticism.314
I brought up Quine’s thesis indeterminacy of translation in order to find a commonality
between Field’s and Horwich’s views of a fact of the matter by examining their responses to
Quine’s thesis. One commonality found is that neither of them takes Quine’s thesis to support
meaning skepticism. Although this is an important commonality, it isn’t enough to show that
their views don’t conflict with each other. The problem is that although they both reject deriving
skeptical conclusion from Quine’s theis, they seem to do so on different grounds. Field’s reason,
as was just explained, is that meaning isn’t a straightforwardly factual notion; it is an evaluative
notion. On the other hand, Horwich’s reason is that Quine’s thesis doesn’t show that there is no
313

As I stated above, this isn’t what Field states explicitly; I derived this view from Field’s discussion of
epistemological properties. But I am quite confident that this is what Field would have said about his evaluativism
about meaning. See H. Field, ibid.
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Field says,
Indeed, a main virtue of evaluativism is that it removes the force of most skeptical arguments. Most skeptical
arguments depend on assuming that reasonableness is a factual property of beliefs or of rules, and on the
understandable resistance to stripping away the normative nature of reasonableness by identifying it with a
natural property like reliability (for rules; or being arrived at by reliable rules, for beliefs)

H. Field, “Apriority as an Evaluative Notion,” p. 387.
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fact of the matter as to a meaning attribution. Even if Quine’s right in claiming that two nonequivalent translation manuals are justified on empirical grounds, from this we cannot infer that
none of them is “correct”.315 So, one big difference between Horwich and Field seems that
whereas Field takes meaning to be an evaluative notion, Horwich doesn’t—he seems to take it to
be a straightforwardly factual notion.
I doubt, however, this is correct; I will argue that the notion of meaning in Horwich’s
account isn’t straightforwardly factual, either. A caveat is needed here; Horwich has never
expressed his view on this issue explicitly, so what I will argue in the following is my
interpretation of Horwich’s view of meaning.
Horwich’s view of a meaning attribution is subtler and more complicated than it appears
to be. Its subtlety and complexity are well captured by what Gupta says of Horwich’s use theory
of meaning. Gupta says,

Horwich's theory is unlike any other use theory of meaning in the philosophical literature.
Whereas the other use theories aim to explain meaning in terms of some aspect of use (e.g.,
inferential or conceptual role), Horwich aims to explain not meaning but meaning properties,
properties such as "x means RED in English," "x means AND in Paul's language," etc.
Horwich is not concerned to reduce meaning to use.316
Although what Gupta says here is important in understanding Horwich’s deflationist view of
meaning, he doesn’t elaborate what he means by the distinction—the distinction between saying
that meaning properties are reduced to use-properties and saying that meaning itself is reduced to
a use-property.317 I will here attempt to provide an explanation of the distinction as follows.
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The distinction has to do with the complexity involved in Horwich’s reductionist theory
of meaning properties. As was explained earlier Horwich denies that the use-property of an
expression strongly determines (DETERMINES) its truth-theoretic properties; namely, he denies
that we can derive 7) from 6) in the following:

6) A predicate x has the use-property U(x).
7) x is true all and only of dogs.318

Neither can we derive 9) from 8):

8) A sentence x has the use-property U1(x).
9) x has the truth-condition that snow is white.

On the other hand, Horwich claims that the use-property of an expression weakly determines
(determines) its truth-theoretic properties—if two expressions are synonymous, they have the
However, as we saw in Chapter 2 (section 2) and Chapter 3 (response to Objection 4), the expectation that one
will be able to read off (and hence to explain) which particular meaning is engendered by a given meaningconstituting property is misguided. It has its origin in the Constitution Fallacy —the assumption that constituent
structure is preserved under reductive analysis. (P. Horwich, Meaning, p. 220.)
Horwich makes the same point over and over again throughout his book Meaning. But he doesn’t say explicitly that
he distinguishes the notion of meaning from the notion of meaning-constituting properties (meaning properties). I
think he should have had—that would have made it much easier to understand his deflationist theory of meaning. In
a sense, I can understand why he didn’t do so—one of his deflationist theses of meaning is that the notion of
meaning, when it is properly understood by his deflationary account, is no different from the notion of meaningproperties. That is to say, Horwich’s point is that we’d better understand ‘x means <dog>’ in terms of ‘x means DOG’.
Nevertheless, to say this is different from saying that ‘x means <dog>’ is reduced to ‘x means DOG’. To say the latter
isn’t consistent with his claim that the meaning-properties of a predicate don’t strongly determine its extension or
the claim that we cannot read off which particular meaning is engendered by a given meaning-constituting property.
This is the reason why I say that Horwich’s deflationist theory of meaning has subtleties.
318
As was just pointed out, Horwich denies that we can read off which particular meaning is engendered by a given
meaning-constituting property. A meaning-constituting property is a use-property. Therefore, we are not supposed to
read off 7) from 6).
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same truth-theoretic property.319 In Horwich’s view, two expressions are synonymous if and only
if they have the same use-properties. So, on this view, if two names have the same use-property,
they are co-referential; if two predicates have the same use-property, they are co-extensional; and
if two sentences are associated the same use-properties, they have the same truth condition. But
these truth-theoretic properties are not themselves reduced to the use-properties of expressions.
For example, the property of being true of all and only dogs in 7) isn’t reducible to U(x) in 6);
the property of having the truth condition that snow is white in 9) in isn’t identified with U1(x) in
8).
Now, consider conditionals of the forms 10) and 11) in the following:

10) x means <dog> → x is true of all and only dogs.
11) x means that snow is white → x has the truth condition that snow is white.

Both 10) and 11) are conceptual truths; they are trivially true in the sense that anyone who has
mastered English would accept 10) and 11).320 On Horwich’s account, however, the antecedents
of 10) and 11) are not reducible to use-properties. For if ‘x means <dog>’ or ‘x means that snow is
white’ were reducible to use-properties, then we should be able to read off truth-theoretic
properties such as ‘x is true of all and only dogs’ or ‘x has the truth condition that snow is white’
from the use-properties of x alone. Given that we accept 10) and 11) as conceptual truths, if the
319

This is one of the subtleties that make it hard to understand Horwich’s view of meaning at first glance. It is like
saying that although we cannot read off which particular disease someone has from his symptom, if two people have
exactly the same symptom, they must have the same disease. This statement makes perfect sense, but the question is
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properties of an expression from its use-properties. To think so is to assume that truth is a naturalistic property. It
isn’t, however, from a deflationary point of view. Therefore, it is committing a category mistake to expect that we
should be able to read off the meaning and truth-theoretic properties of an expression from its use-properties.
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Horwich accepts the triviality of these meaning-to-truth conditionals. See P. Horwich, Meaning, p. 7.
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antecedents of 10) and 11) were reducible to use-properties such as 6) and 8) above, we should
be able to read off the consequents of 10) and 11) from the use-properties 6) and 8). As was
pointed out above, however, Horwich denies that we can do so—we cannot read off the truththeoretic properties 7) and 9) from use-properties 6) and 8).
The conclusion that we can draw from this is that in Horwich’s account ordinary
meaning-attributions of the forms

x means <dog>
x means that snow is white

are not reducible to use-theoretic statements of the forms 6) and 8) above—‘A predicate x has the
use-property U(x)’ and ‘A sentence x has the use-property U1(x).’ Indeed, Horwich himself
makes this point clear; he says,

And finally there is Kripke, whose argument against the naturalistic reduction of
Meaning-facts is based implicitly on the Strong Relationality Constraint. He assumes
that in order for some property of a word to constitute its meaning, it would have
to be possible to, as he puts it, read off from that property exactly which meaning it
constitutes. And this ‘reading off’ requirement is tantamount to the view that a reductive
theory of meaning properties would have to have the form: x means F = T(x, f).321
Here, Horwich says that in order to read off the meaning of an expression from its use-properties,
we need a principle such as ‘x means F = T(x, f).’ To read off the meaning of an expression
amounts to reading off its truth-theoretic properties from its use-properties. If we can read off the
meaning of an expression from its use-properties, then, via meaning-to-truth conditionals such as
10) and 11) above, we should be able to read off the truth-theoretic properties of an expression
321
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from its use-properties. To do so, we need an inflationary principle such as ‘x means F = T(x, f).’
A theory of meaning, however, needs this principle only when it assumes an inflationary
conception of truth. Since Horwich has already freed a theory of meaning from an inflationary
conception of truth, his theory of meaning isn’t required to show how we can read off the
meaning or truth-theoretic properties of an expression from its use-property. So, in Horwich’s
theory of meaning, meaning-attributions of the forms ‘x means <dog>’ and ‘x means that snow is
white’ are not reducible to facts about use-properties.
The reason why I don’t think the notion of meaning in Horwich’s account is
straightforwardly factual has to do with this feature of his theory—that ordinary meaningattributions (e.g. ‘x means <dog> and ‘x means that snow is white’) are not reducible to facts
about use-properties. As Gupta says above, Horwich’s use theory doesn’t aim to reduce meaning
to use; it is only concerned with reducing meaning-properties such as ‘x means DOG ’ and ‘x
means SNOW IS WHITE’ to use-properties. The difference between meaning and meaningproperties is that whereas meaning is an intrinsically truth-theoretic property, meaning-properties
are not. As is indicated by 10) and 11) above, we can derive, without an auxiliary hypothesis, ‘x
is true all and only of dogs’ and ‘x has the truth condition that snow is white’ from ‘x means
<

dog>’ and ‘x means that snow is white.’ We cannot derive, however, ‘x is true all and only of

dogs’ and ‘x has the truth condition that snow is white’ directly from ‘x means DOG’ and ‘x
means SNOW IS WHITE’. For this reason, the epistemological status of 12) and 13) seems to be
different from that of 10) and 11):

12) x means DOG → x is true all and only of dogs.
13) x means SNOW IS WHITE → x is true iff snow is white.
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Horwich says that his use theory of meaning involves a series of reductive analyses such as



x means DOG = U(x)



x means ELECTRON = V(x)



. . . and so on.322

Given that meaning-properties are reduced to use-properties in the way above, if we could derive
truth-theoretic properties directly from meaning-properties, we should be able to read off truththeoretic properties from use-properties. As was discussed above, however, this is denied in
Horwich’s deflationary theory of meaning. Therefore, the consequents of 12) and 13) cannot be
derived directly from their antecedents—we need some auxiliary hypothesis such as 14) and 15):

14) ‘dog’ is true all and only of dogs.
15) ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white.

Horwich says that although we cannot read off the meaning or truth-theoretic property from a
use-property, if two expressions have the same use-property, they should have the same meaning
and truth-theoretic property. In Horwich’s theory, the concept, DOG is by definition the
meaning-property of the English word ‘dog’; and the concept, SNOW IS WHITE is the
meaning-property of the English sentence ‘Snow is white.’ 14) and 15) are trivially true in a
deflationary theory of truth; they are instances of the disquotational schemas. So, unlike 10) and
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11), 12) and 13) can be made sense of only when they are supplemented with auxiliary
hypotheses such as 14) and 15).
To summarize, in Horwich’s account, meaning is an intrinsically truth-theoretic, but not
straightforwardly factual notion—the meaning of an expression cannot be reduced to a useproperty. A meaning-property, however, isn’t an intrinsically truth-theoretic, but is
straightforwardly factual notion—it is reduced to a use-property. Such a discrepancy between the
ordinary notion of meaning and a meaning-property is also found in Field’s theory of meaning.
Although Field doesn’t take meaning and synonymy to be straightforwardly factual notions, he
takes a meaning-characteristic to be a straightforwardly factual notion. It is a straightforwardly
factual matter whether an expression has a certain meaning-characteristic. It isn’t, however, a
straightforwardly factual matter which meaning we are to ascribe to an expression on the basis of
its meaning-characteristics. Neither Horwich nor Field, however, considers the irreducibility of
meaning an obstacle in the way of developing an adequate theory of meaning. Given that the
ordinary notion of meaning is intrinsically truth-theoretic, the irreducibility of meaning to a
factual notion would engender a problem only if truth-theoretic properties were to play important
roles in an account of meaning and content. The whole point of deflationism about meaning and
truth is to deny it. But then, the irreducibility of meaning to a straightforwardly factual property
isn’t a problem at all.

4.4 Field’s Response to The Success Argument: A Different Version

In this section, I will discuss Field’s response to the success argument against a
deflationary theory of truth—the criticism that a deflationist cannot accommodate the role of

230

truth in an account of the success of behavior. I discussed Horwich’s response to the success
argument in Ch. 3. Field’s response to the success argument, however, is a little different from
Horwich’s—whereas Horwich’s response is focused on explaining the role of truth in a successexplanation, Field’s is focused on explaining the role of truth conditions. To be more precise,
Horwich responds to the success argument by showing that the role of truth in a successexplanation of the form 1) below can be explained within the framework of a deflationary theory:

1) X succeeds in achieving his desire because, among other things, he believes that p, and
his belief is true.
The role of truth in 1) is simply that it enables us to infer 2):

2) X succeeds in achieving his desire because, among other things, he believes that p, and p.

In order to explain how 1) entails 2), we need to assume nothing more or nothing less than the
equivalence schema (E) (<P> is true iff P). To be sure, Horwich’s point isn’t that the notion of
truth is redundant in a success-explanation—it serves the generalization function.323 A
deflationist recognizes this function, but she argues that the generalization function can also be
fully accommodated by what is implied by the equivalence schema.
Field’s concern with the success argument, in a nutshell, is whether a deflationist can
explain the role of truth conditions in a similar way—that the truth conditions of an agent’s
belief play only an expressive or logical function in an account of the success of an agent’s
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We appeal to the notion of truth as a device of generalizations over beliefs when we cannot articulate an agent’s
belief. For example, we may say ‘Warren Bennett succeeds in making money because most of his beliefs about the
stock market are true.’ Here, the notion of truth cannot be eliminated because we don’t know what Warren Bennett
believes.
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behavior. If a deflationist can show this, she can also show that no inflationary theory of truth
conditions is needed—the role of truth conditions in a success-explanation can fully be explained
by assuming nothing more or nothing less than the disquotational schema (DS): ‘p’ is true iff p.
How can a deflationist show that truth conditions play only an expressive role in an
account of the success of behavior? This is not an easy task, since in order to show this, a
deflationist needs to replace an ordinary success-explanation of the form 2) with an explanation
that doesn’t invoke ‘that’-clauses. As Field says, to say that an agent believes that p is to say that
he is in a belief-state that has the truth condition that p. Suppose we explain the success of a
pilot’s behavior in the way below:

3) A pilot manages to land a plane safely with regularity because she slows down her plane
when she believes that the airspeed is too high, and her belief is true.

In the explanation 3), the truth condition of the pilot’s belief plays an important role, since it
characterizes her belief by invoking a ‘that’-clause—i.e., that the airspeed is too high. To say
that she believes that the airspeed is too high is to say that her belief is true if and only if the
airspeed is too high. So, according to 3), the truth-conditional content of the pilot’s belief plays
an important role in an account of the success of her behavior. The truth-conditional content of
the pilot’s belief is its representational content—to say that the pilot’s belief has the truth
condition that the airspeed is too high is to say that it represents the external condition that the
airspeed is too high.324 Field’s concern is whether a deflationist can recognize the explanatory
role of the truth-conditional or representational content of a belief. Field says,
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Presumably, the truth-conditional content of a belief-state isn’t always equivalent to its representational content.
In this example, though, it is.
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A detailed explanation of how the pilot functions would involve the existence of some class
C of internal representations, intuitively representing airspeed, such that when she believes a
representation in C that represents too high an airspeed she slows the plane and when she
believes one that represents too low a speed she speeds it up; and the representations in C
that she believes tend to be true. The last part can of course be rephrased as a generalization:
she tends to believe a representation in C that represents too low a speed when the plane is in
fact too slow, etc. But is this restatement of the claim that she has true beliefs about airspeed
‘innocent’ from the deflationist viewpoint? What may well seem a problem is that it is put in
terms of what the pilot's internal representations ‘represent’.325

To make a long story short, Field’s answer is that a deflationist cannot recognize the explanatory
role of truth-conditional or representational content in a success-explanation. A deflationist can
recognize an expressive or logical function served by the truth-conditional or representational
content of a belief-state, but she cannot recognize a role that goes beyond that. But then, in order
to show that the role of truth-conditional or representational content is exhausted by its
expressive or logical function, a deflationist needs to replace a success-explanation such as 3)
with an explanation that doesn’t explicitly invoke truth-conditional or representational content.
This in turn implies that a success-explanation such as 3) should be replaced with an explanation
that doesn’t invoke ‘that’-clauses in the characterization of beliefs. Thus, Field suggests that we
replace the success-explanation with one that goes as follows:

An obvious strategy for responding to this argument is to say that talk of representation is
serving a merely heuristic role in the explanation of the pilot’s ability; put without the
heuristic, the explanation involves the existence of some class C of internal representations in
the pilot and two subcalsses C1 and C2 of C such that (i) when she believes a representation
in C1 she slows the plane and when she believes one in C2 she speeds it up, (ii) there is a 1-1
function f from C to a certain set of real numbers such that (a) C1 is that subclass of C that is
mapped into numbers above a certain threshold and C2 is that subclass of C that is mapped
325
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into numbers below a certain (slightly lower) threshold, and (b) she tends to believe a
representation r in C when the airspeed in knots is approximately f(r).326

What Field suggests here is that we consider the truth-conditional or representational
characterization of a belief as serving only a “heuristic role”—that is, we characterize a beliefstate by invoking a ‘that’-clause (e.g. ‘believes that the airspeed is too high’) only when we don’t
have detailed knowledge of an agent’s computational psychology. When we do, we replace the
truth-conditional or representational characterization of a belief-state with a purely
computational characterization of the pilot’s internal representations.327 A purely computational
characterization of a belief invokes only the computational roles (causal-inferential roles) and
indication relations of an agent’s internal representations. In order to explain the success of the
pilot’s behavior only by invoking the computational roles and indication relations of the pilot’s
internal representations, we first identify the class C of her internal representations in terms of
their computational roles. The class C has two subclasses C1 and C2 which are defined as follows:
when the pilot believes an internal representation belonging to the subclass C1, she slows down
her plane, and when she believes an internal representation belonging to the subclass C2, she
speeds up her plane. Second, we identify the class C of the pilot’s internal representations in
terms of their indication relations. The internal representations belonging to the subclass C1
indicate airspeeds above a certain threshold, and those belonging to the subclass C2 indicate
airspeeds below a certain threshold.
Once we identify the computational roles and indication relations of the pilot’s internal
representations, we explain the success of her behavior by invoking the internal representations.
326
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That is to say, the pilot succeeds in landing her plane safely because she slows down her plane
when she believes an internal representation belonging to the subclass C1; and she speeds up her
plane when she believes an internal representation belonging to the subclass C2. Unlike the
intentional (truth-theoretic) explanation 3) above, this explanation doesn’t invoke a ‘that’-clause
in characterizing the pilot’s belief-state. Instead of saying that the pilot succeeds because she
believes that the airspeed is too high when she slows down her plane, we say that she succeeds
because she believes an internal representation that belongs to the subclass C1. As a result, we
avoid invoking the truth-conditional or representational content of the pilot’s belief-state in an
account of the success of her behavior.
Basically, what Field tries to show is that a deflationist can replace an intentional
explanation with a non-intentional explanation just in the same way Horwich replaces an
explanation of the form 1) with an explanation of the form 2). By doing so, Horwich shows that
the role played by truth in a success-explanation can be accommodated by a deflationary theory
of truth. In the same way, Field tries to show that the role played by a truth-condition in a
success-explanation can be accommodated by a deflationary theory. Surely, we cannot always
replace a success-explanation invoking the notions of truth and truth-conditions with the one that
doesn’t. When we don’t have detailed knowledge of an agent’s computational psychology, we
cannot replace an intentional explanation such as 3) with a non-intentional explanation. Even
when we have detailed knowledge of an agent’s computational psychology, we still need an
intentional explanation because of its convenience—it is simply too inconvenient to give a
computational explanation of an agent’s behavior in everyday life. So, we cannot eliminate an
intentional explanation—we cannot entirely avoid truth-conditional characterizations of belief or
desire-states. When we invoke them, however, we use them as a merely heuristic device. Just as
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we invoke the notion of truth when we cannot or don’t want to articulate a proposition or
sentence, we invoke truth-conditions when we cannot or don’t want to give a computational
explanation of an agent’s behavior.328
So, Field’s deflationist view of truth conditions doesn’t advocate an eliminativist view of
truth conditions or truth-conditional content. It only advocates a deflationist or minimalist view
of the role of truth-conditional content. In his review of Field’s Truth and the Absence of Fact,
Loewer says:

The most serious challenges for the deflationist program rather come from issues concerning
explanation. Can psychological explanations be understood or reconstructed or replaced
without loss by explanations in which the only semantic notions that figure are D-notions? . . .
it is not at all obvious that there would be a way of picking out the relevant class of
computational roles without appealing to R-reference and R-truth conditions.329
Loewer is right here—we need to invoke intentional (truth-conditional) content in order to pick
out relevant class of computational roles and indication relations of internal representations. In
the pilot example above, we appeal to the truth-conditional content of the pilot’s belief in order
to pick out the relevant class of internal representations—namely, we appeal to the ‘that’-clause
characterization ‘The pilot believes that the airspeed is too high when she slows down her plane.’
This doesn’t show, however, that the truth-conditional content of the pilot’s belief plays an
“explanatory role” in an account of the success of her behavior. The success of her behavior is
exhaustively explained by the computational roles and indication relations of her internal
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representations. There is simply no room for truth-conditional content to play an additional
explanatory role. The only way to argue for the explanatory role of truth-conditional content is to
give a reductive or quasi-reductive account of truth-conditional content—an account that
systematically connects the truth-conditional content of a belief- or desire-state with the
computational roles and indication relations of internal representations.330 Field is skeptical about
the prospect of such an account, which I think has to do with his conversion to deflationism in
the first place. This is not the right place, however, to discuss this issue. Assuming that a
reductive or quasi-reductive account of intentional content isn’t likely to be forthcoming, Field’s
non-eliminative and deflationist view of truth conditional content seems to have plausibility. It
recognizes the important role played by the concepts of intentionality (e.g., the concepts of truthconditions, representational content, etc.). In doing so, however, it doesn’t inflate these
concepts—their roles are purely heuristic or expressive. So, we have arrived at an all-around
deflationist view of truth-theoretic concepts—they are purely expressive devices.
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